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Chapter 1
Motivation and Overview
“The production of wealth is the result of agreement between labor and capital,
between employer and employed. Its distribution, therefore, will follow the law
of its creation, or great injustice will be done.”
Leland Stanford (1824-1893) – founder of Stanford University
1.1 The role of labor in sustainable development
1.1.1 On the emergence of sustainable development
The field of development economics is not limited to the analysis of economic growth in
the developing world, as one might initially believe. The narrow perception of development
as purely economic development – with the growth of gross domestic product (GDP) as
ultimate goal – was widely abandoned in the 1980s and 1990s when it was replaced by the
broader concept of human development (Todaro and Smith, 2009).1 Especially thanks to the
work of the philosopher and economist Amartya Sen, income was no longer seen as an end
1The division of the world into ’developed countries’ and ’developing countries’ can be criticized for the
hierarchy it implies between ’advanced’ and ’backward’ countries, as argued by the post-development school
(for example, Escobar, 2000, Sachs, 1992 and Ziai, 2012). Similarly, this school questions the concept of
’development’ as a whole since it aims at a form of development that is universal and usually exclusively
based on western ideas of industrialization (e.g. consumerism). In this dissertation, I stick to the terms
’development’ and ’developing countries’ as they are common concepts in development economics and since
their perception also has broadened among development economists in the last decades. However, I would
like to emphasize that I interpret ’development’ as a transformation process that involves a pluralism of ideas
and that I use the country classification ’developing country’ to be able to clearly define the study area of this
work (and not to indicate any order of countries). An alternative term in this context is ’Global South’, which
is, however, rarely used in the field of development economics.
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in itself but as a means of expanding people’s choices (UNDP, 1997). Poverty alleviation
and aspects such as health, education and political freedom and hence the multidimensional
nature of development were increasingly acknowledged. In 2000, the international commu-
nity adopted the by then broadest program for human development, the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals (MDGs). 189 member countries of the United Nations agreed to implement
eight goals to fight poverty in its various facets, including eradicating extreme poverty and
hunger, achieving universal education and reducing child mortality by 2015 (UN, 2016).
These ambitious goals were not fully achieved, one reason being that the program left aside
the issue of inequality (UN, 2015); Vandemoortele (2011) therefore even speaks of “Mind-
ing Development Gaps” (p.1).
In fact, high inequality threatens the social inclusiveness of education and health pro-
grams and aggravates the fight against poverty since economic growth is not specifically
targeted at the poor. Furthermore, distributional impacts of development policies have to be
understood to assess their impact on the poor (Ravallion, 2001). But inequality in incomes
– and even more so in wealth – is immense, especially in poor countries (see figure 1.1),
thus threatening human development. In the last three decades, and over the MDG period,
income inequality has increased within most countries, not only in high income regions, but
also across the developing world (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2015, Dabla-Norris, 2015,
Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007, Milanovic, 2015, UNDP, 2013, WB, 2016d). As a result of
these trends, especially global interpersonal inequality – i.e. inequality between individu-
als worldwide – is still very high and on similar levels with the most unequal societies in
the world such as Brazil (Milanovic, 2012). Equivalently, the gaps in terms of health, ed-
ucation and nourishment remain large in many countries (Klasen, 2016, UN, 2015). Many
economies achieved progress in human development on average but were at the same time
confronted with persistent or even increasing disparities (UNDP, 2013). These inequities,
however, were not captured by the MDGs that only measured global and national averages
(van Bergeijk and van der Hoeven, 2017, Melamed, 2012).
Until the 2000s, the distribution of income has been left largely unattended by the eco-
nomic discipline, including many development economists. But the persistence of poverty
in many developing countries and indications of historically high levels of inequality, for
example that “the top decile owns[ed] 71 % of global wealth” (Davies et al., 2011, p. 223),
continues to draw the interest of social scientists. Since the late 2000s, questions of inequal-
ity are increasingly placed on the international research agenda. It has become clear that
to achieve the goals of human development, such as improved health and access to edu-
cation, distributional patterns need to change. Most importantly, fighting poverty through
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Figure 1.1: Gini index of national income distribution around the world
Note: The Gini index measures the statistical dispersion of a country’s income distribution and ranges between
0 (perfect equality) and 100 % (perfect inequality).
Source: UNU-WIDER 2017.
economic growth can hardly be achieved when income inequality remains at such high lev-
els (van Bergeijk and van der Hoeven, 2017, Lübker, 2002).2
In order to respond to the challenges and limitations of the MDGs, inequality played
an increasing role when the international community negotiated the follow-up development
agenda, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which was adopted by 193 UN
member states in 2015. Amongst the set of 17 goals – the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) – is also goal 10, which calls for “reduced inequalities – reduce inequalities within
and among countries” (UNSD, 2016).
The SDGs are much more comprehensive than the MDGs and based on the concept of
sustainable development (UNCTAD, 2014). Sustainable development combines the goals of
economic development, social inclusion and environmental sustainability (see figure 1.2).
It hence incorporates human development but has an additional focus of eliminating in-
equalities and further emphasizes environmental impacts, which the expansion of human
development might entail, demanding that natural, man-made and human capital should be
2For example, Lübker (2002) calculated that “if countries had managed to maintain the most favorable
income distributions of the past three to five decades, this would have reduced the number of people living on
less than a Dollar per day from the present figure [1998] of 1.2 billion to 900 million” (p. 22).
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sustained for current and future generations (Sachs, 2015).3 In contrast to the MDGs, the
SDGs therefore also encompass several goals on sustainable consumption and production
as well as on environmental conservation.
The more comprehensive approach of sustainable development provides further reason
to reduce income disparities – apart from contributing to the fight against poverty. The last
decades were not only characterized by high inequalities but also by human-induced climate
change, environmental degradation (such as the loss of biodiversity) and resource pressure,
threatening the livelihood of societies worldwide (IPCC, 2007). Inequality in incomes usu-
ally entails inequality in resource use, on the global level as well as within developing
countries (Seyfang and Paavola, 2008). Although the same size of an economy can have
varying degrees of environmental impact, a larger economy in monetary terms also tends to
have a larger material basis (Behrens et al., 2007, Jakob et al., 2014, Ravallion et al., 2000).
To achieve sustainable development, a major challenge for the international community
therefore is to increase the incomes of the poor while at the same time mitigating environ-
mental degradation. Against this background and from a climate justice4 point of view, it
is necessary to not only promote low-material growth but also to make economic growth
pro-poor. If mankind wishes to successfully combat poverty within planetary boundaries,
(limited) natural resources need to be distributed more fairly and the use of natural sinks,
such as forests, for waste disposal and emissions more balanced (Sachs and Someshwar,
2012, Steffen et al., 2015).
1.1.2 The concept of the labor share
Employment and the quality of employment – decent work – plays a significant role in
the promotion of sustainable development. Productive and remunerative work is the main
route out of poverty and the creation of decent employment is vitally important to make
growth pro-poor (OECD, 2009, WB, 2013). The poor mostly only have their labor force to
generate income; other income sources – returns on capital or public and private transfers –
only make up a small proportion of their incomes (Besley and Cord, 2007). In contrast to
labor income, income from capital assets is generally much more concentrated and earned
by top income groups. Giving labor a fair share in economic prosperity therefore is key to
3It is further distinguished between strong and weak sustainability. While weak sustainability assumes that
the three different forms of capital (natural, man-made and human capital) are substitutable and only the total
stock of capital matters, the concept of strong sustainability argues that natural capital has unique features and
cannot be replaced by other forms of capital (Stiglitz and Fitoussi, 2009).
4The concept of ’climate justice’ emphasizes that the burdens and benefits of climate change affect people
and regions to different degrees.
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Figure 1.2: The 17 Sustainable Development Goals and their primary dimension of
sustainability
Economic Prosperity  
1. No Poverty  
2. Zero Hunger  
3. Good Health and Well Being  
6. Clean Water and Sanitation  
7. Affordable and Clean Energy  
8. Good Jobs and Economic 
Growth  
9. Industry, Innovation and 
Infrastructure 
 
Social Inclusion  
4. Quality Education  
5. Gender Equality  
10. Reduced Inequalities  
16. Peace, Justice and Strong 
Institutions  
17. Partnerships for the Goals 
 
Environmental Stability  
11. Sustainable Cities and 
Communities  
12. Responsible Consumption and 
Production  
13. Climate Action  
14. Life Below Water  




Source: Adapted from Barbier and Burgess (2017).
fighting poverty and further reducing inequality in income.
To be able to assess how far an economy spreads its income achievements amongst its
working population, overall productivity trends of an economy have to be related to devel-
opments in the labor market. The factor (or functional) income distribution enables to do so
by measuring how aggregate income is distributed between the factors of production: Labor
(including human capital) and capital (including land). The labor’s share in income of a
country then shows how much of national income is earned by labor. Its size depends on
the labor-intensity with which economic output is produced and on how labor productivity
is reflected in labor incomes. If labor income and economic output develop in tandem, the
labor share remains constant. If, however, labor income is increasing but overall income is
increasing faster, the labor share declines (and vice versa). The labor share thus indicates in
how far an economy manages to translate income gains also into higher wages and whether
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it develops in an inclusive and equitable manner. For this reason, the labor share was im-
plemented within the 10th SDG on “reduced inequalities” as an indicator for target 10.4
(“Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social protection policies, and progressively
achieve greater equality”).
For a long time, the labor share was assumed to be constant and about two-thirds in
size. This primarily goes back to the work of Cobb and Douglas (1928) who presented a
production function which implied constant factor shares and yielded empirical estimations
of the labor share between 60 and 75 % in the United States and other high income countries
countries (Douglas, 1967, 1976). Assuming that wages are paid according to labor produc-
tivity, their model predicts that only non-neutral technological progress and a shift to sectors
that use one of the production factors with relative intensity (for example through trade) will
cause movements in factor shares (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003). The Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function is also at the center of the prominent neoclassical growth model by Solow
(1956) and Swan (1956), which gave further support to the proposition of constant factor
shares in the context of economic development. The long-term stability of factor shares
thus became one of the “stylized facts” of economic growth put forward by Kaldor in 1957.
As a consequence, the economic discipline put the distribution of income between factors
of production aside and turned to the distribution of income between individuals instead
(Sandmo, 2015).
Data, however, began to deviate from these ’facts’ in the early 1990s, bringing the labor
share back on the research agenda in the mid-2000s (Giovannoni, 2014). There were grow-
ing signs that overall productivity had disconnected from labor income and that the labor
share had declined across the globe. Most prominently, Piketty (2014) presented data on
the rising capital share in high income countries and a few global studies also found a simi-
lar trend in low and middle income countries (Harrison, 2005, Karabarbounis and Neiman,
2014, Rodriguez and Jayadev, 2010, Stockhammer, 2013). These developments posed a
puzzle to economists: They had expected the labor share to rise in developing countries in
the last decades, a period of increased globalization (Stockhammer, 2013). This is because
classical trade theory (mainly the Heckscher-Ohlin model and Stolper-Samuelson theorem)
predicts the labor share of developing countries to rise with trade: Since poor countries are
relatively labor-abundant, trade will boost the demand for labor-intensive goods in these
countries. This, in turn, is predicted to translate into higher wages and a higher labor share.
However, there is evidence that the opposite occurred in the last three decades, which has
serious implications for inequality, poverty as well as overall political stability and hence
sustainable development.
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1.1.3 The labor share in the context of sustainable development
As mentioned above, sustainable development covers the economic, social and environmen-
tal system. Each of the 17 SDGs can be primarily attributed to one of the systems, but they
also touch the other dimensions to a greater or lesser extent. The dimensions of sustainabil-
ity and the several SDGs are therefore connected to each other in multiple ways and build an
integrated system and network of goals (Barbier and Burgess, 2017, Le Blanc, 2015). The
links between the goals can be positive as well as negative, creating synergies and trade-offs.
Thus, although the labor share primarily refers to inequality and hence the social system,
it further affects the economic system (through its impact on income and poverty) and to
some degree also the environmental system.
The fact that labor has been losing ground against capital since the early 1990s, not only
in high income countries but also in the developing world, can in part explain the substantial
increase in personal income inequality, i.e. inequality in income between individuals, that
is observed in many developing countries. The personal income distribution is linked to
the factor income distribution through factor ownership and can be derived from it once it
is known how capital and labor are distributed among people (Ray, 1998). The factor in-
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come distribution is therefore a statistical determinant of the personal income distribution.
The relationship between the personal and factor income distribution is complex but several
studies show that a lower labor share is associated with higher inequality in personal in-
comes (as measured by the Gini coefficient), mainly because profits, rents and other income
from capital are concentrated amongst the rich (Bengtsson and Waldenström, 2015, Daudey
and García-Peñalosa, 2007, ILO, 2013, Rani and Furrer, 2016). This is also suggested by
Figure 1.3 which shows that average labor shares and average Gini coefficients develop in
opposite directions: Across country income groups, a decrease in the labor share since 1990
came along with an increase in personal income inequality. The labor share is therefore a
highly informative macroeconomic variable to explore when analyzing the roots of personal
inequality. As has been emphasized by Atkinson (2009), shifting the focus from the per-
sonal to the factor level can deliver a more integrated understanding of the determinants of
inequality between individuals. It might not only be relevant how income is distributed but
also how it was earned. By decomposing inequality into factor shares and their concentra-
tion, the underlying causes of income disparities can be more easily grasped. Eventually,
the labor share plays a role in the discourse on inequality since factor shares also “address
the concern of social justice with the fairness of different sources of income” (Atkinson,
2009, p. 5). For example, people might consider it an injustice when capital profits are
increasing faster than wages (Glyn, 2009). This is also because employment not only has an
income aspect but also a social function. Having a decent job can be a source of self-esteem
and the esteem of others, a function which Sen (2000) terms “recognition aspect” (p.5). In
that sense, income from work also differs from earnings that come from charity or social
transfers (Ray, 1998).
Given that production factors, especially capital, are still very unequally distributed
within societies, a decreasing labor share is a significant barrier in reducing poverty. As
the poor are largely dependent on productive and remunerative jobs to generate income,
the decoupling of wages from productivity has slowed down poverty alleviation. There is
a large body of literature which shows that it is mainly labor market dynamics, i.e. more
decent jobs and increasing wages, that lifts people out of poverty (see Besley and Cord,
2007, Melamed et al., 2011, WB, 2016d and others for country examples). Hence, poverty
would have receded more quickly if productivity increases had translated to a greater extent
into increases in labor income in the past. But on the contrary, the decoupling of wages
from productivity has fostered the phenomenon of the working poor, a phenomenon which
prevents people from climbing into the middle class (see table 1.1). Working poverty is the
headcount of employed people whose incomes fall below the poverty line. Although the
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share of extreme working poor (incomes below 1.25 USD a day) has decreased from 45.1
to 14.4 % and the share of moderate working poor (incomes below 2 USD a day) from 68.6
to 32.2 % in total employment since 1991 in the developing world, the progress in the least
developed countries has been limited (ILO, 2014a). In absolute numbers, extreme working
poverty has increased from 133 to 138 million and moderate working poverty from 176 to
242 million in income economies between 1991 and 2013. As a result, 375 million em-
ployed people in the developing world still lived in extreme and 839 million in moderate
poverty in 2013. This implies that about one third of employed people in developing coun-
tries are poor (despite working) and that about 90 % of poor people are working (Fields,
2011, ILO, 2014a, WB, 2016d). The challenge in developing countries is therefore not
to reduce unemployment but to create decent, well-paid jobs. In fact, about two-thirds of
workers in low income countries and about half of workers in middle income countries are
working under vulnerable conditions, meaning that their work does not generate adequate
earnings and formal arrangements and social security are likely to be missing.5 The 8th
SDG therefore calls to “promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full
and productive employment and decent work for all” (UNSD, 2016) to increase the growth
elasticity of poverty, i.e. the connection between the change in economic growth and poverty
reduction. Target 8.2 of the goal further demands to “focus on high-value added and labor-
intensive sectors” since those sectors are most likely to reach the poor. This relationship is
also known in the literature as the “virtuous circle of links among growth, employment and
poverty reduction” (Islam, 2006): The stronger the link between economic growth and the
creation of decent employment, i.e. the higher the labor-intensity of growth, the more likely
it is that growth will be pro-poor (ILO, 2013, Loayza and Raddatz, 2006, OECD, 2009).
Goal 8 is thus directly linked to target 10.4 which calls for a higher labor share.
Additionally, a high labor share is favorable for a stable political and macroeconomic
environment, which might further help to reduce poverty and inequality among a country’s
society. First, and as has been mentioned above, the higher the labor share, the more likely
it is that improved macroeconomic conditions also translate into higher household incomes
and that gains from a globalized economy are fairly distributed. This, in turn, could maintain
people’s support for open markets. If, on the other hand, inequality is high and the poor
have little hope of future income improvements, this might not only lead to the rejection
of economic integration but also to social and political unrest, threatening future economic
growth (Berg and Ostry, 2011, IMF, 2017). Second, labor income has a higher marginal
5The ILO classifies own-account workers (typically subsistence farmers or street vendors) and unpaid
family workers as vulnerable workers.
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Table 1.1: Working poverty, 1991-2013
Share of working poor in total employment in %
Extreme poverty (1.25 USD) Moderate poverty (2 USD)
1991 2000 2007 2013 1991 2000 2007 2013
DCs 45.1 32.7 20.4 14.4 68.6 56.6 41.1 32.2
LICs 65.8 60.4 46.2 37.4 87.1 84.6 73.6 65.2
LMICs 45.7 37.5 27.3 19.4 74 68.2 57.3 48.2
UMICs 40.3 22.6 8.4 3.7 61.1 41.6 20.4 10.0
Total working poor in millions
Extreme poverty (1.25 USD) Moderate poverty (2 USD)
1991 2000 2007 2013 1991 2000 2007 2013
DCS 811 693 491 375 1234 1198 989 839
LICs 133 156 146 138 176 219 232 242
LMICs 293 292 245 190 475 530 514 471
UMICs 384 245 100 47 583 450 243 126
Note: Figures in PPP (purchasing power parity). DCs = Developing countries, LICs = Low income countries,
LMICs = Lower middle-income countries, UMICs = Upper middle-income countries.
Source: ILO (2014a).
propensity to consume than capital income (ILO and WB, 2015, Onaran et al., 2011). A
lower labor share therefore diminishes domestic demand, which leads to lower growth and
an increased dependency on exports if investments do not rise by the same amount (ILO,
2013). Low labor incomes may further cause financial instabilities if capital incomes are
invested in financial rather than productive assets (ILO and WB, 2015).
Finally, the labor share also touches the environmental dimension of sustainable devel-
opment. Target 4 of the 8th SDG (decent work and economic growth) demands a lower
domestic material consumption per GDP “to decouple economic growth from environmen-
tal degradation” (UNSD, 2016).6 Economic output can be produced in a capital- or labor-
intensive manner, depending on the composition of economic sectors and the degree in how
far capital and labor can replace each other within a sector. A labor-intensive production
has the advantage that it is on average much less pollution-, energy- and material-intensive
than a capital-intensive production, as several (ecological) economists, such as Antweiler
et al. (2001), Cole (2003, 2004), Cole and Elliott (2005), Zhang (2016), argue. This is be-
cause (physical) capital is by definition composed of, produced by and operated by material
resources, as well as by sources of energy, which, in turn, are produced by the support of
material resources (Daly and Farley, 2011). Labor-augmenting technological change might
6Additionally, target 9.2 calls for a lower “CO2 emission per unit of value added”.
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therefore help to decrease dependence on material resources while at the same time sta-
bilizing or even increasing the incomes of the working poor. In how far this is possible
depends on the elasticity of substitution between production factors: The higher the elastic-
ity of substitution, i.e. the easier labor can replace physical capital and material resources,
the more likely it is that there are positive employment and labor share effects (Bovenberg,
1999, Bovenberg and van der Ploeg, 1996). On the downside, a higher labor share and
the associated higher propensity to consume is likely to increase overall carbon emissions.
As argued by Ravallion et al. (2000) and others, lower incomes also tend to have a higher
marginal propensity to emit, creating a conflict between redistribution of incomes and cli-
mate change mitigation. Indeed, higher income inequality (and thus lower labor shares)
has been found to be associated with lower carbon emissions, at least in poor countries
(Grunewald et al., 2017, Holtz-Eakin and Selden, 1995). The aggregated effect of changes
in the labor share – from the production as well as consumption side – on the environmental
system is therefore very complex and not clear.
On the whole, to achieve the ambitious set of sustainable development goals, it will be
key to designing policies that consider and minimize trade-offs between the various goals
of economic efficiency, social equity and environmental conservation (Barbier and Burgess,
2017, WB, 2016d). Given its diversified impacts on the social, economic and environmental
system, the labor share is an integral part of this challenging task.
1.1.4 What is the role of labor in sustainable agriculture?
1.1.4.1 Sustainability in the agricultural sector
The agricultural sector is home to the majority of the poor, generates substantial economic
output and at the same time is largely responsible for the over-use of the planet’s resources.
Hence, it deserves particular attention. In fact, almost two-thirds of the working poor are
employed in the agricultural sector and about half of agricultural laborers are poor (Cas-
tañeda et al., 2016). In 2015, the sector represented about one-third of GDP in low income
countries (WB, 2016a). Moreover, it is a major emitter of greenhouse gases, accounts for
70 % of global water uses and threatens biodiversity due to deforestation and its extensive
use of fertilizer, herbicides and pesticides (Sachs, 2015).
Within this context, the agricultural sector has significant transformation potential for
low and middle income countries towards sustainable development (SDSN, 2013). The
2nd SDG therefore explicitly requests to “promote sustainable agriculture” (UNSD, 2016).
Sustainable agriculture describes a form of agriculture that ensures a profitable and stable
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production of crops (and livestock) while at the same time preserving environmental re-
sources and ensuring a fair share of benefits (Zhen et al., 2005). The farming sector is also
a sector with one of the highest labor shares in the developing world. This is because most
of the agricultural activity is pursued by smallholder farmers who employ few capital assets
and mainly work manually (Inklaar and Timmer, 2013). Hence, the debate on sustainable
agriculture also needs to address the role of labor for transformation.
1.1.4.2 Small-scale versus large-scale farming
Several studies show that increasing agricultural incomes of small-scale farmers signifi-
cantly reduces poverty (Besley and Cord, 2007, WB, 2008). This is not only due to the fact
that many farmers are poor but also due to the high labor-intensity of smallholder farming,
which creates employment opportunities in poor rural areas (Loayza and Raddatz, 2006,
Wiggins et al., 2010). At the same time, there is a trend towards large-scale farming, which
relies more on machinery and chemical inputs, and is hence relatively capital-intensive
(Wiggins et al., 2010).7 This dynamic, which is mainly driven by the increased commer-
cialization of agriculture, as well as large investments in agricultural land, has considerable
economic, distributional and ecological implications. The substitution of labor with capital
on large-scale farms implies a considerable change in the production technology. On the
one hand, the increased industrialization implies higher negative external effects on the en-
vironment, primarily due to the application of fossil-fuel intensive as well as monocultural
practices and the associated greenhouse gas emissions, loss of biodiversity and degradation
of natural resources (Robertson et al., 2000, Tilman et al., 2002). On the other hand, tech-
nological change may increase overall revenues. The empirical literature discusses whether
there are economies or diseconomies of scale regarding agricultural production by compar-
ing the production per land unit of smallholders and large-scale farms – with mixed results.
Many studies find smallholders to be more productive per land unit, which is mainly at-
tributed to their more effective use of labor (Binswanger et al., 1995, Klasen et al., 2016,
Lipton, 2005, Wiggins et al., 2010). Other research emphasizes that larger farms perform
better as they can exploit economies of scale regarding marketing, wholesale trading and
storage and since they can make more effective use of innovations (Collier and Dercon,
2014, Deininger and Byerlee, 2011). In case there are economies of scale, the shift to large-
scale farming increases agricultural incomes, potentially also for the poor. But at the same
7As any other sector, agricultural output can be produced capital- or labor-intensively, depending on the
factor-intensity of the produced crop and on the specific elasticity of substitution, for example between labor-
intensive manual weeding and the capital-intensive use of herbicides.
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time, it raises the capital share and probably also increases inequality as income is trans-
ferred from labor to the owners of agricultural capital. Nolte and Ostermeier (2017) show
that large-scale farms crowd out smallholders, which has negative employment effects since
small farms apply more labor per land unit than larger farms.8
1.1.4.3 Cash crop farming as a sustainable development path for smallholders?
The persistence of poverty amongst smallholder farmers and severe environmental degrada-
tion underscores the importance of the transformation of the agriculture sector, with various
transition paths having been discussed (Collier and Dercon, 2014, Tilman et al., 2002). To
approach agricultural sustainability, the goals of social inclusion, economic prosperity and
ecological stability have to be promoted at the same time, which requires a balance in trade-
offs between them.
The literature perceives the transition from purely or semi-subsistence farming to the
cultivation of cash crops9 as a potential route for agricultural growth and poverty reduction
amongst small-scale farmers by increasing incomes as well as employment (Klasen et al.,
2013, WB, 2008). Many smallholder farmers are poor because they engage in unprofitable
subsistence farming rather than commercial agriculture as large-scale farms do. This is
mainly because smallholders face substantial input and output market failures (Hettig and
Sipangule, 2016). For smallholder farmers to escape poverty, it is essential that they diver-
sify their farming activities and include crops for sale on (global) markets into their port-
folio, such as cocoa, vanilla or cotton. However, a successful integration into global crop
markets depends crucially on the ability of farmers to cope with the risks associated with
cash crop production. Cash crop farming may increase incomes but at the same time creates
dependencies as farmers directly depend on market prices and their variability, which may
reduce their food security (Achterbosch et al., 2014, Barbier, 1989, Rist et al., 2010, Steffan-
Dewenter et al., 2007, Sunderlin et al., 2001, Wood et al., 2013). Furthermore, monocultural
cash crop production increases the sensitivity to ecological risks, such as soil degradation or
harvest failures due to weather shocks or pests and diseases (Steffan-Dewenter et al., 2007).
The ecological impact of cash crop farming does not fundamentally differ from that of
food crop production (Barbier, 1989). The environmental sustainability of the farming sec-
tor rather depends on the crop management practices that the farmer employs. Cash crop
farming can potentially implement sustainable intensification practices and thus promote
8The precise employment effects, however, depend on the factor intensity of crop production and whether
large-scale farms establish contract-farming schemes (Nolte and Ostermeier, 2017).
9Cash crops are food and non-food commodities that are primarily produced for sale on agricultural mar-
kets. Food (or subsistence) crops, by contrast, are mainly produced for domestic consumption (Barbier, 1989).
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the movement towards sustainable agriculture (Achterbosch et al., 2014). Simple intensi-
fication practices aim to increasing production output, and thus income, primarily through
higher yields rather than extending farmland. This has positive ecological impacts if it re-
duces the pressure to clear further forest, wet- or grassland for agriculture. However, an
intensive management of cash crops often involves a considerable use of chemical inputs,
such as fertilizers and pesticides, which, in turn, threatens environmental stability. In this
context, a sustainable intensification of agriculture intends to increase yields while at the
same time minimizing greenhouse gas emissions and the depletion of soil, biodiversity and
the ecosystem (Beddington et al., 2011, Garnett et al., 2013, SDSN, 2013). This cultiva-
tion strategy thus also takes the environmental costs of fossil fuel-intensive practices and
the degradation of natural resources into account in order to achieve an efficient manage-
ment of natural resources (Bowman and Zilberman, 2013, Tilman et al., 2002). Sustainable
agricultural intensification involves, for example, intercropping or micro-dosing of fertil-
izers (Achterbosch et al., 2014). As such cultivation strategies tend to be labor-intensive
and smallholders are relatively labor abundant, there is the possibility that small-scale cash
crop agriculture may alleviate poverty and create employment and at the same time support
ecological sustainability in the farming sector (Achterbosch et al., 2014, Silici et al., 2015,
UNCTAD, 2015). This potential, however, depends crucially on the farmers’ risk and crop
management skills.
1.2 Current state of research
The concept of sustainable development is broad and complex and its empirical assessment
therefore highly challenging. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is an attempt
by the international community to grasp and promote this vision. To this end, 17 goals, 169
targets and 230 indicators have been established, one of the latter being the labor’s share in
income.
While the relevance of the labor share for sustainable development and especially for
a fair and equitable society is straightforward, its assessment is less clear.10 In the context
of the developing world, measuring the labor share is an extremely arduous endeavor. The
functional labor distribution is well documented in high income economies but the situation
is quite different for low and middle income countries. Mainly two reasons hamper the mea-
surement of factor incomes in the context of the developing world: First, national accounting
10This discrepancy between relevance and measurement is not only an open issue of the labor share but also
of many other SDG indicators.
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data in the majority of poor countries is limited, incomplete and often also unreliable (UN,
2012). Especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, country statistics are marked by data gaps and
inconsistencies (Jerven, 2012). This is not only due to the under-funding and insufficient
resources with which statistical offices in poor countries are confronted. Another cause is
the labor market structure of low and middle income countries, which also leads to the sec-
ond reason: In contrast to high income countries, most of the workers in the developing
world are not in wage employment but are self-employed. They are own-account workers
or unpaid family workers, typically subsistence farmers or micro and small entrepreneurs,
such as street vendors, whose activities are often located in the informal sector. This means
that the majority of the labor force not only earns income from labor – as wage employees
do – but also from capital assets, such as land or investment in equipment and machines.
This creates a significant complication in measuring factor income shares in the develop-
ing world. To determine the labor income of the self-employed and to be able to compute
the labor share, the labor component of the self-employed income needs to be filtered out
in a first step. This, however, requires making assumptions about the capital-labor mix of
self-employed activities as the production process usually remains unobserved. This task is
further complicated by the fact that many self-employed activities take place in the informal
sector.
On these grounds, findings on the magnitude and development of the labor share in poor
countries are limited. Most existing data sets that allow us to compute the labor share only
provide data for high income and some middle income countries. The most important data
source in that context is the United Nations’ System of National Accounts (UN SNA). These
accounts allow to compute the share of employees’ wages in national output for the major-
ity of developing countries. However, due to the reasons mentioned above, a systematic
recording of the self-employment sector is missing and the labor share in national income
that covers the entire labor force cannot easily be determined. But given that a large portiont
of workers in the developing world are self-employed, it is of crucial importance to account
for the labor incomes of the self-employed as well. Otherwise, the measurement of the la-
bor share underestimates the actual share of labor incomes in total output. Furthermore –
and fundamental for dynamic analyses – a partial labor share, the so-called unadjusted labor
share, does not permit meaningful conclusions about the evolution of the labor share over
time. In the course of development, self-employed individuals typically leave subsistence
agriculture to work in the wage-employment sector. As a consequence, their labor incomes
suddenly appear in wage statistics, raising the labor share, even though their labor incomes
might not have substantially changed (or only very little). Further effort is therefore needed
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to measure the all-encompassing labor share, the so-called adjusted labor share.
The empirical literature on the labor share thus is confronted with major measurement
difficulties. The majority of the studies are restricted to high income economies, where
data quality and coverage is high and labor income from wage and self-employment ob-
servable. For instance, Piketty’s (2014) highly illuminating results on factor income distri-
bution are bound to OECD countries and a few major emerging economies where a well-
documented tax base is available that can be used as a data source. There are some studies
with global coverage, such as Diwan (2001), Harrison (2005), Karabarbounis and Neiman
(2014), Maarek and Decreuse (2015), Rodriguez and Jayadev (2010) and Stockhammer
(2013). These studies, however, remain either limited to the corporate or manufacturing
sector (such as Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014 or Maarek and Decreuse, 2015) and thus
turn a blind eye to small private businesses, which make up a significant portion of the
workforce in developing countries, or they base their assessment on the unadjusted labor
share (such as Harrison, 2005, Jayadev, 2007, Stockhammer, 2013). Using the unadjusted
labor share may yield inconclusive results as the labor share is biased downwards and its
time trend upwards, since it is does not control for shifts between different sectors. When
they employ the adjusted labor share in robustness checks, this sharply reduces the sample
size, mainly to high income countries. Notwithstanding these restraints, these studies yield
valuable results. They all suggest a decline of the unadjusted, as well as corporate, labor
share across the globe since 1990, confirming the findings of OECD studies and extending
the results to developing economies. The finding that the share of employees’ wages in
national income has declined not only in high income countries, but also in the developing
world, is remarkable. As a substantial share of the workforce switched from self- to wage-
employment over the same period and the wage-employment sector became increasingly
important in developing countries, ceteris paribus, the opposite was expected. But while
national income has been rising, the proportion of the economic pie going to all wage la-
borers has become smaller, even though the number of laborers has increased in absolute
terms. Overall productivity has thus decoupled from wages in the last decades and income
generation has increasingly shifted from labor to capital. This is even more surprising in
light of the fact that the last three decades were marked by increasing global trade. As
mentioned above, standard models predict that trade benefits the abundant production fac-
tor in a country, which is labor in the case of developing countries. These findings also
run counter to conventional growth and development theories, most prominently Solow’s
model, which relies on constant factor shares. Kanbur and Stiglitz (2015) therefore call for
“new theories”, which can explain the increasing share of capital and the associated upsurge
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of income inequality. In light of these observations, literature has concentrated on the anal-
ysis of the driving forces behind the labor share decline in the late 2000s. Trade, as well
as financial globalization, have been identified as significant drivers of the downward trend,
which is mainly explained by the changing bargaining positions of capital and labor (Har-
rison, 2005, Jayadev, 2007, Maarek and Decreuse, 2015, Stockhammer, 2013). As capital
becomes relatively mobile in the course of globalization and can offer a credible threat of
relocating abroad, domestic labor now directly competes with labor abroad (Rodrik, 1997).
This weakens the bargaining position of labor vis-à-vis capital, exerts a downward pressure
on wages and eventually results in a decreasing labor share. Consistent with this view is
the claim that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor moves beyond one that
enables capital to be more easily substituted for labor in the production process. In that
regard, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) find technological change to have significantly
contributed to the decline in the labor share by pushing down the relative price of capital.
They estimate the substitution elasticity between capital and labor to be greater than unity
in the long-term, allowing capital to smoothly replace labor and eventually leading to de-
creasing labor shares as the relative cost of capital falls less than the absolute volume of
investments increases.
As mentioned above, these important findings remain either limited to the corporate or
manufacturing sector or rely on the unadjusted labor share. Given that the labor market in
developing countries is characterized by segregation into different sectors and substantial
movements between them, labor share analyses that cover the whole economy might con-
tribute important findings that the existing literature cannot capture. For example, deregu-
lation of markets may not only directly impact sectoral labor shares but also induce labor
force dynamics between different sectors that should be integrated into the assessment as
well. Currently, research fails to provide satisfactory evidence on the economy-wide labor
share and its determinants in the developing world which is a clear gap in the economic
literature. Such insights are, however, crucial to designing and evaluating policies that af-
fect the entire labor market. Only if it is understood how the labor share evolves and what
its drivers are, can policy makers set bounds to declining trends of the labor share and the
concomitant detrimental effects for income equality and poverty alleviation.
A second focus of this thesis is placed on the transformation of the agricultural sector
towards sustainable development, and the role of labor- and capital-intensive strategies in
facilitating this transformation. This thesis assesses one potential route of agricultural trans-
formation, namely the transition of smallholder farmers from pure or semi-subsistence agri-
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culture to commercial farming. The potential of cash crop agriculture in reducing poverty
among smallholders and at the same time limiting environmental damage depends signif-
icantly on the cultivation strategy of the farmer. If smallholders manage their farms inef-
ficiently and lack agronomic skills, this potential may not be fully harnessed. First, farm
management skills have been found to be a central factor for maintaining and increasing
yields, and thus reducing poverty (Mueller et al., 2012, Neumann et al., 2010, Tittonell and
Giller, 2013, Tittonell et al., 2007). Second, the appropriate management of chemical in-
puts, such as fertilizers and pesticides, helps to maintain environmental stability. Especially
in the long run, improper management of inputs may not only cause depletion of soils but
can put the farmer’s yield at additional risk, as intensified monocropping is more prone
to pests and diseases (Steffan-Dewenter et al., 2007). As a result, yield performance has
been found to vary substantially between cash crop farmers, which is – besides input and
output market failures – mainly attributed to varying management practices (Euler et al.,
2016, Mueller et al., 2012, Neumann et al., 2010, Tittonell and Giller, 2013, Tittonell et al.,
2007, UNCTAD, 2015). Determining yield gaps – the difference between potential and ac-
tual yield – and understanding the underlying management practices is therefore crucial in
reducing poverty and identifying sustainable management strategies (Ittersum et al., 2013,
SDSN, 2013). As farm management practices are likely to vary in their degree of economic
(as well as ecological) sustainability, long-term insights into the link between yields and
cultivation strategies are of key importance in this regard. But while the short-term ben-
efits of cash crop farming for smallholders are well-documented in the literature (Carletto
et al., 2009, Klasen et al., 2013, Tittonell et al., 2007), long-term evidence is scarce. This
is mainly because such assessments require long-term panel data, which are – as already
mentioned above – hardly available for the (semi-)informal agricultural sector. But insights
into whether cash crop farming can also reduce poverty amongst smallholders sustainably
and which cultivation strategy can close yield gaps in the long run could contribute to the
development of sustainable farming and thus poverty reduction strategies.
1.3 Contribution to the literature
This dissertation contributes to the debate on sustainable development and the associated
role of labor in two ways:
Firstly, it focuses on the labor income share, which is a fundamental ingredient for
poverty-reducing and equitable development. By addressing the enormous difficulties as-
sociated with its measurement, this thesis intends to overcome the gap between the socio-
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economic relevance of the labor share and its empirical assessment. For this purpose, it
develops a new macro-level data set on the labor share, covering about 100 low and middle
income countries from 1990 to 2011, that is backed up with micro-economic evidence and
addresses the specific challenges associated with its measurement in developing countries
(chapter 2). Furthermore, this dissertation reviews existing labor share data sets and dis-
cusses their strength and weaknesses to give guidance on deciding for the most appropriate
measure and on necessary future steps in data collection (chapter 3). It also contributes
to the debate and literature on the development of the labor share and its macro-economic
determinants. It shows that there is a need to distinguish between types of capital when
assessing the impact of financial globalization on the labor share and provides evidence
that de facto foreign investment cannot explain the decline of the labor share in developing
countries whereas data suggests that trade is a substantial driver of the observed downturn
(chapter 4).
Secondly, this dissertation addresses the transformation of the agricultural sector to-
wards sustainable development and assesses the transition of smallholder farmers to cash-
crop agriculture as one potential path of development. Relying on a unique panel data set
that has a time horizon of more than ten years, it contributes to the literature by showing
that cash-crop farming has the potential to reduce poverty amongst smallholders in both the
short and long term but that this potential can only fully be harnessed when a farmer applies
proper labor- and capital-intensive management practices (chapter 5).
Brief summaries of these contributions, their research questions, methodological ap-
proaches and main results, are summarized below.
All chapters take a long-term view by using panel data. This means that phenomena
are not observed at one point in time but over a period of several years or even decades,
which allows to draw conclusions about long-term effects. Panel data is rare in developing
countries but the use of it brings important econometric benefits: They allow to control for
(unobserved) household and country fixed effects, endogeneity and initial conditions and
further enable the estimation of dynamic models and to account for the between and within
variation of variables.
The second chapter, entitled Measuring the Labor Income Share of Developing Coun-
tries – Lessons from Social Accounting Matrices, is dedicated to the measurement of the
labor income share in developing countries. When this dissertation was initiated, no data
on factor income distribution was available that includes a broad range of low and middle
income countries, captures entire economies and further adjusts for self-employment. This
is largely the result of the poor availability and reliability of national account data in de-
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veloping countries as well as the fact that the self-employed, whose labor income is hard
to capture, account for a significant portion of the workforce and often work in the infor-
mal sector. This chapter addresses these challenges and computes a panel data set on the
labor share that allows the following chapters to assess the magnitudes and trends, as well
as the determinants, of the labor share. To deal with measurement difficulties, social ac-
counting matrices (SAMs) were consulted in addition to the UN SNA, to construct a labor
share macro-level data set that is backed up with micro-economic evidence. First, SAMs
are used as case studies to open the “black box” of national accounts and obtain knowledge
on self-employment in developing countries to formulate assumptions that are necessary to
compute labor share data at the macro-level. Second, a pool of SAMs serves as a benchmark
to check the reliability of the estimates obtained from national account data. The final data
set that adjusts for the labor income of the self-employed provides estimates for about 100
developing countries from 1990 to 2011. The labor share is found to be, on average, close to
one half (47 %) and thus less than the standard ’two-thirds’ in the economic literature. The
data further suggests that the findings of declining labor shares in previous studies also ap-
plies to the specific sample of low and middle income countries since the early 1990s. This
corresponds to Piketty’s (2014) hypothesis of wealth accumulation proceeding faster than
economic growth: Also in the developing world, income generation seems to be shifting
more and more from labor to capital, implying nothing else than a shrinking labor share.
The third chapter, entitled The Labor Income Share in Developing Countries: A Review
and Analysis of International Panel Data, directly builds on chapter 2 and reviews the above
mentioned data set and other international panel data sets on the labor income share in low
and middle income countries. In addition to data sets that are either limited in country or
sector coverage or do not adjust for self-employed labor income, this review also includes
the Penn World Tables (PWT) labor share data set, which was published in 2013. This data
set builds on the UN SNA as well and provides adjusted labor share estimates for a broad
range of developing and advanced countries. This chapter has a two-fold objective. Firstly,
it provides an overview of different measurement approaches and data sources. Given that
labor income of the self-employed is not directly observed, computing adjusted labor share
data requires making assumptions. Although different data sets aim to measure the same
thing (the labor share), estimates are very heterogeneous, which is attributed to the differing
underlying assumptions. Various data sets relying on different assumptions are compared
and their strengths and weaknesses discussed. Secondly, the chapter presents descriptive
statistics on the labor income share and extracts results that hold true independent of the
data set used. Unlike the standard suggestions in the literature and in line with the findings
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of the estimates developed in chapter 2, there is evidence that the labor share is neither
constant nor of a magnitude of two-thirds. Across the board, the labor income share has
been declining in the developing world since 1990, indicating that labor income has been
lagging behind overall productivity increases for the last two decades, and is found to be
one-half in size at most. There is evidence that the labor share of the self-employed, as
well as that of wage employees, contributes to the decline. The share of self-employed in
the workforce decreased over time, and correspondingly, also the labor share of the self-
employment sector has decreased. This decline, however, has not been compensated by
an increase in the labor share of the wage employment sector, although wage employees
make up a growing proportion of the labor force in these countries. The negative trend
of the aggregate labor share has been especially endured by low-skilled workers, whereas
high-skilled workers have managed to increase their labor income share in national value
added. Also the manufacturing sector has experienced a shrinking labor share since 2000.
Decomposing by sector further suggests that not only have changes within sectors driven
these findings, but also shifts away from labor-intensive agriculture towards more capital-
intensive sectors. Finally, there is evidence that the growing gap between a country’s wage
rates and productivity (and not changes in employment) is driving these results.
The fourth chapter turns to the analysis of the determinants of the labor share. An alarm-
ing result of the first two chapters is the substantial downturn of the labor share in the devel-
oping world since the early 1990s. The fourth chapter, entitled Financial Globalization and
the Labor Share in Developing Countries: The Type of Capital Matters, therefore assesses
the drivers of this trend. More specifically, it investigates how de facto financial globaliza-
tion has influenced the labor share in developing countries. As has been reviewed above,
previous research has found that international capital mobility can partly explain the decline
in the labor share in developing countries. This chapter adds to this strand of literature and
further contributes to the research that emphasizes the differences between types of interna-
tional capital flows, their determinants, and effects (e.g. Daude and Fratzscher, 2008). It is
argued that there is a need to distinguish between different types of capital – foreign direct
and portfolio investments – when analyzing the influence of financial globalization on the
labor share. This is because different forms of foreign investment have different fixed costs
and impacts on the host countries’ production process and vary concerning their bargaining
power vis-à-vis labor. ‘Capital’ has mostly been considered to be a pretty homogeneous
concept in this specific context. Although this aggregate view is sometimes helpful, assum-
ing an aggregate elasticity of substitution between capital and labor can be misleading in
cases where different modes of production are associated with specific capital flows, as is
22 Chapter 1
the issue here. To empirically asses these relationships, the analysis relies on the labor share
data set constructed in chapter 2 as well as the recently published PWT labor share data. It
therefore covers the entire economy and accounts for the problem of labor income for the
self-employed. The econometric analysis of the impact of foreign direct investment versus
portfolio investment, in a sample of about 40 developing and transition countries after 1992,
supports the claim of heterogeneous effects of capital inflows. Using different panel data
techniques to address potential endogeneity problems, it is found that foreign direct invest-
ment has a positive effect on the labor share in developing countries, while the impact of
portfolio investment is significantly smaller, and potentially negative. As the increase of for-
eign portfolio investments was rather modest compared to foreign direct investment in the
observed time period, the analysis concludes that de facto financial globalization by itself
cannot explain the decline of the labor share in developing countries over the last decades.
Instead, results suggest that trade might be a potential candidate.
The fifth chapter with the title Cash Crops as a Sustainable Pathway out of Poverty?
Panel Data Evidence on Heterogeneity from Cocoa Farmers in Sulawesi, Indonesia has a
different focus. It contributes to the sustainable development debate by assessing whether
cash crop cultivation sustainably reduces poverty amongst smallholders and exploring which
role various labor- and capital-intensive management practices play for the welfare out-
comes of cash crop farmers. The diversification into cash crops has a great potential for
reducing poverty in the developing world that may not be fully harnessed because many
smallholders are inefficient producers. Since cash crop agriculture may experience boom
and bust cycles, caused by volatile world market prices, local weather shocks and pests,
welfare effects are likely to differ significantly between farmers. Furthermore, income gains
may only be static and it is not certain whether the poverty and vulnerability of smallholder
households are reduced sustainably, particularly when farmers lack proper farm manage-
ment skills. To examine the long-term poverty impacts of cash crop agriculture, the analysis
draws on a unique panel data set of smallholder farmers in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia,
covering the years 2000, 2006, and 2013. The analysis shows that – over the analyzed time
horizon of more than ten years – cocoa cultivation is associated with a strong and sustain-
able reduction in poverty. Cocoa farmers fare better than non-cocoa farmers and welfare
gains can mainly be attributed to increasing cocoa yields. Yet, yield gaps remain large,
are increasingly heterogeneous and a significant share of cocoa farmers remain poor. This
variability in yields can be traced back to farm management practices that include both the
application of chemical inputs (especially fertilizer) and labor-intensive practices (especially
removing infested cocoa pods and the pruning of trees), with the latter found to be crucial
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for pest control. Linking these findings to poverty transitions, the analysis shows that better
intensification and maintenance practices facilitate the transition out of poverty and shields
against income losses. Training smallholders in cash crop management not only has the
potential to close yield gaps and improve the livelihoods of smallholder farmers but also to
maintain environmental stability by improving the application of synthetic inputs and taking
the pressure off forests.

Chapter 2
Measuring the Labor Income Share of




This paper addresses the challenges associated with measuring the labor income share of
developing countries. The poor availability and reliability of national account data as well
as the fact that self-employed whose labor income is hard to capture account for a major
share of the workforce and often work in the informal sector render its computation difficult.
I consult social accounting matrices as additional source of information to construct a labor
share data set that is backed up with micro-economic evidence. The final data set covers
about 100 developing countries from 1990 to 2011. The data suggests that the finding of
declining labor shares of previous studies also applies to the specific sample of low and
middle income countries. Furthermore, I find the labor share in developing countries to be
about one-half in size and thus less than the standard ’two-thirds’ in economic literature.
2.1 Introduction
The labor income share is a measure of the factor income distribution and reflects how much
of national value added accrues to labor (as opposed to capital and land). Dynamics in the
factor income distribution are of particular relevance for developing countries, especially
in their effort to fight poverty. The main asset of the poor certainly is labor, usually in
form of agricultural self-employment (Fields, 2014, WB, 2006, 2013). Hence, regressive
redistribution of factors and their remuneration will be felt strongly in these countries due
to weak social safety nets and limited capital access of the poor.
The measurement of the labor share, however, is notoriously difficult for low and middle
income countries. Most studies rely on the relation of compensation of employees (CoE)
to GDP from national account statistics when measuring the labor share. A key problem
of this simple definition is the fact that CoE does not include the labor income of the self-
employed. They, however, account for the major fraction of the labor force in developing
countries (ILO, 2015, WB, 2013).1 An additional difficulty arises from the fact that self-
1In this paper, the term “developing countries” refers to both low and middle income countries.
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employment in developing countries is often located in the informal sector. As data on the
number of self-employed, their income and labor component is deficient for these countries,
adjusting the labor share for the self-employment sector requires assumptions. The fact that
the economic structure of developing countries fundamentally differs from the ones of high
income economies makes separate assumptions necessary. For example, self-employed in
OECD countries are more likely to have consciously decided to enter self-employment while
it may well be a business out of necessity for workers in the developing world (Günther and
Launov, 2012). Eventually, developing countries give reason for concern about the scope,
detail and quality of their national accounts (UN, 2012). The adjustment of the labor share
thus requires more prudent handling in the case of low and middle income countries.
This paper presents a data set on the labor income share in developing countries which
addresses these issues. As (macro-level) national accounts have data gaps regarding the self-
employment sector and may suffer from measurement errors, I additionally consult micro-
level data to increase the reliability of labor share data constructed at the aggregate level.
For this purpose, I draw upon social accounting matrices (SAMs). SAMs are micro-founded
presentations of national accounts in matrix form which integrate information from various
data sources besides national accounts such as household and labor force surveys. This
paper uses SAMs to give guidance in two ways: First, three representative SAMs serve as
case studies to open the “black box” of national accounts and to obtain knowledge on self-
employment labor income in developing countries. These insights are used to formulate
assumptions necessary to compute labor share data at the macro-level. Second, a pool of 51
SAMs for 45 developing countries (taken from UN DESA and IFPRI) covering the period
1991-2008 is compared to the final labor share data set to check the reliability of estimates
obtained from national account data. By this means, the information content of micro- and
macro-level data can be exploited in a meaningful manner.
The final data set covers about 100 developing countries spanning the period 1990-2011.
The recent economic literature identified a decline in labor shares in high income countries
and on the global level. This finding also seems to apply to the specific sample of low
and middle income countries as the data suggests that labor’s relative income in developing
countries has been declining by on average 10 % points since the early 1990s. This holds
true for most of the developing regions and seems to be independent of a country’s develop-
ment stage. Furthermore, I find the labor share in developing countries to be about one-half
in size and thus lower than in high income countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the concept of the labor share
and elaborates on its measurement from national accounts. Existing data sets are reviewed in
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section 2.3. Section 2.4 discusses the challenges associated with measuring the labor share
of developing countries from national accounts. Section 2.5 performs three case studies us-
ing SAMs to extract information about the self-employed and their labor income. Findings
are used to formulate assumptions and construct labor share data from national accounts in
the following step (section 2.6). Section 2.7 validates the data by comparing it to a pool of
51 SAMs and section 2.8 presents some properties of the data set. Section 2.9 concludes.
2.2 The labor share: Concept and measurement
The labor share reflects how much of national income is earned by labor. Assuming that
value added, or production output, is given by Y = f (K,L), where K is capital (including
land) and L labor (including human capital) used in production, the income distribution













The labor share can be computed from national accounts. The empirical literature usu-






Data is provided by the United Nations System of National Accounts (UN SNA) and is
accessible through the National Accounts Official Country data.2 This simple measurement,
however, tells only half the story and is often referred to as the naïve labor share (LSn). As
pointed out by Gollin (2002) and Krueger (1998), CoE merely covers wage earners in the
corporate sector and ignores self-employment. The challenge with self-employed income
is that it consists of income from labor as well as from capital so that its labor component
needs to be filtered out in a first step. Due to the poor data situation in developing countries,
2The UN SNA has undergone several revisions (1968, 1993 and 2008). These always came along with new
standards, also affecting major aggregates such as GDP and its income components. Different series might
therefore imply different data.
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this is a tricky task. If it is not corrected for self-employment, however, self-employed
income would be mistakenly treated as only consisting of capital income, resulting in a
downward bias of the labor share. Furthermore, in a dynamic perspective, ceteris paribus
shifts in the composition of employment would automatically change the labor share. For
example, when formerly self-employed enter wage employment – in developing countries,
this typically is the movement away from subsistence agriculture to the corporate sector –
their labor income suddenly appears in employee compensation statistics, raising the labor
share, even though their labor income has effectively not changed (or only very little). Gollin
(2002) therefore came up with three possible approaches to adjust the naïve labor share for
self-employed labor income, relying on three different assumptions.
Gollin’s first two adjustments make use of the item mixed (MI) income listed in the UN
SNA. MI refers to the remuneration of the self-employed and – as the term already suggests
– includes income from labor and capital (UN, 2009). By using this item and filtering out
its labor income component, which is then added to employee compensation, a meaningful
measure of the labor share can be obtained. In his first adjustment, MI is simply added to





As this procedure ignores self-employed income from other factors of production than
labor, it is likely to overestimate the labor share. His second adjustment assumes self-






This approach is more straightforward but disregards that capital and labor shares might
vary substantially across sectors and with the size and structure of businesses.
Gollin’s third adjustment draws on data on the employment structure of a country. Re-
lying on the assumption that self-employed earn the same labor income as employees, it
imputes the average wage bill of employees (E) to the self-employed. Only income of the












where T E is total employment. This adjustment does not take into consideration that
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self-employed and wage earners might work in different sectors, realizing different labor
productivities. For example, if self-employment mainly occurs in subsistence farming and
other low-productive activities, as it is typically the case in developing countries, this equa-
tion systematically overestimates the labor share. To account for such systematic differ-
ences, some studies (Arpaia et al., 2009, OECD, 2012, and others) use average sector wages
to impute the income of the self-employed per sector. Such detailed data is, however, only
available for OECD countries (for example in the EU KLEMS data).
Gollin (2002) finds labor shares to be more or less constant across time and space when
applying his adjustments and therefore suggests to adhere to models using a Cobb-Douglas
production technology.3 He finds the labor share to range between 60 and 85 %. His results
are, however, based on a small sample of 31 high and low income countries observed at only
one point in time. Recent studies challenge these findings, as reviewed in the next section.
2.3 Data review
Aside from Gollin (2002), various international organizations as well as researchers have
taken up the analysis of trends in labor shares. The majority of the empirical literature
(Arpaia et al., 2009, Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003, Blanchard, 1997, Daudey and García-
Peñalosa, 2007, Ellis and Smith, 2007, Elsby and Sahin, 2013, Guscina, 2006, Hutchinson
and Persyn, 2012, IMF, 2007, Jaumotte and Tytell, 2007, OECD, 2012, Slaughter, 2001,
and others) , is restricted to OECD countries, where data quality as well as coverage is high
and data on employment structure and mixed income available. They rely on the naïve labor
share or, additionally, Gollin’s third adjustment, as it is for example provided in the Euro-
pean Commission’s AMECO database. Piketty (2014) adopts an entirely different approach
and uses tax data to study the distribution of top incomes and capital gains.4 His study is
restricted to around 30 countries, mainly from the Western Hemisphere, that provide in-
come tax data. When he splits mixed income between capital and labor income, he relies
on Gollin’s second adjustment.
There are some more broader studies (for example, Bernanke and Gürkaynak, 2001,
Diwan, 2001, Guerriero and Sen, 2012, Harrison, 2005, Jayadev, 2007, Karabarbounis and
Neiman, 2014, Rodriguez and Jayadev, 2010, Stockhammer, 2013) that conduct worldwide
analyses including a number of developing countries. Like the recent study by Karabar-
3Due to its assumption of constant output elasticities and factor remuneration according to productivity,
the Cobb-Douglas production technology predicts factor shares to be constant over time.
4Available in the World Top Income Database.
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bounis and Neiman (2014), they mainly base their analysis on the naïve labor share. As
data is lacking, applying one of Gollin’s adjustments (usually, the first or third) comes with
the consequence that only a few developing countries remain in the sample.5 Some other
studies (such as Maarek and Decreuse, 2015, Ortega and Rodriguez, 2001 use the UNIDO
INDSTAT data set which, however, only measures the labor share in the corporate manufac-
turing sector. The ILO Global Wage Database, the ILO/IILS data and the Socio Economic
Accounts of the World Input Output Database (WIOD SEA) are additional data sources.
Likewise, they provide adjusted labor shares only for a handful of developing countries.
With adjusted labor share data for 127 low, middle and high income countries for at
least 20 years, the Penn World Table (PWT) is the largest provider of data on global labor
share trends.6 By using data on total agricultural value added as a proxy for MI, Inklaar
and Timmer (2013) are able to increase the number of sample countries by about 60. Time
and country coverage is further extended by interpolating and keeping labor shares constant
over time. They develop a “best estimate” labor share that chooses the most appropriate
from the three Gollin adjustments according to three rules which are based on a country’s
data availability and plausibility. The final labor share data for low and middle income
countries eventually relies in almost equal shares on LSG2 – assuming that self-employed
mixed income has the same labor share as employees – and, where not available, on LSG1 –
classifying all self-employed income (proxied by agricultural value added) as labor income.
In the few remaining cases, they hold on to the naïve share when it exceeds 70 % and prefer
LSG3 in case this yields lower estimates than LSG1 (given the risk of overestimation).
In contrast to Gollin’s results, all studies find the labor share to be decreasing in most of
the high income countries in the past forty years, regardless of how labor’s share in national
income is measured. The global studies confirm this decline and thus indicate also a negative
trend for the developing world since 1990. The labor share is also found to be less than the
ubiquitous ’two-thirds’ on the global level. For example, it averages 52 % and 46 % in the
PWT and in Harrison (2005) respectively.
To date, the PWT are the most comprehensive data set for labor shares of developing
countries. They are a good starting point, but there is room for precision for the specific
sample of low and middle income countries: Most importantly, as measuring the labor
share of developing countries depends on deficient national account data and necessitates
a set of assumptions, databases should verify their results, for example by checking them
against country- or region-specific data. Furthermore, studies may not adequately account
5For example, when Rodriguez and Jayadev (2010) adjust their naïve labor share data set of 135 countries
for mixed income, their sample size sharply reduces to 59 (mainly high income) countries.
6It publishes labor share data since its version 8.0 released in 2013.
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for systematic differences between industrialized and developing economies when applying
the same assumptions for a global sample. Therefore, value may be added to the existing
data by using a separate empirical investigation.
In view of this, my data set contributes to the literature in three respects: First, it draws
upon additional information from SAMs to increase the reliability of macro-level data on
the labor share. Qualitative information from case studies and quantitative information from
cross-country data is used to formulate assumptions and to check the validity of the final
data. Second, my data builds on as few assumptions as possible. The PWT interpolates
missing observations and assumes labor shares to be constant at the start and end points.
Especially the latter is demanding in light of the increasing evidence of non-constant labor
shares. Third, my data set is limited to low and middle income countries, allowing to better
consider differences owed to a country’s development status when constructing the labor
share. Besides, I provide additional information on the series of the UN SNA used to take
the differences between the 1968, 1993 and 2008 series into account.
2.4 Measurement challenges
Constructing a macro-level panel data set on the labor share of developing countries is
hampered by the limited availability and reliability of national account data in these coun-
tries. Data on MI (required for LSG1 and LSG2) is only provided by about one third of
low and middle income countries that also report CoE; and even basic figures such as the
self-employment share (required for LSG3) are scarce. This is not surprising in view of the
fact that the most prevailing forms of self-employment in developing countries are micro
and small enterprises (typically street vendors) and subsistence farmers. These forms of
self-employment mostly coincide with informality and therefore usually remain statistically
unobserved. UN SNA standards demand to record the so-called shadow economy but due
to its very nature national accounting often fails to do so (OECD, 2004). As a consequence,
especially national income accounting in Sub-Saharan Africa is fraught with data gaps and
inconsistencies which impairs cross-country comparability (Jerven, 2012).
These data constraints require to select proxy variables for either self-employed income
or their employment share. This, in turn, involves making assumptions about the composi-
tion of total employment or self-employed value added. To extract the labor income of the
self-employed and to decide for one of Gollin’s adjustments, further assumptions are needed
concerning self-employed factor intensities and productivities. This dependence on assump-
tions, coupled with the poor data situation, suggests that data compilation at the macro-level
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is a delicate issue and may benefit from additional (micro-level) information sources.
Choosing a proxy in the context of developing countries takes place against the back-
ground that an average of about two-thirds and up to 90 % of the working population is
self-employed, with most of them being vulnerable and belonging to the informal sector
(ILO, 2014b). The PWT use total value added in agriculture as proxy for self-employed
labor income, building on the assumption that most of self-employed income stems from
agricultural production, with labor being by far the most important input factor (Inklaar and
Timmer, 2013). This proxy is plausible, yet it disregards capital, especially land, as agricul-
tural production factor and leaves aside labor income from other forms of self-employment
(ibid.). In a dynamic perspective, it cannot capture the process of industrialization of agri-
culture, resulting in an increasing capital share in agricultural value added over time.
To meet these challenges, the next section explores SAMs as additional sources of in-
formation before turning to the formulation of assumptions and deciding on proxies.
2.5 Social Accounting Matrices
A SAM is a matrix representation of national accounts that displays flows of all transactions
that take place in an economy. SAMs are constructed by matching and complementing
national accounts, input-output tables, labor force surveys, household surveys et cetera.
They thus bridge income data collected at the household level and macro-economic data
which implies a higher reliability than national accounts. Pyatt, who introduced SAMs to the
World Bank in the 1960s, and others therefore stress the role SAMs can play in improving
the quality of national accounts (Pyatt and Round, 1985). As SAMs break down national
accounts in greater detail, they also make the composition of labor visible. By this means,
SAMs can be used to identify the sectors of the self-employed as well as the corresponding
productivities and factor intensities. This information can be used as basis for estimating the
labor income of the self-employed. Unfortunately, SAMs are not available at large scale.
But the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the UN Development and
Analysis Division (UN DESA) provide data for several developing countries. In addition,
there are a number of country case studies available from various sources.
In theory, a SAM always balances, but in the empirical practice it never does from the
outset. This is because the data stems from different sources, national accounts are often
inconsistent in developing countries and SAMs require to convert every item into money
flows. For this reason, statistical methods are needed to adjust the unbalanced SAM. This is
most frequently done with the cross-entropy approach which is based on information theory
2.5 Social Accounting Matrices 35
and minimizes the cross-entropy of the distance between the original and a newly estimated
SAM (Fofana et al., 2005). The advantage of this method is that it can start from inconsistent
data (estimated with error) and thus can deal with the poor data situation of developing
countries (Robinson et al., 2001). Furthermore, the approach makes use of all available
information and not only the sums of rows and columns (ibid.). It can therefore balance
a SAM in a flexible and efficient way when facing scattered, sparse and even inconsistent
data. A drawback of this method is that it does not allow to include judgments on the
relative reliability of the various data sources used, as for example the Stone-Byron method
does (Round, 2001). Round (2001) and Fofana et al. (2005), who discuss different balancing
methods, conclude that neither method is perfect and that users should consider it together
with the source data.
2.5.1 Three case studies: Indonesia, Zambia and Bolivia
In a first step, I take a closer look at three SAM case studies that have a distributional focus,
include an analysis of self-employed and their factor income and are therefore a useful
source of qualitative information on self-employment in developing countries. Studies on
Zambia (Thurlow et al., 2004), Indonesia (Yusuf, 2006) and Bolivia (Thiele and Piazolo,
2002), which represent the three major developing regions Africa, Asia and Latin America,
are chosen for this exercise.
As can be seen in the SAM of Bolivia for 1997 (table 2.1), self-employed earning mixed
income mostly work in the traditional agricultural sector, they are smallholder farmers. Out-
side agriculture, self-employed primarily work in the service sector. There, it usually takes
the form of own-account enterprises that engage in wholesale, retail or hospitality. A smaller
share earns income from light manufacturing (for example of consumer goods), especially
in rural areas where processing of agricultural products is common. Self-employed earning
profits (i.e. employers) are mostly active in modern agriculture, light manufacturing and the
service sector (mainly transport and finances). On the other hand, self-employment hardly
appears in the sectors of heavy manufacturing and processing of fossil resources.
It is furthermore observed that sectors in which self-employment prevails are labor-
intensive sectors. For example, in the Indonesian SAM for 2003, the labor share in the
hospitality sector is 80 %, in the agricultural sector 65 % and in the retail sector 58 %
(Yusuf, 2006). At the same time, mining has with 15 % the lowest labor share (ibid.). A
similar pictures emerges from the SAM of Zambia for 2001 (see figure 2.1). Furthermore,
in a given sector, the self-employed seem to pursue a more labor-intensive strategy than
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Table 2.1: Distribution of factor incomes (%) across sectors in Bolivia, 1997
Sector Mixed Employers’ Salary Capital
income profits and wages income
Trad. Agriculture 38 0 0 0
Modern Agriculture 0 11 9 8
Informal service sector 28 0 0 0
Formal service sector 16 55 22 44
Capital goods 0 0 1 0
Consumer goods 8 17 13.5 14
Intermediate goods 1 9 6 7
Construction 4 2 6.5 2
Mining 5 7 5 5
Oil and gas 0 0 4 7
Electricity, gas and water 0 0 2 13
Public sector 0 0 31 0
Total (%) 100 100 100 100
Total (Mio. Bolivianos) 10766 7156 12156 5839
Source: Thiele and Piazolo (2002, p.6).
larger firms. The employment of agricultural capital and thus the capital share increases
with farm size: In the case of maize agriculture, labor makes up 87 % of all factor inputs on
small-scale farms but only 49.2 % on large-scale farms.7 Assessing skills, there is evidence
that self-employed are less educated than the rest of the workforce, suggesting that they are
less productive per unit of labor. First, within the same sector, own-account workers pursue
a less skill-intensive strategy than large firms. As can be seen in figure 2.1, most of labor
in smallholder farming is uneducated, whereas the skill content of labor is higher for larger
farms. Second, self-employed work in sectors where unskilled labor prevails (Yusuf, 2006).
Finally, the Bolivian SAM gives some indication on how the labor income of the self-
employed compares to employees’ wages. As can be seen in figure 2.2, smallholders and
urban own-account workers – who represent the bulk of self-employed – are the most worst
off, suggesting a relatively low labor income (besides a low income from capital). An
exception are urban employers who realize the highest income, mainly from capital; they
are small in number though. The average wage employee earns more than the average
self-employed, suggesting that own-account enterprises are less productive than their larger
counterparts (which is mainly due to their low educational attainment and limited access to
7The reason of higher labor intensities in small farms is often seen in the availability of family labor which
gives smallholders easy access to manpower (WB, 2013, Wiggins et al., 2010).
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Figure 2.1: Factor employment across sectors in Zambia, 2001
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Source: Author’s illustration based on Thurlow et al. (2004, Table 5.6).
capital).
What can be learnt from these case studies regarding self-employed labor income? Most
importantly, the level of self-employed labor-income primarily depends on the type of self-
employment. Rural own-account workers have high labor shares but earn relatively low
incomes, such that their labor income is likely to be lower than that of wage employees.
Urban own-account workers earn more than their rural counterparts, their labor shares are
high when they work for example in the service sector and lower if they are manufactur-
ing entrepreneurs. Employers seem to be above average earners, they do not only earn
mixed income but also profits. How high the labor incomes of employers and urban own
account workers are in relation to employees is therefore not clear from the outset, they
could be higher, equal or lower, depending on their skills and the sector in which they
work. How employees’ labor incomes relate to self-employed labor income on the national
level depends therefore crucially on the employment structure of an economy. Figure 2.3
therefore shows the share of employees, employers, own-account and contributing family
workers across income groups and regions in 2010. As can be seen, the share of vulnera-
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Source: Author’s illustration based on Thiele and Piazolo (2002, table 8).
ble (self-)employment (i.e. own-account and contributing family workers) is about 80 % in
low-income countries; here only 2 % of all self-employed are employers. The share of self-
employment (and its vulnerability share) decreases in the course of development such that
in upper middle income countries, self-employed only make up 36 % of all employed, about
6 % of them being employers. The share of vulnerable self-employment is especially high
in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Furthermore, own-account workers in low income
countries mostly run rural subsistence businesses, whereas own-account workers in upper
middle income countries are more likely to be urban entrepreneurs, with a high degree of
similarity to employers (Cho et al., 2015). Of course, these are just individual cases but find-
ings are consistent with the general literature on self-employment in developing countries
(for example, Bargain and Kwenda, 2011, Cho et al., 2015, Fields, 2014, Fox and Sohnesen,
2012, ILO, 2016 and WB, 2013).
2.6 Measuring the labor share: Steps of construction
Now having a more precise understanding of self-employment in low and middle income
countries, I turn to the construction of an aggregate labor share data set. As illustrated above,
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Note: Self-employment = Own-account workers + Contributing family workers + Employers; Vulnerable
employment = Own-account workers + Contributing family workers.
Source: Author’s illustration based on ILO (2017a).
there are mainly three alternatives to adjust the naïve labor share for self-employment, rely-
ing on three different assumptions.
As a basis, the naïve labor share is computed from the UN SNA with Formula 2.3.8
Data is retrieved from the most recent UN SNA series available.9 The final labor share data
set includes information on the UN SNA series used, as there can be substantial differences
between them.
In a next step, the naïve labor share is adjusted for self-employment. Gollin’s first ad-
justment treats all self-employed income as labor income. Although SAMs have shown that
typical self-employed activities are associated with high labor shares, this approach tends
to overestimate the labor share. Studying SAMs revealed that there is an (albeit small) non-
8Data on CoE is determined by the income approach (or, more precisely, the primary distribution of income
accounts). Conversely, I take GDP from the expenditure side, although theoretically producing the same result
as GDP coming from the income side. The reason behind is that when using expenditure components (rather
than income components) to measure GDP, there is a higher reliability that the informal sector is covered as
well (Schneider and Bühn, 2016, US Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2009).
9Within a series, I chose the sub-series with the lowest number available. In case this procedure results
in different series for compensation of employees and GDP, I adapt case by case to make sure that the same
series is used for both items.
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labor share in smallholder agriculture and that the higher the share of urban own-account
workers and employers, the higher the capital share. The next option – Gollin’s second
adjustment – assumes self-employed income to contain the same mix of capital and labor
income as the rest of the economy. This, by contrast, rather understates the labor share. It
might be appropriate for urban own-account workers and employers but smallholder farm-
ers have much higher labor shares than incorporated businesses. Furthermore, as mentioned
above, applying either of these two adjustments shrinks the sample size as only a few de-
veloping countries report data on mixed income. Gollin’s third suggestion uses the share
of self-employment in total employment to impute the average wage sum of employees to
the self-employed (equation 2.6). On the one hand, this method might be appropriate for
employers and (successful) urban own-account workers, as it assumes that they earn the
same labor income as wage employees. On the other hand, it probably overestimates the
labor share in case self-employment mainly occurs in the form of small-scale agriculture.
However, by imputing not the total but just a share of employees’ wage bill, it can be a
meaningful starting point. Data on the self-employment share (not to mention on the types
of self-employment) is not available for all low and middle income countries. Implement-
ing this adjustment therefore requires to chose a proxy that can serve as indirect measure.
Building on the analysis above, I select agricultural employment as proxy variable, assum-
ing that most of the self-employed in poor countries are smallholders and most of the farm
labor force is self-employed. Certainly, this proxy is more appropriate in some regions (es-
pecially low income countries) than in others, depending on the sectoral composition of an
economy, and disregards self-employed activities other than in agriculture. But the correla-
tion of 0.80 between the self-employment share (taken from ILOSTAT) and the agricultural
employment share suggests that it serves as a good proxy. Aside from the high congruence,
another strength of this proxy variable is the high availability and quality of data. Data on
agricultural employment is provided for almost all developing countries by either the World
Bank World Development Indicators (WB WDI) or UN’s Food and Agricultural Organiza-
tion (FAOStat). Figure 2.4 illustrates the development of the agriculture employment share
by region over time. Similar to what we know about self-employment in the developing
world, it shows how the importance of agriculture varies across regions and how it declines
with the economic development of a country.







where agricultural employment (AE) serves as proxy for self-employment. The full
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Source: Author’s illustration based on FAO (2012) and WB (2017).
imputation seems to be suitable for many countries: In Eastern Europe, Central and East
Asia, Middle East, North Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean this adjustment yields
labor shares that range between 17 and 82 % and average at 50 % or below. Furthermore,
it ranges between Gollin’s first and second adjustment for most countries which report MI.
I therefore hold on to this adjustment in these countries. At the same time, however, it
yields implausibly high values for other countries (for example, 208 % in China, 240 % in
Bhutan or 318 % in the case of Burkina Faso). There may be three reasons for this: (1)
countries might already correct for labor income of the self-employed in their reported CoE
such that any further amendment would mean a double adjustment; (2) the national account
data may contain errors or agricultural employment may be an inappropriate proxy; (3) the
assumption behind this adjustment might not hold for all countries.
Bhutan is certainly a case where the national statistics office contrary to general account-
ing rules already corrected for the labor income of the self-employed: Their reported naïve
labor share amounts to 91 %.10 This seems also to be the case for a few other countries.
So no further modification is done in countries where the naïve labor share is already rea-
10These marking values stem from the most extreme labor shares observed in SAMs, the naïve share and
after Gollin’s first and second adjustment.
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sonably high (greater than 21 %) and an imputation of wages would overshoot (greater than
91 %). A special case are post-Soviet states as they all show a considerable plunge in the
naïve labor share in the early 1990s. Behind this fall is not only the heavy economic trans-
formation but also stagnant statistics: Suddenly, a previously non-existing shadow economy
sprang up in the former Soviet republics which the national statistics offices were not able
to capture (Johnson et al., 1997, Kaufmann and Kaliberda, 1996). Many formerly official
workers began to work as self-employed in the informal economy and no longer appeared
in official statistics. To correct for the increasing shadow economy and the related drop in
the naïve labor share, I leave the naïve labor share in the years before the plunge so that
incorrect upward adjustments are avoided. Most observations with implausibly high labor
shares, however, give reason to conclude that the underlying assumption (same labor income
of self-employed and employees) is not appropriate: Very high adjusted labor shares (above
91 % or even above 100 %) go hand in hand with very low naïve labor shares (below 21 %),
suggesting that the actual labor share lies somewhere in between.11 The cases concerned
are the most backward economies – basically countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and South
Asia – where most self-employed are low-productive subsistence farmers (Figure 2.4, FAO,
2012, WB, 2013. For the low and lower middle income countries from these two regions, I
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Following Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003), the self-employed are assumed to earn on
average two-thirds of employee income. Of course, this assumption is of arbitrary kind but
the resulting adjusted labor shares appear reliable. They range between 11 and 77 % in
Sub-Saharan Africa and 42 and 75 % in South Asia and, where available, move between
Gollin’s first and second adjustment or below.
After completing these steps, Gollin’s first adjustment functions as upper and his second
adjustment as lower bound in countries which report MI and in case the so far adjusted labor
share exceeds either of these limits.
Table 2.2 summarizes the resulting labor share and its components. The final data set
covers about 100 low and middle income countries from 1990 until 2011 (see appendix A
for a list of countries included) for the final data set). It is an unbalanced panel with in total
1397 observations.12 The labor share ranges from 6 to 92 % with a mean and a median of 47
11The most extreme example is Burkina Faso which has a mean naïve labor share of 21 % that wage
imputation lifts up to 318 %.
12The PWT data set has more than 50 % more observations in its sample of low and middle income countries
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Table 2.2: The final labor share (in %) and its components
Adjustment Range Mean Median Obs. Comments
Final labor 6.0-91.7 46.9 46.9 1397 (100 %) Composition of the
share below adjustments
1. Step: Gollin’s 3rd adjustment (with agri. employment as proxy for self-employment)
a) LSG3′ 6.0-87.2 46.4 46.3 707 (50.6 %)
b) LSG3′′ 10.8-77.0 46.8 47.7 256 (18.3 %) In low and lower middle inc.
countries in SA and SSA
2. Step: Use naïve labor share in case it already covers self-employment
LSn 23.7-90.7 52.4 50.5 89 (6.4 %)
3. Step: Framing the data with Gollin’s 1st adjustment (upper bound)
and 2nd adjustment (lower bound)
a) LSG1 26.2-64.5 48.6 52.6 54 (3.9 %)
b) LSG2 21.0-73.4 46.1 46.3 291 (20.8%)
Source: Author’s calculation based on UN SNA (2015), FAO (2012) and WB (2017).
%. While the PWT labor share is based in more or less equal parts on LSG1 (using agricul-
tural value added as a proxy for MI) and LSG2, my data relies in the majority of cases (70 %)
on LSG3. LSG3 is computed using agricultural employment as proxy and imputing the full
average wage of employees to the self-employed in the emerging regions and a fraction of
two-thirds in the less developed regions of South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. LSn is taken
in the few cases where it seemingly already has been adjusted for self-employed income.
Finally, the data is framed with LSG1 and LSG2 where available. Due to the systematic dif-
ferences between self-employed and employees in developing countries, relying on Gollin’s
third assumption might overestimate the labor share of developing countries (Inklaar and
Timmer, 2013). The summary statistics suggest that this is not the case given that in 20 %
of cases LSG2 serves as a boundary.
2.7 Validation of data
To check the reliability and validity of the macro-level estimates, they are checked against
micro-level data from SAMs. IFPRI and UN DESA provide 51 SAMs for 45 developing
countries.13 As SAMs disaggregate by production factors, the labor share can be easily
but this is due to inter- and extrapolation.
13To ensure comparability, I restrict the data to SAMs from IFPRI and UN DESA that both apply the
cross-entropy approach.
44 Chapter 2










0 20 40 60 80 100
% of GDP
SAM labour share Composed labor share
PWT labour share Naive labor share
Note: Kernel density estimates.
Source: Author’s illustration based on FAO (2012), IFPRI (2015), PWT (2013), UN DESA (2015), UN SNA
(2015) and WB (2017).
extracted by dividing the sum of labor incomes by total factor income. Unfortunately, the
size of the data pool is too small to conduct large-scale data analyses across time and space.
Nevertheless, the SAMs provide some usable quantitative information about the size and
distribution of labor shares in developing countries which can serve as benchmark. For this
purpose, figure 2.5 provides the probability density function for the SAM data pool obtained
from Epachenikov kernel density estimates. The SAM labor share data ranges between 24
and 71 %, with a mean and a median of 46 %. These values are very close to the macro-
level estimates from national accounts, giving support to the way of construction. Both
estimates are close to a normal distribution. Figure 2.5 further shows the distribution of the
naïve labor share and the PWT adjusted labor share. As expected, the distribution of the
unadjusted labor share is slightly to the left of the adjusted estimates. With a mean of 52 %,
the PWT estimates are relatively high which is mainly due to the reliance on Gollin’s first
and second adjustment. As argued in section 2.2 and 2.6, relying on these adjustments in
the context of low and middle income countries runs risk to overestimate the labor share.
SAMs only offer limited possibility to check the validity of the macro-level data set in
a dynamic perspective since SAMs are usually constructed at large time intervals; in most
cases there is just one observation per country available. However, some insights can be
gained from the example of South Africa which is the only country for which at least three
SAMs covering a time span of more than ten years are available. According to the SAM
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Note: PWT uses agricultural value added as a proxy for self-employed labor income, the composed labor share
uses agricultural employment as a proxy for self-employment.
Source: Author’s illustration based on FAO (2012), IFPRI (2015), PWT (2013), UN DESA (2015), UN SNA
(2015) and WB (2017).
estimates (see figure 2.6), the country’s labor share decreased by 7 % points between 1993
and 2005 (from 56.3 to 49.8 %). The composed labor share (here LSG3′) shows a similar
pattern, suggesting that this is an appropriate way of proceeding for this country. Leaving
the naïve share as it is, on the other hand, would understate the labor share while the PWT
labor share yields comparably high estimates.
We can also learn from looking at the components of the macro-level labor share (see
figure 2.7). From mid-1990s onwards, the composed labor share is just about the same level
as LSG2, indicating that the adjustment process results in an average capital-labor mix of
self-employment like in the rest of the economy. The composed labor share is centered
between the LSn (no self-employed income) and LSG1 (all self-employed income treated as
labor income) which further suggests that the labor share of self-employment is on average
close to one half (as is the labor share in national income). LSG3 (using agricultural em-
ployment) lies in between LSG1 and LSG2. As the former rather overestimates and the latter
rather underestimates the labor share, it seems to be reasonable to use the third adjustment
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Note: Data on Gollin’s first, second and third adjustment is interpolated and kept constant beyond start and
end points for this illustration to deal with unbalanced panel data.
Source: Author’s illustration based on FAO (2012), PWT (2013), UN SNA (2015) and WB (2017).
as a basis. The naïve labor share is much lower than the adjusted alternatives which stresses
the importance of adjusting the labor share in the context of developing countries. There is
a sharp drop in the naïve share in the early 1990s. This partly stems from the post-Soviet
states in transition, supporting the procedure described above for these cases. The PWT
labor share relies on Gollin’s first and second adjustment and is therefore centered between
these two measures, resulting in comparatively high labor shares.
2.8 Properties of the data set
2.8.1 Descriptives on the labor share
Consistent with findings of other recent studies, my results provide evidence against the
hypothesis of constant labor shares. As can be seen in figure 2.7, I find the labor share data
to be also declining in developing countries since 1990. It is stable in the early 1990s but
starts declining sharply with the end of the Cold War. The labor share recovers slightly
in the late 2000s in the course of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-8 but falls back to
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the pre-crisis level afterwards.14 The negative trend in the labor share is robust to differ-
ent forms of measurement. It should be emphasized that even the naïve share, which only
captures wage employment, is decreasing significantly over time. It is a well-known fact
that the labor share has fallen in most high-income economies over the last two decades.
This is mainly explained with capital-augmenting technological progress and the special-
ization into capital-intensive commodities in the course of globalization an argument based
on the Heckscher-Ohlin model and Stolper-Samuelson theorem. To the extent that labor
is abundant in developing countries, one would rather expect the labor share in developing
countries to rise with international integration. This should be especially the case for the
naïve share, expecting trade and development to expand the (assumingly labor intensive)
corporate sector. The reasons for the decreasing labor share might be different in various
contexts. The literature mainly discusses the effects of technological change, financializa-
tion, worldwide competition, unemployment and the decreasing bargaining power of labor
(Stockhammer, 2013).
The significant downward trend is also seen when regressing the composed and the naïve
labor share on time and the SNA system in a fixed and random effects model (see table
2.3). The composed labor share on average decreases by 0.5 and the naïve share by 0.25 %
points per year over the observed period (i.e. in total by about 10.5 and by 5.25 % points
respectively). The regression shows that the SNA series has a negative but insignificant
influence on the resulting data.15
As shown in figure 2.8, the fall in the labor share has been present in all developing re-
gions between 1990 and 2011. East Asia and the Pacific is the region which experienced the
fastest decrease (on average by 14% points) during that period, followed by Latin America
and the Caribbean (10 % points) and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (8 % points). A con-
siderable decline also occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa (5 % points) and the Middle East and
North Africa (4 % points). Only in South Asia (Sri Lanka, Bhutan and India), the labor share
remained more or less on a constant level. The level of the labor shares varies between the
regions. South Asia exhibits the highest labor shares (on average 70 %), which is, however,
mainly due to the high reported naïve share of Bhutan (about 90 %). The labor shares are
lowest in the Middle East and North Africa (about 40 %) which is expected as most of the
oil-producing countries are located in this region. In the other regions, labor shares range
between 40 and 60 %. The average level is therefore well below the standard of ’two-thirds’
in all regions except for South Asia. This finding corresponds to recent economic studies
14This temporarily reversed trend mainly goes back to the countercyclical movement of the labor share,
meaning that capital owners usually loose more than wage earners during crises (ILO, 2013).
15In many cases, data is available from different series.
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Table 2.3: Regression of labor share on time trend and SNA system
VARIABLE Composed LS Naïve LS
Fixed Effects Model
Time trend -0.514*** -0.250***
[0.078] [0.070]
SNA series -2.596 -0.990
[2.149] [1.704]
Random Effects Model
Time trend -0.519*** -0.255***
[0.076] [0.069]
SNA series -2.235 -0.730
[2.061] [1.665]
Observations 1397 1397
Number of countries 94 94
Av. observations per country 15 15
Note: SNA system is a categorical variable (=0 if 1968 series, =1 if 1993 series and =2 if 2008 series).
Cluster-robust standard errors in brackets. *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value <0.1.
Source: Author’s calculation based on FAO (2012), UN SNA (2015) and WB (2017).
which argue that the labor income share in developing countries is significantly lower than
that in high income economies and about one-half in size (for example, Chen et al., 2010,
Imrohorolu and Üngör, 2016, Izyumov and Vahaly, 2015, Young and Lawson, 2014).
Finally, Figure 2.9 displays labor shares for different income groups (low, lower-middle
and upper-middle income) according to the World Bank’s country classification in 2000.
The level of a country’s labor share seems to be independent of a country’s stage of devel-
opment. Also the negative trend occurs across all income groups.
2.8.2 Unit roots
Descriptives on labor share data already provide some evidence against the long-prevailing
hypothesis of constant factor shares. Nevertheless, many theoretical models are still based
on the Cobb-Douglas production technology or similar models that treat the labor share as
a persistent variable. For future applications, it is therefore important to be on notice of the
possible presence of unit roots in the labor share data as the problem of spurious regression
may arise (Granger and Newbold, 1974, Kao, 1999). I therefore test for the presence of unit
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Note: Data is interpolated and kept constant beyond start and end points for this illustration to deal with
unbalanced panel data.
Source: Author’s illustration based on FAO (2012), PWT (2013), UN SNA (2015) and WB (2017).






where πi is the p-value of any unit root test for each cross sectioni.16 Within this frame-
work, the augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) test is performed which can be considered as
the most common method, testing the null hypothesis of unit root against the alternative
of stationarity. The Fisher test statistic is preferred over other test statistics, such as Im-
Pesaran-Shin, as it is not an asymptotic but an exact test which does not require a balanced
panel. The results, however, should still be treated with caution, given the low power of unit
root tests in finite samples like here (Blander and Dhaene, 2012).
Table 2.4 shows the test results for the composed labor share data. The test comes in
three versions (without constant and trend, with trend and with constant) and is run on the
first, second and third lag which are appropriate lag lengths for annual data. The null of unit
root is rejected in all nine tests at the 1 % level of statistical significance, thus providing
16The test is χ2-distributed with 2N degrees of freedom.
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Note: Income classification according to 2000. Data is interpolated and kept constant beyond start and end
points for this illustration to deal with unbalanced panel data.
Source: Author’s illustration based on FAO (2012), PWT (2013), UN SNA (2015) and WB (2017).
strong evidence against the persistence of the labor share in developing countries.17 Con-
ducting the same tests for the PWT labor share data allows to reject the null hypothesis in
only six (out of nine) versions, which might be due to the inter- and extrapolations in the
data set.
2.9 Conclusion
This paper reveals that measuring the labor share of low and middle income countries is
neither direct nor straightforward. There clearly is a quality-coverage trade-off regarding
its computation: The more global the coverage, the greater the prevalence of poor quality
data and the more questionable the comparability between countries. However, giving up on
its cross-country measurement and simply assigning ’two-thirds’ to the labor share cannot
be the consequence. Although different developing regions can hardly be measured with
the same yardstick, broad data sets are required to analyze comprehensive trends in labor
shares.
17The degrees of freedom equal the number of countries in the data times two. This number, however, varies
across the different tests because data gaps prevent to perform the test on all countries.
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Table 2.4: Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of labor share data
Lags No Trend With Trend With Constant
1 χ2(174)=271.5*** χ2(174)=410.6*** χ2(164)=476.7***
2 χ2(170)=260.5*** χ2(170)=281.6*** χ2(154)=399.1***
3 χ2(164)=370.7*** χ2(164)=267.9*** χ2(144)=375.8***
Note: Degrees of freedom in parentheses. *** p-value <0.01.
Source: Author’s calculation.
Up to date, labor’s share in income in the specific sample of low and middle income
countries remains underexplored. This paper contributes to the literature by providing a
macro-level labor share data set which integrates information from SAMs to underpin the
results and mitigate methodological problems such as the necessary specification of assump-
tions. Unfortunately, there is only a limited set of SAMs available which I do not claim to
be statistically representative. But the micro-data can give guidance in the data process-
ing and validates the distribution of the final estimates. Future research on the labor share
depends crucially on more valid and robust (national accounting) data. Counter-checking
national accounts with micro-economic data can only be a second best option. It is there-
fore recommended that national statistics offices increase their effort in gathering data on
the (informal) self-employment sector. In a first step, data acquisition should focus on types
and sector composition of the self-employed. For this more funding and qualified person-
nel directed towards reliable and regular data collection will be necessary (Jerven, 2012).
Until high quality data is available, it is inevitable to conduct robustness checks on national
account data, with SAMs being just one possibility.
The data set confirms the finding of previous studies of the downward trend in labor
shares also for the developing world. Furthermore, the labor share is found to have an
average level of one half. Future research should therefore develop new economic models




The Labor Income Share in Developing




This paper reviews international panel data on the labor income share in low and middle in-
come countries with two objectives. First, it provides an overview of different measurement
approaches and data sources. Given that labor income of the self-employed – who account
for a large portion of the workforce and often work in the informal sector – is not directly ob-
served in these countries, computing the labor share requires several assumptions. Various
data sets relying on different assumptions are compared and their strengths and weaknesses
discussed. Second, the paper presents basic statistics on the labor income share and extracts
results, which hold true independent of the data set used. Unlike standard propositions,
there is evidence that the labor share is neither constant nor does it represent two-thirds of
total output. The labor income share has been declining in the developing world since 1990,
indicating that labor income has been lagging behind overall productivity increases for the
last two decades, and is found to constitute half of total production output at most. There is
evidence that not only has the labor share for the self employed declined, but also for wage
employees, although they make up an increasing proportion of the labor force in these coun-
tries. The decline in the labor share can also be seen in the manufacturing sector since 2000
and has especially affected low-skilled workers, whereas high-skilled workers managed to
increase their labor income share in national value added. Decomposing by sector further
suggests that not only have sectoral changes driven these findings but also shifts away from
labor-intensive agriculture towards more capital-intensive sectors. Finally, there is evidence
that the increasing gap between a country’s wage rates and productivity – and not changes
in employment – is driving these results.
3.1 Motivation
The labor share measures the share of an economy’s national income that stems from labor,
in contrast to the income share earned by other factors of production, mainly capital. The
labor share is of particular relevance for developing countries, especially in their effort to
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fight poverty and inequality. In the developing world, a bulk of the society only has its labor
force to earn income and most low income households are poor because their work does
not generate enough income. About one third of all employed persons in these countries are
working poor, meaning that they live on less than 2 US-Dollar a day (ILO, 2014a). Hence, to
ensure that an economy’s income achievements are spread among its society and poverty is
successfully addressed, it is essential that productivity gains also translate into higher wages.
This is the case if the labor share is on a constant and sufficiently high level. However, there
are increasing signs that labor has been losing ground against capital in the last decades,
not only in high income countries but also in the developing world. This suggests that
labor income has been lagging behind overall productivity increases and that welfare gains
have not equally reached the recipients of capital as well as labor income. Furthermore, as
capital income continues to be more concentrated than labor income and inclines to go to
rich households, a declining labor share is likely to correspond to an increase in inequality
between individuals.
These developments have led the United Nations to incorporate the labor share into the
2015 adopted Agenda for Sustainable Development within the scope of the Sustainable De-
velopment Goal (SDG) 10, which is to “reduce inequality within and among countries”
(UNSD, 2016). Target 10.4 (“Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social protection
policies, and progressively achieve greater equality”) urges for more policy action against
national inequality and uses the labor share as an indicator. For example, policies involving
setting a minimum wage or tax concessions for investment, directly influence the relation-
ship between capital and labor and hence inequality. The labor share has been implemented
to evaluate whether public policy is designed such that increased production leads to broad
improvement in the living standards of a society, and not only of a small group of people
earning capital income. To assess the achievement of this target – i.e. the development
of the labor share over time –, data on an economy’s labor income and total national in-
come (measured, for example, by GDP) is needed. However, measuring labor income in
the context of developing countries is an extremely difficult undertaking. A massive data
problem arises from the fact that the majority of the working population in low and middle
income countries works in the self-employed sector (in contrast to the wage employment
sector). Although wage employment has been increasing over time, and in the course of
economic development, self-employment still makes up about two-thirds of total employ-
ment in low income countries, about one half in lower middle income countries and about
one third in upper middle income countries (see figure 3.1). The difficulty in measuring
income stemming from self-employment is that their labor income is not directly observed.
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This is because the self-employed in low and middle income countries are usually own-
account workers or contributing family members (for example subsistence farmers or street
vendors) whose activities are located in the informal sector. As a consequence, their income
usually does not appear in (national) statistics and needs to be estimated. Furthermore, even
if data on self-employed income is available, it consists of income from labor as well as
from capital and its labor share has to be first extracted. Since there is no comprehensive
information of good quality available on the labor-capital mix of self-employed income,
assumptions are required.
As a consequence, the United Nations, or more specifically the International Labor Or-
ganization (ILO) which is the custodian of this indicator within the scope of the SDGs, relies
on the share of labor income of wage employees in GDP, leaving out the self-employed. This
labor share is termed unadjusted or naive labor share in the literature and is meaningful in
high income countries where about 15 % of the labor force is self-employed. However, in
countries where a large share or even the majority of workers are self-employed, this will
systematically “underestimate the proportion of GDP accrued to total employment” (UNSD,
2016). Furthermore, in a dynamic perspective, an increase in the unadjusted labor share –
which is to be achieved under target 10.4 – might simply be the result of people entering
wage employment. When the self-employed switch to wage employment – in developing
countries, this typically is the movement away from subsistence agriculture to the corporate
sector – their labor income for the first time appears in official statistics, raising the labor
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share, even though their labor income has not significantly changed. To avoid this, the ILO
suggests estimating an adjusted labor share, which also includes the labor income of the
self-employed (UNSD, 2016). As previously mentioned, emphasis is placed on the term
’estimate’, since no adequate and broad data base on self-employed labor income exists.
While the labor share has been neglected by the economic discipline for some decades,
the literature revived the analysis of the labor share in the early 2000s and also addressed the
issue of self-employment in this context. However, the vast majority of researchers and in-
ternational organizations have concentrated on high income and a few emerging economies
where they encountered reliable and broad data. To date, only a few studies explicitly deal
with the measurement of the labor share in low and middle income countries and address
the issue of self-employment in these countries.
This paper reviews the various approaches used in the literature to measure the adjusted
labor share (i.e. including self-employment) in the developing world. As the adjustment
process relies on estimations, different data sets and studies using different assumptions
(and data sources) yield varying results. This paper surveys the data and the underlying
assumptions and discusses their strengths and weaknesses. In this way, this paper intends to
give guidance when deciding on the most appropriate measure and on the necessary steps
in future data collection. Furthermore, the data is merged to assess how far their empir-
ical findings vary and if there is a general picture emerging from the data. The various
data sources all show a significant decline in the labor share since the 1990s, when data
for developing countries became available. Across the board, the labor share is one half
in size at most. Moreover, all regions and country income groups experienced this down-
turn, although to varying degrees. The decline holds true for wage employees, as well as
for the self-employed, and has also affected the manufacturing sector since 2000, which
traditionally is a source of hope for productivity increases in conjunction with broad in-
come effects. The fall in the labor share has especially affected low-skilled workers, while
high-skill workers managed to increase their labor share. Decomposing by sector further
suggests that not only changes within sectors have driven these findings but also shifts away
from labor-intensive agriculture towards more capital-intensive sectors such as real estate.
This development takes place during a phase of strong labor force growth, suggesting that
the decline is a result of an increasing gap between productivity and wages (and not due to
fewer people in employment).
This paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 illustrates the concept of the labor share
and presents different measurement approaches. Section 3.3 reviews existing data sets and
their underlying assumptions. I then analyze the data and present basic statistics on the
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magnitude and trend of the labor share in section 3.4. Section 3.5 takes a look at the different
components of the labor share and examines which parts drive the descriptive results at the
aggregate level. Section 3.6 synthesizes the results and discusses implications for future
measurement and analyses.
3.2 The labor share in theory and its practical measure-
ment
The labor share is a measure of the income distribution between different factors of produc-
tion, i.e. between labor on one hand and capital (including land) on the other. It reflects how
much of a country’s national income is earned by labor. It thereby differs from measures,
such as the Gini coefficient, which display the income distribution between individuals.
However, the personal income distribution can be directly determined from factor income
shares once the owners of capital, land and labor are known (Ray, 1998).
Assuming that value added, or production output, is given by Y = f (K,L), where K is
capital (including land capital) and L labor (including human capital) used in production,







where w is the wage rate, i is the interest rate and P is the price level.








As such, the concept of the labor share is similar to the measurement of the real unit
labor cost (Marterbauer and Walterskirchen, 2003) and the wage-productivity ratio (ILO,









The standard approach to describe the relationship between the factors of production
and their production output continues to be the Cobb-Douglas production function (Cobb
and Douglas, 1928). This production function assumes the capital share to be constant over
time and that wages move parallel to productivity. Changes in the labor share may only
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originate from shifts to sectors that use one of the production factors with relative intensity
(for example through trade), non-neutral technological progress, or a deviation of a factor’s
remuneration from its marginal product caused by labor adjustment costs or bargaining
between capital and labor (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003). Early empirical estimations of
the factor income distribution using the Cobb-Douglas production function found the labor
share to range between 60 and 75 % in the United States and other high income countries
(Douglas, 1967, 1976). This gave rise to the standard value of two-thirds for labor’s share
in production output. The same studies approved the long-term stability of factor shares,
which also became one of the ’stylized facts’ of economic growth put forward by Kaldor
(1957).
In practice, the labor share is measured by drawing on national accounting data. In
a first step, data on the total wage bill of employees, which is usually readily available
as “compensation of employees” (CoE) in the primary distribution of income accounts, is





This simple measure is referred to in the literature as the unadjusted labor share (LSunad j)
because it only takes wage employees into account and does not adjust for the labor income
of the self-employed. Adjusting for self-employment is not straightforward because (1) the
self-employed’s income is often not directly observable and (2) the self-employed not only
generate income from labor force participation but also from capital investments.
The first point is a serious data problem in developing countries. Self-employment is
the standard in these countries (see Figure 3.1) but the activities of the self-employed are
rarely recorded since most of them are located in the informal sector where incomes are dif-
ficult to capture. Self-employment in developing countries primarily refers to workers who
are forced into self-employment, given that formal labor markets are relatively underdevel-
oped offering only limited job opportunities (Fields, 2014, WB, 2013) . People are own-
account workers (typically subsistence farmers or street vendors) or unpaid family workers,
mainly because they cannot find employment on the regular job market. People who are
self-employed in developing countries are thus generally in a position of vulnerability.
Even if statistical offices are able to collect data on self-employed income, the second
point causes a further problem since the data usually comes as ’mixed income’, which con-
tains - as the term already suggests - both capital and labor income. The labor component
of the self-employed mixed income still has to be estimated, given that regular data surveys
cannot easily capture the capital-labor-mix used in production.
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Despite these obstacles, it is essential to adjust the labor share for self-employment. If
the whole self-employment sector is left aside, the labor share would be underestimated
and the capital share overestimated (Kravis, 1959, Krueger, 1998). This handling would
implicitly assume that self-employed income only consists of capital income, since self-
employed income is added to the denominator of equation 3.3 but not to its numerator. This
procedure has even more severe impacts in a dynamic perspective as it does not adequately
reflect structural changes in employment: Ceteris paribus, the movement of workers out
of self-employment into wage employment would automatically raise the labor share, even
though overall labor income has effectively not changed. This increase would simply be
the result of fragmented data collection, which captures the income of wage employees but
not of the self-employed. An informative measure of the labor share therefore needs to
encompass the entire share of national income, which captures labor, regardless of whether
it is earned by employees or the self-employed.
There are several suggestions on how to adjust the labor share for the income of the
self-employed. Most prominently, Gollin (2002) has identified three potential approaches,
relying on three different assumptions. His article soon became the standard reference.
His first two suggestions make use of the item ’mixed income’. By estimating the share
of labor in mixed income and adding it to the unadjusted share, we can arrive at a sound
measure of the labor share.






where MI is the mixed income of the self-employed. This procedure overestimates the labor
share as it assumes self-employed income to only be generated from labor and ignores other
factors of production, such as land in subsistence farming.
His second adjustment (G2) takes this into account and only adds a share of mixed
income to the compensation of employees. It assumes mixed income to have the same labor
share as the rest of the economy. It subtracts mixed income from total value added such






This approach is more plausible but disregards the fact that capital and labor shares might
vary substantially between the self-employment and wage employment sectors. In devel-
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oping countries, self-employed enterprises are likely to be more labor-intensive than corpo-
rations as the self-employed have limited access to capital. This adjustment thus tends to
underestimate the labor share in these countries.
A major drawback of these first two approaches in the context of the developing world
is that only about one-third of low and middle income countries, which report compensation
of employees, also provide data on self-employed mixed income.
Gollin’s third adjustment (G3) places fewer demands on the data since it only requires
information on the employment structure of a country. Like the second adjustment, it starts
from a certain resemblance between the wage and self-employment sectors and assumes the
average labor income of the self-employed and employees to be the same, i.e. their labor
productivity to be identical. By using data on the employment structure, the average wage












where T E is total employment, E employees and T E =E+S with S denoting self-employment.
While the unadjusted labor share reflects the share of the total wage bill of employees in
GDP, the labor share computed using this third adjustment relates the wage per employee to
the value added per employed person. It follows that the adjusted labor share rises (falls) if
the wage per employee grows faster (slower) than the productivity per employed person. A
drawback of this approach is that it does not consider that employees and the self-employed
might work in different sectors and under different conditions – for example employing
different skills – with the result that they achieve different levels of productivity. This ad-
justment might therefore underestimate the labor share in high income countries where the
self-employed belong to the top income earners of the economy. On the other hand, it is
likely to overestimate the labor income of the self-employed in low and middle income
countries where they belong to the low-skilled, vulnerable sector. To account for these
systematic differences between sectors and skills, an advanced version of this adjustment
performs the wage imputation separately by sector and skill. This, however, requires high-
quality data, which is very rare in the context of the developing world.
Neither of these adjustments generates completely satisfactory results; each measure has
to rely on assumptions that might not always reflect the true situation of a country, yielding
divergent estimates. Low and middle income countries further face a poor data situation
which limits the computation of and choice between different measures. The next section
collates and reviews available data and derived labor share measures.
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3.3 Data review
A look into the literature reveals that most of the analyses are still restricted to advanced
countries (Arpaia et al., 2009, Elsby and Sahin, 2013, Hutchinson and Persyn, 2012, Jau-
motte and Tytell, 2007, Jayadev, 2007). There are only a few studies that analyze the labor
share on a global scale (Bernanke and Gürkaynak, 2001, Diwan, 2001, Guerriero and Sen,
2012, Harrison, 2005, Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014, Maarek and Decreuse, 2015, Or-
tega and Rodriguez, 2001, Rodriguez and Jayadev, 2010, Stockhammer, 2013). However,
in recent years, there has been an increasing effort among researchers and international or-
ganizations to address the measurement of labor shares in low and middle income countries.
Table 3.1 summarizes all currently available data sets, which (also) cover low and middle
income countries since 1990, as only then did data became also available for the developing
world.
The most important data source to compute the labor share on a global level is the United
Nations System of National Accounts (UN SNA) . It standardizes national accounting and
collects data from member countries to compile data on various national accounts, mainly on
income and production accounts. It provides data on GDP for almost all countries around
the world. Since 1990, it also records data on the compensation of employees for about
two-thirds of low and middle income countries. The unadjusted labor share (denoted as
SNA unadj.) can therefore easily be computed for 93 low and middle income countries,
covering an average time span of 15.3 years per country and resulting in 1421 observations.
Not only is it an unbalanced panel data set but it also does not include a systematic and
consistent record of self-employed income. Only about one-third of developing countries,
which report compensation of employees, also report mixed income on a regular basis to
the UN SNA. Adjusting the labor share for self-employed income by making use of mixed
income is therefore only possible against the backdrop of losing the bulk of observations,
mainly the least developed countries (especially countries in South Asia, South-East Asia
and Sub-Saharan Africa), which do not have the institutional capacity to collect the data.
LSG1 and LSG2 can only be computed from UN SNA for 38 countries (denoted SNA G1 and
SNA G2). The third adjustment alternative requires data on the employment structure of a
country, just as it is available in the ILO’s database KILM (Key Indicators of the Labour
Market). Although less demanding, the data only covers a share of those countries that also
reports on the compensation of employees. Computing LSG3 using KILM and UN SNA
data (denoted SNA G3) gives estimates for 73 low and middle income countries. Due to
data gaps in the employment structure data, it provides a total of 766 observations.
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Accordingly, only consulting UN SNA and KILM as data sources is not satisfactory due
to the data constraints. Further effort is needed to obtain a broad data set on the adjusted la-
bor share for the developing world. This is possible either by consulting additional national
or regional data sources to extend the coverage and fill the gaps of data from UN SNA and
KILM. Another way would be to identify variables which can serve as proxy variables for
self-employed income or the employment structure and are available on a broader scale.
Matthieu Charpe and his colleagues at ILO decided in favor of the first option. They
compute LSunad j and LSG3 from UN SNA and KILM and expand the database by adding
data using OECD statistics (mainly for Mexico and middle income countries in Eastern
Europe) and from China’s and Brazil’s statistical offices. The compiled data set (denoted
ILO unadj./adj.) covers 73 countries, providing a total of 1044 estimates and was published
within the scope of the World of Work (WOW) Reports .
Feenstra et al. (2015) and myself used the second method and searched for proxy vari-
ables to address the problem of limited data availability. Feenstra et al. (2015) chose value
added in agriculture as a proxy for self-employed income, which is available in the World
Input Output Database (WIOD). The rationale being that most of the self-employed in low
and middle income countries (i.e. countries for which mixed income is not available in UN
SNA) are active in the agricultural sector where the labor share is very high. They use this
proxy to compute LSG1, meaning that all agricultural value added is added to employee com-
pensation. Through this method, they manage to compute adjusted labor shares for about 60
additional low and middle income countries. They build a data set which is compiled of dif-
ferent adjustment approaches. For each country and year, they employ the most appropriate
of Gollin’s adjustments, given the respective data availability and plausibility. The final data
set comprises 93 low and middle income countries and is composed in almost equal parts
of LSG1 (using agricultural value added as proxy) and LSG2 (using mixed income from UN
SNA). In a few cases, they use LSunad j or LSG3, latter computed using KILM data. They
increase the number of observations by interpolating missing data and computing constant
labor shares at the start and end points. Their final data set – which is published in the Penn
World Tables (PWT) and is here denoted as PWT – has 2298 observations.
In my paper (Trapp, 2015), I chose the share of agricultural employment in total employ-
ment (taken from FAOStat and WB World Development Indicators) as a proxy for the share
of self-employment, given that most of the self-employed in developing countries are farm-
ers and most agricultural workers are self-employed. I use this proxy to compute LSG3. As
this is likely to overestimate the labor share in the least developed countries, I only imputed
two-thirds of the average wage sum of employees (and not the full wage sum) to the self-
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employed in the low and middle income countries of South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Like the PWT data, my data set is a mix of different adjustment approaches that employs
the most appropriate measure considering data availability and economic conditions. In the
majority of cases (68 %), the data set employs LSG3; LSG2 is used in 21 % of cases and the
remainder is composed of LSG2 and LSunad j. The final data set (denoted as Trapp) has 1421
observations for 93 countries. These are are fewer observations per country than in the PWT
data, which is the result of skipping the step of inter- and extrapolation.
The Socio Economic Accounts (SEA) from the WIOD, as well as the INDSTAT database
from UN’s Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), are two more available data
sources. In contrast to the data sets presented above, they are not based on UN SNA. The
WIOD project has extended the EU KLEMS (EU level analysis of capital, labor, energy, ma-
terial and services) database to a few developing countries by drawing on data from several
national statistics offices and constructing socio-economic accounts, which, among other
things, contain information on employment, labor compensation and value added. Data is
available aggregated as well as disaggregated by 35 sectors or skills (low-, medium- and
high-skilled). Following Gollin’s third approach, the labor income of the self-employed has
been imputed from wage employees to the self-employed, in most cases by sector and if
possible by additional characteristics. The WIOD SEA are only available for 16 low and
middle income countries since 1995, resulting in 258 observations (denoted as WIOD un-
adj./adj.). The UNIDO INDSTAT database is a large industrial statistics database. Like the
WIOD SEA, it too provides data on employment, labor compensation and value added on
the aggregate level as well as disaggregated by 23 industries. Data is available for 96 low
and middle income countries since the 1970s. It only covers the corporate manufacturing
sector, implying that other sectors and self-employed activities are not considered. Never-
theless, it is included in this review (denoted as UNIDO), as it is often used in the literature
and provides valuable information on the labor share in the manufacturing sector.
As can be seen in table 3.1, the data sets vary considerably in terms of coverage and
adjustment approach. The advantage of computing LSG1 and LSG2 from UN SNA is that
this approach makes use of directly observed mixed income. However, the data is only
available for a few countries. LSG3 can be computed for more countries by drawing on
additional employment data. In terms of coverage, the ILO data set by Charpe et al. (2014)
is preferred over the computation that only relies on employment data from KILM. The
G3 approach, however, has to rely on wage imputation, rather than on actual observations,
which can be a problem if the underlying assumption is unwarranted. This seems to be the
case with regard to some countries, as SNA G3 yields estimates of up to 658.4 % and the
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ILO data of up to 231.7 %.
Employing a proxy variable to estimate the labor share – as in the PWT and Trapp
data sets – are only a second best option. Both proxies (agricultural value added for self-
employed income in the case of PWT data and the agricultural employment share for the
self-employment share in my data set) are plausible but disregard self-employed activities
out of the agricultural sector. This may result in labor share estimates being too low. On
the other hand, agricultural value added, in addition to labor, also involves other production
factors (especially land) (Inklaar and Timmer, 2013), while the agricultural employment
share – in addition to self-employed people – also includes agricultural employees (such as
day laborers). As a result, this might overstate the true labor share. In how far these two
factors make up for each other differs from country by country and depends, amongst other
things, on the sectoral structure of an economy. The more a country’s economy corresponds
to the classic notion of an agrarian society, the more appropriate are the proxies. Structural
changes in the agricultural sector, especially an increase in industrialization, resulting in
higher capital and lower labor shares, cannot be captured by the PWT proxy. My data set is
more flexible in this regard as varying proportions of the average wage bill are imputed to
the self-employed depending on the economic development of a country. But this is can also
only be a simplification of the actual developments. In this regard, the WIOD data has the
great advantage that they have been imputed by sector, and if possible, even by additional
characteristics. They can therefore reflect the sectoral development of a country much better.
On the downside, data is only available for a few low and middle income countries, mainly
emerging economies in Eastern Europe.
Table 3.1: Overview of labor share measures for low- and middle-income countries since 1990
Data set Obs. Years Ctry. Mean Median Min Max SD Adj. approach Data sources Authors
SNA unadj. 1421 15.3 93 35.3 35.5 5.4 90.7 11.8 unadj. UN SNA UN 2017
SNA G1 508 13.4 38 56.5 56.1 26.2 87 10.4 G1 UN SNA UN 2017
SNA G2 508 13.4 38 45.6 46 21 73.4 8.5 G2 UN SNA UN 2017
SNA G3 766 10.5 73 62 55.5 21.5 658.4 33.8 G3 UN SNA, KILM UN 2017,
ILO 2017
ILO unadj. 1044 14.3 73 39.6 39.9 3.4 93.8 14 unadj. UN SNA, KILM, OECD, Charpe 2011
China NBS, SNA Brazil
ILO adj. 1044 14.3 73 56.9 56.2 3.4 231.7 25.1 G3 UN SNA, KILM, OECD, Charpe et
China NBS, SNA Brazil al. 2014
PWT 2298 24.7 93 52 52.6 9 86.6 13.1 G2 (47 %), G1a (47 %), UN SNA, WIOD Feenstra et
G3 (3 %), unadj. (3 %) al. 2015
Trapp 1421 15.3 93 46.8 47 6 90.7 12.5 G3b full (50%), UN SNA, FAOStat, Trapp 2015
G3b 2/3 (18 %),G1 (4 %), WB WDI
G2 (21 %), unadj. (6 %)
WIOD unadj. 258 16.1 16 42.3 44.5 22.2 61.8 8.5 unadj. WIOD SEA Timmer et
al. 2015
WIOD adj. 258 16.1 16 53.2 53.4 31.5 104.5 11.3 G3 WIOD SEA Timmer et
al. 2015
UNIDO 1072 11.2 96 29.9 28.3 1.7 140.9 14 corp. manuf. sector INDSTAT2 UNIDO 2015
aagricultural value added used as a proxy for mixed income bagricultural employment share used as a proxy for the self-employment share
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The measurement of the labor share in low and middle income countries is clearly sub-
ject to a quantity-quality trade-off: The broader the coverage, the more it has to rely on
assumptions and the more uncertain are the resulting estimates. In the end, all measures
have to rely on assumptions to obtain a measure of the labor share for the whole economy,
since the labor income of the self-employed is not directly observed. A data set on the la-
bor share should therefore be judged according to its underlying assumptions, i.e. in how
far they correspond to the economic reality of a country. Another important point is data
coverage and quality. Especially in developing countries, where the scope, detail and qual-
ity of the data is not always reliable and requires scrutiny (Jerven, 2012). In light of these
circumstances, the data set by PWT and myself are preferred options because they have a
broad coverage and at the same time choose the most appropriate adjustment approach on
a case-by-case basis. Since data availability and economic conditions vary from country to
country, it is not advisable to rely on one single adjustment approach. For example, some
countries (such as Bhutan) report an unadjusted labor share of more than 70 % and hence
seem to already have covered the income of the self-employed in the item compensation of
employees – although this runs counter to international accounting standards. Any further
adjustment in these cases overestimates the labor share. Equally, computing LSG3 (which
most data sets do) gives reasonable estimates in some cases; however, in other cases, it gives
unrealistically high results of up to 658.4 % (see SNA G3 in table 3.1). A one-size-fits-all
approach is therefore not useful.
The PWT data employs the labor share that is based on the most plausible and available
data: LSG2 is the first choice and used if mixed income is available. If it is not available,
the lower of LSG1 (proxied by agricultural value added) or LSG3 is used, given the risk of
overestimation in these two approaches in the context of developing countries. No further
adjustment is made when the unadjusted labor share exceeds 70 %. My data follows a
slightly different approach, as it takes the income group and region into account and com-
putes two different versions of LSG3. As explained above, varying fractions of the average
wage sum of employees are imputed to the self-employed depending on region and income
status. The resulting estimates are framed with LSG1 as the upper bound and LSG2 as the
lower bound (if mixed income is available) and the labor share is left unadjusted in case
it is already reasonably high (greater than 21 %) and an adjustment would overestimate
the labor share (greater than 91 %). Furthermore, my data set corrects for a considerable
plunge in the labor share estimates of post-Soviet states in the early 1990s since this is not
only the result of the heavy economic transformation at that time but also due to changes
in the acquisition of data (suddenly, an informal and unobserved economy evolved). An-
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other advantage of my data set is that the final estimates are checked against micro estimates
from social accounting matrices, which is recommended for data sets based in large part on
assumptions.
As a result of varying coverage (of countries and time periods) and varied adjustment
approaches involving different assumptions, the estimates of unadjusted and adjusted labor
shares differ considerably between the data sets. Before discussing the level and trend of the
estimates in the next section, the correlation between the estimates is investigated. Table 3.2
shows the pairwise correlations between the adjusted and unadjusted labor share measures.
As expected, the unadjusted measures (SNA unadj., ILO unadj. and WIOD unadj.) are
highly correlated. When it comes to the adjusted estimates, however, the correlations are
only low or moderate. Although all figures intend to measure the same thing, there are
major differences between them. This is mainly the result of the different assumptions
lying behind the measurement approaches. The data set SNA G3, for example, has the
highest correlation with the adjusted labor share measures from the ILO and WIOD, which
too rely on Gollin’s third adjustment. The correlations between the data sets SNA G1 and
SNA G2, as well as the PWT, Trapp and WIOD data, are moderate (correlation coefficients
between 0.49 and 0.96). SNA G3 and the adjusted labor share from the ILO, however, are
hardly correlated with the other estimates, which is probably the result of the uncontrolled
imputation of wages which yields estimates far beyond 100 %. The PWT measure has
the highest correlation with SNA G1 and SNA G2, as it is mainly composed of these two
approaches. The Trapp data set exhibits the highest correlation with SNA G2, because 21
% of the data set is composed of this measure and the imputation procedure results in labor
share estimates of similar magnitude. The UNIDO estimates only loosely correlate with the
other measures, as they only refer to a small share of the whole workforce and economy. It
has the highest correlations with the unadjusted labor shares (SNA unadj., ILO unadj. and
WIOD unadj.).
Table 3.2: Correlation matrix of labor share estimates
SNA unadj. SNA G1 SNA G2 SNA G3 ILO unadj. ILO adj. PWT Trapp WIOD unadj. WIOD adj. UNIDO
SNA unadj. 1
n=1421
SNA G1 -0.03 1
n=508 n=508
SNA G2 0.7 0.67 1
n=508 n=508 n=508
SNA G3 0.12 0.29 0.24 1
n=766 n=339 n=339 n=766
ILO unadj. 0.76 -0.08 0.57 -0.04 1
n=1036 n=401 n=401 n=582 n=1044
ILO adj. 0.37 -0.03 0.36 0.40 0.48 1
n=1036 n=401 n=401 n=582 n=1044 n=1044
PWT 0.58 0.60 0.87 0.16 0.53 0.35 1
n=1357 n=508 n=508 n=748 n=995 n=995 n=2298
Trapp 0.72 0.62 0.96 0.33 0.56 0.43 0.57 1
n=1421 n=508 n=508 n=766 n=1036 n=1036 n=1357 n=1421
WIOD unadj. 0.85 0.16 0.56 -0.01 0.29 0.35 0.57 0.53 1
n=220 n=149 n=149 n=180 n=198 n=198 n=258 n=220 n=258
WIOD adj. 0.45 0.53 0.68 0.21 0.46 0.41 0.49 0.54 0.62 1
n=220 n=149 n=149 n=180 n=198 n=198 n=258 n=220 n=258 n=258
UNIDO 0.41 0.08 0.34 -0.10 0.45 0.17 0.24 0.18 0.47 0.28 1
n=706 n=274 n=274 n=469 n=600 n=600 n=886 n=706 n=211 n=211 n=1072
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Figure 3.2: Box plots of labor shares, 1990-2011
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3.4 Level and trends
3.4.1 Overall findings
This section displays descriptive statistics on the different labor share measures (1) to in-
vestigate the level and trend of the labor share in developing countries and (2) to assess the
differences and common grounds in the results of these estimates. Despite the divergent
measurement approaches and data sources: Is there a general picture emerging from the
data?
Figure 3.2 provides a box plot of the labor share measures. The median of the unadjusted
labor share measures range between 35.3 and 44.5 % and that of the adjusted measures
between 46 and 56.2 %. This not only shows the variance in the different estimates but
also the importance of adjusting the wage share for the income of the self-employed. If the
labor share is not adjusted in the context of developing countries, it would be understated
by about 10 to 20 % points. A reference line for the standard value of two-thirds used in the
economic literature is also drawn into figure 3.2. None of the measures comes close to this
standard value. As argued by some researchers before, labor shares in developing countries
do not necessarily converge to the level of two-thirds prevailing in advanced countries but
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Note: Data is interpolated and kept constant beyond start and end points for this illustration to deal with
unbalanced panel data sets.
remain about 15 % lower and range around one-half (Chen et al., 2010, Imrohorolu and
Üngör, 2016, Izyumov and Vahaly, 2015, Ortega and Rodriguez, 2001, Young and Lawson,
2014).
As expected, measures based on G1 and G3, which are likely to overestimate the labor
share in developing countries, yield the highest values. SNA G2, which might underestimate
the labor share in the context of developing countries, yields the lowest estimates of adjusted
labor shares. The UNIDO estimates, which indicate the labor share in the manufacturing
sector, are the lowest: It has a median of 29.9 %. The other estimates are in between. As
can be seen in Table 3.1, the mean is always very close to the median. An exception is the
case of SNA G3, where the mean is much higher due to the outliers at the right tail of the
distribution. The range of the distribution is especially high in the case of SNA G3 (21.5 to
658.4 %) but also in the case of ILO unadj. (3.4 to 93.8 %), ILO adj. (3.4 to 231.7 %) and
UNIDO (1.7 to 140.9 %) (note that Figure 3.1 does not display outliers which lie beyond
the whiskers). Statistically, labor share values can exceed 100 % but values far beyond that
limit do not appear realistic. In further analyses, I will therefore leave the measure of SNA
G3 aside and focus on the other G3 alternatives such as the ILO data.
Figure 3.3 shows the unweighted averages of the estimates over time and allows us
to visually asses trends in the labor share. The left-hand panel shows that SNA unadj.,
SNA G1, SNA G2, PWT and Trapp more or less run parallel to each other. Also the ILO
labor shares (see right-hand panel) follow a similar pattern, resulting from the fact that
they all build upon the same data source: UN SNA. The differences lie in the level: SNA
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G1 runs about 20 % points and SNA G2 about 10 % points above SNA unadj. The PWT
estimates range between SNA G1 and SNA G2, while the Trapp estimates are centered
between SNA unadj. (no self-employed income) and SNA G1 (total mixed income is added
to the compensation of employees) and are close to SNA G2. By contrast, the UNIDO
and WIOD estimates – which are based on other data sources – follow a different pattern.
However, on average, the WIOD and ILO estimates of adjusted labor shares, both relying
on G3, and SNA G1, move on the same level.
Interestingly and despite the differences in levels, all measures exhibit a negative trend:
The labor share seems to be stable in the early 1990s but starts to decrease in the second half
of the decade. It slightly recovers during the Financial Crisis of 2007-08 but falls back to
the initial level afterwards. This trend is robust in all estimates. This strongly suggests that
declining labor shares are not only an issue in advanced countries but also in the developing
world. Only the UNIDO estimates follow a different pattern and show a slight increase in
the 1990s with a slight peak at the end of the 1990s but they have decreased since then.
The industrial sector has a special role in terms of economic development as, according to
conventional wisdom, this has been the sector where value added is growing, wages are high
and the living standards of a whole society are increased through spill-over effects. Against
this background, it is surprising to see that the labor share in the industrial sector is on a
constantly low level and even decreasing since 2000.
To more reliably check whether the estimates follow a time trend, they are regressed
on years in a fixed and random effects model (see Table 3.3).1 The regression results con-
firm a downward trend in the labor share in low and middle income countries since 1990,
independent of the form of measurement. An exception to this general picture is only the
unadjusted labor share from WIOD and the UNIDO estimates. According to the SNA G1,
SNA G2 and Trapp estimates, the adjusted labor share decreased sharply over the observed
period, on average by about 0.55 % points per year and in total by about 10 % points. The
estimates from PWT, ILO and WIOD on adjusted labor shares exhibit a more moderate de-
cline but still suggest a decrease of about 0.25 % points per year and in total by about 5 %
points. It is remarkable that also the unadjusted measures (SNA and ILO unadj.), which only
record compensation of wage employees, show a downward trend in the last three decades,
although the wage employment sector has developed during that time.
1Both specifications are displayed as the Hausman test fails to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of
the explanatory variables with the time and country fixed effects at the 1 % level of significance.
Table 3.3: Time trends in labor shares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES SNA unadj. SNA G1 SNA G2 PWT Trapp ILO unadj. ILO adj. WIOD unadj. WIOD adj. UNIDO
Fixed effects
Year -0.274*** -0.548*** -0.528*** -0.246*** -0.568*** -0.294*** -0.383*** -0.002 -0.244*** -0.057
[0.021] [0.039] [0.038] [0.012] [0.026] [0.030] [0.062] [0.035] [0.078] [0.051]
Constant 38.345*** 63.079*** 51.934*** 54.842*** 53.119*** 42.331*** 60.438*** 42.297*** 56.258*** 30.366***
[0.259] [0.498] [0.488] [0.172] [0.316] [0.307] [0.634] [0.471] [1.050] [0.541]
Random effects
Year -0.274*** -0.545*** -0.522*** -0.246*** -0.565*** -0.292*** -0.380*** -0.002 -0.241*** -0.057
[0.021] [0.039] [0.038] [0.012] [0.026] [0.030] [0.062] [0.035] [0.079] [0.050]
Constant 37.074*** 62.681*** 51.857*** 54.679*** 51.829*** 41.463*** 59.732*** 42.053*** 55.936*** 30.284***
[1.297] [1.754] [1.372] [1.281] [1.270] [1.628] [3.025] [2.001] [2.473] [1.294]
Obs. 1,421 508 507 2,298 1,421 1,044 1,044 258 258 1,072
Countries 93 38 38 93 93 73 73 16 16 96
Standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3.4 Level and trends 75
To conclude, there is evidence that the stylized fact of constant factor shares does not
hold but that the factor labor is losing ground against the factor capital in the developing
world. When the labor share is decreasing although the economy continues to grow – which
is the case in most countries –, this means that an economy’s productivity is growing faster
than labor income and that welfare gains are not fully translated into higher wages. While
wages increase, productivity is increasing much faster and capital is able to disproportion-
ately increase its revenues. The literature discusses various reasons of these observed dy-
namics. Especially technological change towards capital and high-skilled labor, weakening
of labor market institutions and increased international financialization and competition are
suspected to decrease the labor share. It is remarkable that the latter is considered to have
a negative effect also on the labor share of developing countries as classical trade theory
(mainly Heckscher-Ohlin model and Stolper-Samuelson theorem) predicts the labor share
of these countries to rise with trade: Poor countries are relatively labor-abundant and hence
trade will boost the demand for labor-intensive goods. This, in turn, is predicted to translate
into higher wages and a higher labor share and should especially lift the labor share in the
wage employment sector, expecting that trade promotes its development.
3.4.2 By region and income group
This subsection examines whether the above findings only apply on average or if the de-
tected low magnitude and decline of the labor share is present across all regions and income
groups.
As can be seen in figure 3.4, the average level of the labor share varies to some degree
between the regions. Europe and Central Asia exhibit slightly higher labor shares than the
other regions (adjusted labor shares between 49.7 and 62.7 %). Except for the labor share
in the manufacturing sector (as measured by UNIDO), also South Asia has comparatively
high labor shares, even when Bhutan is dropped from the sample (adjusted labor shares
between 52.7 and 64.9 %). The labor share estimates are lowest in the region of Middle
East and North Africa (adjusted labor shares between 34.1 and 50.6 %), which is expected
as many oil-producing countries are located in that region. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa
and South Asia, there is a major difference between the unadjusted and adjusted shares, a
consequence of the large self-employment sector. The labor shares in the regions of East
Asia and Pacific, as well as Latin America and the Caribbean, are in the mid-range. Except
for the measures, which are likely to overestimate the labor share (SNA G1 and ILO adj.),
the adjusted labor share never reaches the standard value of two-thirds.
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The downward trend in the labor share is present in all regions. There are considerable
differences in the magnitude, but the negative trend prevails on all continents and is visible
for all measures (unadjusted and adjusted) of the labor share. Also the labor share in the
manufacturing sector (UNIDO) is decreasing in four out of the six regions. Only the WIOD
adj. measures suggest a moderately positive trend in Latin America and the Caribbean
and Middle East and North Africa. The overall picture, however, is that all regions have
experienced a non-negligible decline in the labor share since 1990. The decline is more
pronounced in East Asia and Pacific, South Asia and Europe and Central Asia and rather
moderate in the Middle East and North Africa.
Figure 3.5 differentiates between country income groups according to the classification
by the World Bank as of 2000. The picture is quite uniform across income groups: The
adjusted labor share remains at a very low level (roughly around 50 %) and has been declin-
ing considerably since 1990. There are hardly any differences between the income groups
despite the fact that the higher the income group, the higher the unadjusted shares and the
lower the gap between the adjusted and unadjusted measures. This corresponds to figure
3.1 which illustrates that the wage employment sector is increasing with average incomes.
Apart from this, there seems to be no relation between a country’s stage of development and
its labor share. It is especially worrying that even the labor share in low income countries
decreased in the last decades. The hope that increasing globalization and economic growth
promotes factor labor in the poor countries seems not to have materialized and may have
run counter the fight against poverty in these countries.
3.5 The components of the labor share
Why do we see these low levels of and decline in the labor share? This section takes a
look at the components of the labor share to investigate the driving forces behind these
findings. For this, recapitulate equation 3.3 and that the labor share is the proportion of a
country’s economic pie that goes to workers in the form of labor compensation. The slice
of labor compensation, in turn, is the product of labor income per worker (or working hour)
and worker (or working hour, respectively). Workers can be further subdivided into wage
laborers and self-employed, or classified by skill. The total economic pie can also be viewed
as the sum of several sectoral outputs.
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3.5.1 Labor force, income and productivity
First, I assess whether the decreasing labor share is the result of an increasing gap between
labor income and total output (also termed the wage-productivity gap), or just the result
of a decreasing number of workers. When GDP is constant, the labor share can decrease
either as a result of falling labor incomes or as a result of a shrinking labor force (or a
combination thereof). Most developing economies, however, have been growing during the
last few decades (ILO, 2010). The question therefore is how far output increases have also
translated into higher labor incomes: Do we observe a decline in the labor share because
every worker gets a smaller share of overall output, or because there are fewer workers?
As can be seen in figure 3.6, total employment has increased in all regions over the
period examined: Between 1991 and 2012, it almost doubled in Sub-Saharan Africa and
the Arab States, it increased by around 50 % in Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and
the Caribbean and South Asia and rose by about 11 % in Europa and Central Asia. At the
same time, total employment is increasingly composed of wage employment. The share
of self-employment is falling but remains on a very high level in all regions except for the
Arab states and Europe and Central Asia. Similarly, the WIOD data suggests that the total
working hours increased by 20.5 % between 1995 and 2009 and the UNIDO data suggest
that the number of employees in the manufacturing sector increased by 29.8 % between
1990 and 2010.
As such, there is evidence that the decline in the adjusted labor share is not driven by
a shrinking labor force. Also the decline in the unadjusted labor share cannot be explained
with a smaller wage employment sector. In a growing economy, where the labor force is
increasing (△L > 0) and labor income per worker is constant (△w = 0), capital income
growth (△i×K) has to exceed the growth rate of the labor force (△i×K >△L) in order
for a decline in the labor share to be observed (see Equation 3.3). This implies that the ratio
between wages and total output (w/w×L+ i×K) has to decrease by a larger percentage than
the labor force is increasing. The gap between labor income per worker and productivity
(wage-productivity gap) must have widened considerably over the examined period. If labor
income per worker is increasing as well (△w,△L > 0) – which is the case in most countries
(ILO, 2017b) – capital income has to grow even faster to exceed the growth rate of total
labor income (△w× L). The employment statistics therefore suggest that the slice going
to labor is not only decreasing but also that the slice going to each worker is decreasing as
well.
Table 3.4 regresses the labor force participation rate (LFPR) on the labor share to as-
sess the relation between the relative size of employment and the factor income distribution.
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The labor force participation rate is the share of the population which is active in the la-
bor market, either by having a job or searching for one.2 It is therefore an indicator of the
relative labor supply in a country and should be positively associated with the labor share.
Interestingly, while a higher LFPR in the upper middle income countries is indeed posi-
tively correlated with the labor share, the opposite seems to be the case in low and lower
middle income countries. This correlation does not necessarily imply causation and further
effort is needed to check whether there is also causation in place. However, I would like
to mention the model of a dual sector economy by Lewis (1954) in this context as it might
provide a causal explanation for this finding. In this model, a poor economy is divided into
a low-productive subsistence sector and a high-productive industrial sector. As the latter is
more productive, it can pay higher wages and people prefer to transition there and leave the
subsistence sector. However, in the beginning, the industrial sector is relatively small and
does not offer enough jobs to employ everyone. To attract workers, the industrial sector
thus does not have to pay wages equal to productivity but just sufficiently higher wages than
those in the subsistence sector. The model predicts that the higher the labor force participa-
tion rate, i.e. the higher the labor supply, the more downward pressure is placed on wages in
the industrial sector. As a result of these dynamics, the gap between wages and productivity
increases and the labor share decreases (Gollin, 2014). In the course of development, the
industrial sector develops and absorbs an increasingly higher share of the workforce such
that the pressure on wages decreases. Eventually, wages are paid according to productivity
and the labor share decline comes to a halt. If labor becomes scarce, an increasing labor
supply may even increase the labor share. Column (10) regresses the LFPR on the UNIDO
labor share data and therefore exclusively refers to the industrial sector. There seems to be
no correlation in low income countries but a significantly negative correlation between the
LFPR and the industrial labor share in lower and upper middle income countries. This is
not expected by Lewis’ model and additional forces seem to be at work that increase the gap
between productivity and labor income, as mentioned in section 3.4.
2The LFPR is usually higher in poorer countries, as people spend fewer time in education. In this sample,
it is 71.6 % in the low income and 64 % in the middle income countries (ILO 2017).
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Note: Exceptions of the given time range are WIOD unadj./adj.(1995-2009), ILO unadj./adj. (1990-2008)
and UNIDO (1990-2010).
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Note: Exceptions of the given time range are WIOD unadj./adj.(1995-2009), ILO unadj./adj. (1990-2008)
and UNIDO (1990-2010). Income group as of 2000.
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Table 3.4: Regression with labor force participation rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES SNA unadj. ILO unadj. WIOD unadj. SNA G1 SNA G2 PWT Trapp WIOD adj. ILO adj. UNIDO
Low Income Countries
LFPR -0.096 -0.421*** 0.221 0.068 -0.204 0.200*** -0.351* 0.347 -1.302*** 0.220
[0.128] [0.106] [0.268] [0.216] [0.278] [0.072] [0.181] [0.347] [0.345] [0.309]
Year -0.126** -0.051 -0.300*** -0.925*** -1.045*** -0.244*** -0.592*** -0.356*** -0.603*** 0.130
[0.057] [0.056] [0.058] [0.098] [0.126] [0.026] [0.081] [0.076] [0.182] [0.121]
Constant 36.184*** 57.152*** 23.481 76.316*** 72.403*** 43.134*** 76.355*** 32.668 140.229*** 9.738
[9.102] [7.354] [17.873] [14.720] [18.960] [5.126] [12.872] [23.106] [24.013] [22.558]
Obs. 338 220 20 79 79 662 338 20 220 268
Countries 34 21 3 8 8 39 34 3 21 38
Lower Middle Income Countries
LFPR -0.130* -0.232** 0.111 0.099 0.148 -0.321*** -0.258*** -0.284 0.120 -0.762***
[0.071] [0.095] [0.186] [0.198] [0.179] [0.050] [0.082] [0.271] [0.176] [0.173]
Year -0.377*** -0.363*** -0.129 -0.587*** -0.452*** -0.172*** -0.703*** -0.315* -0.234** 0.188*
[0.039] [0.056] [0.113] [0.103] [0.093] [0.022] [0.044] [0.165] [0.104] [0.099]
Constant 48.688*** 58.011*** 35.088** 55.964*** 40.201*** 74.345*** 71.922*** 75.532*** 57.134*** 75.541***
[4.566] [6.020] [13.585] [12.548] [11.348] [3.192] [5.221] [19.770] [11.180] [10.757]
Obs. 636 488 81 182 181 902 636 81 488 445
Countries 64 56 13 26 26 72 64 13 56 58
Upper Middle income countries
LFPR -0.073 0.019 0.506*** 0.445*** 0.603*** -0.035 -0.022 1.504*** -0.072 -0.660***
[0.092] [0.116] [0.177] [0.169] [0.175] [0.067] [0.114] [0.494] [0.171] [0.229]
Year -0.271*** -0.380*** 0.016 -0.467*** -0.500*** -0.304*** -0.428*** -0.408** -0.504*** -0.336***
[0.031] [0.043] [0.060] [0.052] [0.054] [0.022] [0.039] [0.168] [0.064] [0.077]
Constant 47.042*** 48.610*** 9.104 28.375** 11.381 55.269*** 52.417*** -41.244 65.201*** 78.369***
[5.935] [7.469] [11.679] [11.137] [11.563] [4.324] [7.355] [32.534] [11.018] [14.779]
Obs. 413 312 129 229 229 652 413 129 312 322
Countries 45 32 13 24 24 52 45 13 32 38
LFPR = Labor Force Participation Rate, Standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: ILO 2017
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3.5.2 Wage and self-employment sector
Also decomposing the aggregate labor share into that of wage employees and self-employed
can provide insights into structural developments of the labor market and associated changes
in the labor income share.
In the course of development, people switch from self- to wage employment (see figure
3.1). Ceteris paribus, the unadjusted labor share (which measures the share of wage em-
ployee compensation in GDP) should increase and the share of self-employed labor income
in GDP decrease as a result of the shifting labor force. Section 3.4 has shown that the ag-
gregate labor share decreased over time and already gave some indication that this is also
the result of a decline in the labor share of the wage employment sector. Figure 3.7 decom-
poses the aggregate labor share into that of the wage and self-employment sector and shows
their average developments over time. There is evidence that the decline in the aggregate
labor share is the consequence of a fall in the labor share across both sectors. The share
of self-employed in the workforce decreased over time, and correspondingly, also the labor
share of the self-employment sector decreased, given that fewer workers earn self-employed
labor income. The various data sources indicate that the labor share of the self-employed
workers have especially decreased since the mid-1990s. This decline, however, has not been
compensated by an increase in the labor share of the wage employment sector: Although
increasingly more people entered wage employment over the period examined, the increas-
ing number of wage earners did not lift the labor share of the wage employment sector; on
average, it even decreased. This negative trend is most pronounced in the UN SNA data but
the decline is also found in the ILO data while the WIOD data indicates a labor share of the
wage employment sector on a more or less constant level. These findings are not expected
when workers are paid according to their productivity. Productivity increases in the wage
employment sector must have therefore outpaced wages by far. Again, Lewis’ two-sector
model offers an interpretation of these findings, given that the subsistence sector described
above primarily refers to self-employment and the industrial sector to wage employment.
The WIOD data, which only covers middle income countries, allows us to separately
assess the labor income of wage employees and self-employed as well as the number of
working hours. As can be seen in figure 3.8, the labor share of the wage employment sector
increased slightly by 0.8 % points between 1995 and 2009, while the labor share of the
self-employed sector decreased by 2.1 % points. Total labor income of wage employees
could keep pace with the overall value added, resulting in a more or less unchanged labor
share. The labor share of the self-employed, however, decreased because total value added
increased faster (by 903.5 % over the entire period) than total self-employed labor income
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(which increased only by 807.5 %). The average labor income, i.e. the slice in the economic
pie per worker, increased for wage employees as well as for self-employed, but the whole
economic pie grew much faster than total labor income, such that capital could increase its
share and the adjusted labor share fell by 1.3 % points.
Although wage employment has increased over time, an average of about 40 % of peo-
ple in this sample of low and middle income countries still work in the self-employment
sector. With values around 10 to 20 % (depending on the calculation of self-employed labor
income), the labor share of the self-employment sector is very low. In comparison, the labor
share of wage employment is two to three-times higher (on average between 20 and 45 %,
depending on country coverage and data source). The slice for each self-employed person
in the economic pie is much smaller than the slice of wage employees. This difference can-
not be explained by the size of the labor force and is mainly driven by the productivity gap
between the two sectors. This productivity gap is mainly the result of different skill contents
of the respective workforce, as well as the economic sector in which employees and self-
employed typically work. A large portion of the self-employed work in the low-productive
agricultural sector, whereas employees typically work in the more productive industrial sec-
tor, as also suggested by Lewis’ (1954) dual sector model. This finding further corresponds
to studies that estimate this so-called ’agricultural productivity gap’ and predict workers
outside agriculture to be two to four times more productive than workers inside agriculture
(see for example, Gollin, 2014, McCullough, 2017).
Hence, the overall low level of the aggregate labor share is primarily the result of the low
labor share of the self-employment sector and corresponds to the finding that the agricultural
sector absorbs a large share of the (self-employed) workforce but contributes comparatively
little to national GDP. A second reason is the wage-productivity gap in the wage employ-
ment sector.
3.5.3 Decomposing by sector and skill
The magnitude and development of labor shares vary considerably between sectors and
workers of different skills. Unfortunately, SNA data on compensation of employees and
mixed income is usually only available on the aggregate level but the WIOD data allows
us to decompose by sector and skill. This is only possible, however, for middle income
countries.
Standard economic propositions suggest that the globalization process especially favors
the low-skilled workers of developing countries because they are the relatively abundant
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production factor. Figure 3.9 decomposes the labor share by skill and reflects the contrary.
Although the low-skilled make up almost two-thirds of the labor force, they only earn about
one third of all labor incomes and about 16.5 % of national income in 1995. Until 2009,
their portion in total labor and national income has further declined to 12.2 % and 23 %,
respectively, while their number of working hours remained more or less unchanged. The
finding for high-skilled workers is exactly the opposite: In 1995, only a very small share
of the workforce was high-skilled (6.6 %), but their share in the overall labor share was
disproportionately high with 23.4 % and they further increased their share in labor income
to 33 % and 17.3 % (from 12.7 %) in national income over time. Their representation in the
workforce has also slightly increased to 10 %. The findings for the middle-skilled workers
are somewhere in between: They are the second largest group in the workforce and their
working hours increase over time, while their share in overall labor and national income
remains more or less on the same level during the observed period. The gap between overall
productivity and the average labor income of the middle-skilled thus has widened over time.
This indicates that the low levels in aggregate labor share are primarily driven by the
low labor incomes of the low-skilled workers, which is in line with the findings for the self-
employment sector above as it typically accommodates the low-skilled. Also the decline in
the labor share was entirely at their expense. The literature discusses various reasons for
these trends, such as technological change, which is biased towards high-skilled activities
(Dabla-Norris, 2015, Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007). These dynamics have direct implica-
tions for the income inequality in developing countries: As the decline in the labor share
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affected the low-skilled and hence the bottom of the income distribution, it is likely that
inequality within the labor share, i.e. within workers of different skills, has increased. By
contrast, high-skilled laborers – who earn the highest incomes – could further increase their
income shares but still only make up a small proportion of the total work force (see also
Francese and Mulas-Granados, 2015).
Finally, I decompose by economic sector. This gives a mixed picture of the labor share
(see figure 3.10): The labor share is highest in the sectors of agriculture and transport (over
80 %), followed by the textile and leather industry as well as public administration, educa-
tion, health and social work with labor shares of around 70 %. The labor share is lowest
in the real estate business (13 %). Most of the industries, however, exhibit a labor share of
around 50 %. The low level of the aggregate labor share hence results from the generally
rather low labor shares of 50 % of most sectors but also from the fact that sectors with high
labor shares only play a limited role in terms of value added. For example, the value added
share of labor-intensive agriculture is only 8.3 %, on average, whereas the value added share
of the capital-intensive real estate sector amounts to 7.7 %, on average. About half of the
industries experienced a decline in their labor share (especially the sectors mining and quar-
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rying as well as postal services and telecommunications) between 1995 and 2009, whereas
the other half shows constant or increasing labor shares. A similar picture emerges when
only looking at the different branches of manufacturing. Overall, there is no clear trend
within sectors regarding factor shares that could explain the decline of the aggregate labor
share. However, on average, there is a tendency that sectors with low labor shares increased
their share in total value added (mainly stemming from renting of machines and equipment
and postal services and telecommunication), while sectors with high labor shares (especially
agriculture but also transport) became less important in terms of value added shares (see fig-
ure 3.11 ). It appears that there has been a shift away from the agricultural sector towards
capital-intensive sectors such as real estate and the renting of machines and equipment. The
observed decline in the overall labor share therefore seems to result from a shift away from
sectors with high labor shares towards sectors with higher capital shares, rather than changes
within industries.
3.6 Synthesis of results and recommendations for data col-
lection
Future research on the labor share of the developing world will stand and fall with the avail-
able data base. Reviewing data on the labor share in low and middle income countries has
shown that the currently available data is not sufficient. To date, there is a clear gap between
the generally growing interest in the labor share and its insufficient practical measurement
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so that research findings on the development of the labor share in the developing world re-
main incomplete. This paper intends to contribute to the economic literature by collating
and reviewing available labor share measures. The major problem of measuring the labor
share of the developing world is that information about the self-employed in developing
countries, their earnings and labor intensities, are mostly missing but they make up a large
share of the workforce in these countries; in the low income countries they are even the ma-
jority. As a consequence of these data constraints, it is necessary to formulate assumptions
about the self-employed labor income to compute a labor share which covers all workers,
i.e. wage employees as well as the self-employed. This can only be a second-best solution
and data review has shown that there is no perfect methodology to adjust the labor share
for the self-employed. Different data sets rely on different assumptions when computing
the labor share which results in a considerable disparity between the estimates. The best
approach seems to be to employ a mix of assumptions, in consideration for the data avail-
ability and the economic condition of each country, which the PWT and Trapp data sets do.
A one-size-fits-all approach does not seem appropriate. The WIOD data relies on more ad-
vanced and detailed methods, which can more reliably estimate the labor share, especially
in a dynamic perspective. However, this requires high-quality data, which is only provided
by a handful of middle income countries. When measuring the labor share, one must deal
with a quantity-quality trade-off of international income data.
An important policy recommendation is therefore to improve the collection of data on
the labor income share, especially regarding the self-employed sector. This could be done
in the course of the SDGs (of which the labor share is one indicator) and their assessment
by 2030. To improve the coverage and quality of the data, it will certainly be necessary
to increase funding for the equipment and staff of national statistics offices. A very basic
first step could be to collect comprehensive data on the proportion of the self-employed in
the labor force and their division into own-account workers, contributing family members
and employers. This would allow one to apply different assumptions for each group to
arrive at a more precise labor share. In parallel, the recording of mixed income should
be extended to all developing countries to receive an assessment of the real (in contrast
to assumed) earnings of the self-employed. Additionally, data on skills and the sectoral
distribution of self-employed would help to improve the estimation of labor-intensities of
the self-employed. With this data, one could account for skill and sector composition effects
and further assess inequalities within the labor share. So far, such detailed data is only
available in WIOD for 16 middle-income countries between 1995 and 2009.
Notwithstanding these restraints, the available data sets provide valuable insights into the
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capital-labor ratio in the developing world over the past decades. Contrary to the standard
proposition of a constant labor share of two-thirds, I find the labor share to range between
46 and 56 % in developing countries, depending on the data set. The low level of the labor
share in developing countries mainly stems from low productivity in the self-employment
sector but also from the considerable gap between labor income and productivity in the
wage employment sector. Additionally, there is evidence that the production factor of labor
has been losing further ground against capital since the early 1990s. The downward trend
is observed across data sets, regions and income groups, although its magnitude varies with
the underlying data set. Given that the labor force has been growing over the observed
period, the decline is the result of an increasing gap between labor incomes and overall
productivity. Productivity gains, which have been achieved in most countries in the last
three decades, did not translate into broad wage increases suggesting that the potential of
increasing the living standard of the poor has not been fully exploited. This is especially
worrying as capital is usually much more concentrated than labor and tends to flow to the
top income earners. Furthermore, it appears that the downturn has been especially to the
detriment of low-skilled workers, who are located at the bottom of the income distribution.
One reason for the decline is found to be the shift from labor-intensive sectors (such as
agriculture) to more capital-intensive sectors (such as real estate). This negative trend not
only occurs amongst the self-employed but also in the wage employment sector, which is
astonishing in light of the fact that wage employment has grown in importance over the
period of observation. The dual sector model by Lewis offers a first explanation for this
but future research should focus on the potential reasons behind the declining labor share in
the specific sample of low and middle income countries. The downturn takes place during
times of increased globalization and evolving financialization, suggesting a link between
these phenomena. It is therefore proposed to investigate these relationships and explore
whether there is not only a correlation but also causation in place. In general, new theories
of income distribution are needed, which take leave of the two-third standard and stylized
fact of constant labor shares over time (Kanbur and Stiglitz, 2015).
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Financial Globalization and the Labor
Share in Developing Countries: The
Type of Capital Matters

Abstract
In this paper, we investigate how de facto financial globalization has influenced the labor
share in developing countries. Our main argument is the need to distinguish between differ-
ent types of capital in this context, as different forms of foreign investment have different
fixed costs and impacts on the host countries’ production process and vary concerning their
bargaining power vis-à-vis labor. Assuming an aggregate elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor would thus be misleading. Our econometric analysis of the impact of
foreign direct vs. portfolio investment in a sample of about 40 developing and transition
countries after 1992 supports this claim. Using different panel data techniques to address
potential endogeneity problems, we find that FDI has a positive effect on the labor share
in developing countries, while the impact of portfolio investment is significantly smaller,
and potentially negative. Our results also highlight that de facto foreign investment cannot
explain the decline of the labor share in developing countries over the investigated period.
4.1 Introduction
The post-1990 wave of globalization generated a vivid dispute about its distributional conse-
quences amongst researchers, policymakers, and the public. The ’anti-globalization’ move-
ment of the late 1990s and the current backlash against globalization in the US and Eu-
rope, a broad literature on distributional effects of globalization in developing and advanced
economies (see e.g. Bourguignon, 2015, Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007, Slaughter, 2001) and
the recent debate around Piketty (2014) demonstrate the wide interest in this issue.
International capital flows have been a characteristic feature of this globalization pro-
cess and their effects on developing countries and distributional aspects have attracted the
attention of previous research, as we review in more detail below. ’Capital’ has mostly been
considered as a pretty homogeneous concept in this specific context.1 This aggregate view
1An example is the debate between and about the elasticity of substition between capital and labor. have
recently emphasized the difference between wealth and capital in this context, an argument loosely related to
our argument of heterogeneous types of (foreign) capital. For completeness, we mention that a strand in the
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is sometimes helpful, as it keeps the exposition clear. However, it can be misleading in cases
where very different modes of production are associated with specific capital flows.
The effect of foreign investment on developing countries’ functional income distribu-
tion is such a case. While certain types of these investments (most notably portfolio in-
vestment) might represent capital in a general sense, foreign direct investment is further
associated with transferring certain production technologies, management techniques, and
other features that by themselves will alter factor demand and associated income shares in
host developing countries.2 This leads us to the hypothesis that foreign portfolio investment
(FPI) will have a different impact on developing countries’ labor share than foreign direct
investment (FDI). Taking a first descriptive glance at the data that we are going to present
and analyze in this paper supports the reasonability of this hypothesis: Figure 4.1 shows
the unconditional correlations between mean annual changes of foreign investment and of
the labor share (taken from PWT) in our sample of developing and transition countries after
1992 for FDI (left panel) and FPI (right panel). Without claiming any causation at that stage,
three observations are worth noticing: First, there have been substantial changes in the labor
share over the last two decades in several developing countries, mostly to the downside.3
Second, de facto financial globalization is an unlikely candidate to explain the main part
of this dynamics. This can be inferred from the low correlation, especially for portfolio
investment (suggesting that other factors have been more relevant) and from the fact that the
more relevant correlation between FDI and the labor share seems to be positive (suggesting
that it cannot explain the declining labor share). This is not to say that foreign capital is
unlikely to matter. On the contrary, FDI might have been an important force moderating
the decline in the labor share. Additionally, figure 4.1 does not preclude the possibility that
partial effects of foreign portfolio investment are potentially large. And third, correlations
with the labor share seem to be quite different for FDI and portfolio investment: by and
large, the correlation of FDI with the labor share seems to be positive while, if anything, it
is rather negative for portfolio investment, although the latter does not seem to explain much
cross-country difference and is much more susceptible to the potential outlier of Panama in
this unconditional, descriptive setting.
In this paper, we empirically elaborate on the impact of those two key types of foreign
literature has focused specifically on the social effects of FDI but – to our knowledge – has not paid attention
to its differing impact compared to other capital flows.
2While this is generally true for advanced host economies as well, the technology distance and its associ-
ated effects are expected to be larger for developing countries (see the knowledge-capital model of FDI, e.g.
Markusen et al., 1996, for the impact of skill and related factor differences on FDI).
3The only countries with notable increases, Bulgaria and Moldova, are economies recovering from the
post-transition shock.
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investment on the labor share in developing countries and substantiate their heterogeneous
effects. Our empirical analysis relies on the recently published PWT labor share data and
additionally on a new data set on labor shares in approximately 40 developing and transi-
tion countries that we constructed in the context of this study. To estimate the impact of
foreign investment, we rely on several panel data techniques, including a distributed lag
first-difference model and a novel IV identification strategy that explores the interaction of
global financial conditions and distance from the world’s financial centers and is based on
the more general idea of Nunn and Qian (2014). While this provides us with an identifica-
tion strategy that credibly meets the exogeneity and exclusion restriction despite controlling
for unobserved cross-country heterogeneity, we have to rely on weak instrument techniques
to draw conservative inference.
Across the board, our results confirm the different impact of FDI compared to FPI. More
precisely, we find a positive impact of FDI on developing countries’ labor share, while the
impact of FPI tends to be negative but is often not statistically different from 0. This general
result is robust to various estimation techniques and data set variations. Quantitatively, our
results over the period 1992 to 2009 show that an increase of the FDI stock (as a percentage
of GDP) by 10 % points increases the labor share by about 2 %. An increase of FPI of
the same size would result in a decline of the labor share by a similar magnitude (but less
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statistical reliability). Economically, this is a relevant magnitude, leading us to the conclu-
sion that foreign capital matters for developing countries’ labor share. Furthermore, we find
some evidence that this effect depends on a country’s capital-to-labor ratio. However, de-
spite the economically significant effects of foreign capital on developing countries’ labor
share, other factors were more important for it’s dynamics: as the increase of FPI was rather
modest compared to FDI, one can conclude that de facto financial globalization by itself
cannot explain the decline of the labor share in developing countries over the last decades.
Our results suggest that especially trade might be a potential candidate.
Our results provide a number of broader relevant insights and contributions. First and
foremost, we contribute to a larger debate and literature on the overall distributional con-
sequences of globalization in developing countries (e.g. Dollar and Kraay, 2004, Prasad
et al., 2003, Verhoogen, 2008), showing that the popular view that increasing capital mo-
bility came at the expense of labor income in these countries is generally not defensible, at
least for de facto capital mobility. This has several policy implications for developing coun-
tries integrating into the world economy. Second, and relatedly, we add to a more focused
debate about global developments of the labor share and its macroeconomic determinants
and consequences (e.g. Harrison, 2005, Hutchinson and Persyn, 2012, Karabarbounis and
Neiman, 2014).4 Third, we add to a literature that emphasizes the differences between types
of international capital flows, their determinants, and effects (e.g. Daude and Fratzscher,
2008). This also relates to the debate about the elasticity of substitution between capital
and labor and raises the question to what extent an abstract notion of ’capital’ will provide
us deep insights into distributional effects on the global level. Last not least, we provide
some methodological innovations by proposing a new identification strategy for the effects
of foreign investment in developing countries and providing a new data set on labor shares in
developing countries that covers the whole economy (as opposed to only the manufacturing
sector) and uses country-specific information to correct for self-employment.
Our paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 provides the economic motivation for
our analysis and reviews the relevant literature related to our study. We present the data and
estimation methodology in section 4.3 and the empirical results in section 4.4. Section 4.5
demonstrates the robustness of our results and provides some additional findings. Section
4.6 concludes.
4Maarek and Decreuse (2015) provide an analysis focusing exclusively on FDI and its effect on developing
countries’ labor share. We discuss our relation to this study in subsection 4.2.3. For studies focusing on OECD
countries, see Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003), Guscina (2006), Hutchinson and Persyn (2012), Jaumotte and
Tytell (2007), Richardson and Khripounova (1998).
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4.2 Theoretical motivation and related literature
In this section we discuss why it is important to distinguish foreign direct investment (FDI)
from foreign portfolio investment (FPI) in assessing the impact of capital flows on devel-
oping countries’ labor share. We start with a standard neoclassical argument why ’capital’
in the common sense will have largely neutral effects on developing countries’ labor share.
However, we also point out that this argument rests on the assumed elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor being close to 1. We provide some arguments why this elasticity
might tend to be above 1 for FPI (mostly based on bargaining power considerations), while
it is most likely to be lower than 1 for FDI, as the latter requires complementary domestic
factor inputs (especially skilled labor) and does not enjoy the same bargaining power as FPI
due to fixed costs and hold up problems in complex production networks. This leads us to
our hypothesis that FDI and FPI will exercise different impacts on developing countries’
labor shares.
4.2.1 A standard neoclassical interpretation
By definition, the labor share LS is the part of national income Y that is not acquired by
capital (LS := Y −αY ), which allows us to focus on our research question from the view-
point of capital K. Following Piketty (2014), and based on Harrod and Domar, the capital
share of income, α , will in the long run be determined by the return on capital, r, and the
capital-to-income ratio:
α = r×K/Y, (4.1)
with the latter adjusting in the long run to the ratio of the savings rate, s, to the growth rate,
g.
From a standard neoclassical viewpoint with perfect competition, factor remuneration
by its marginal product, and a Cobb-Douglas elasticity of substitution between capital and
labor equal 1, one would expect a broadly neutral effect of capital flows on the labor share
in the host economy: on the one hand, openness would reduce the return on capital in
developing countries (r ↓) while increasing the return on the more abundant factor labor
(i.e. wages). This is the rationale of standard trade models based on the factor-proportion
approach (Heckscher-Ohlin-Stolper-Samuelson) and can be extended to financial globaliza-
tion to the extent capital mobility acts as a substitute for trade (Ethier and Svensson, 1986,
Mundell, 1957). On the other hand, however, the positive impact on wages and the de-
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cline in the return on capital would be 1:1 outweighed in the capital share as the K/L ratio
would increase by the same amount, due to the elasticity of 1; in terms of equation (4.1):
r ↓= K/Y ↑→ α = α ′, which is also the rationale of the long-assumed stability of the labor
share in neoclassical economics.
4.2.2 Moving beyond a substitution elasticity of 1
Recent contributions such as Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) and Piketty (2014, p. 220)
challenged this unity-elasticity arguing for an elasticity greater than 1, kicking off a fierce
debate on that matter (see e.g. Kanbur and Stiglitz, 2015, Rognlie, 2015, Summers, 2014).
A substitution elasticity above one means that there are many different uses of capital in the
long run and that the marginal productivity of capital (and labor) is the more independent of
the available quantity of capital and labor the higher the elasticity. Intuitively, fixed capital
could then smoothly replace workers in the production process.
The view of an elasticity greater than one is also consistent with the view that the in-
creased mobility of capital due to globalization increased its bargaining power vis-à-vis
labor, whose de-facto mobility remained virtually unaltered (e.g. Harrison, 2005, Jayadev,
2007, Rodrik, 1997). According to this argument, threatening to offshore jobs, either by out-
sourcing or FDI, puts tight discipline on workers’ wage claims.5 As Arseneau and Leduc
(2011) show, equilibrium effects of such outside options for entrepreneurs can be substantial
in size.6
On the other hand, one may argue that human capital has become an ever increasing
input factor in modern production that cannot easily be substituted away by physical capital
and give more power to skilled laborers, resulting in a decline in the substitution elasticity.
After all, different forces influence the elasticity of substitution and their relative im-
portance can differ over time, between countries, and between different types of capital. In
the following subsection, we discuss the main considerations influencing the elasticities for
two main types of investment in developing countries: FPI and FDI. How large and relevant
these factors are in practice remains an empirical question, thus motivating our empirical
analysis of the impact of foreign investment on the labor share in developing countries.
5Outsourcing/offshoring and investing abroad differ from each other in the aspect that the latter constitutes
ownership while the former establishes an arms-length relationship.
6Similarly, since attracting foreign investment – especially FDI – has become a policy goal in itself in many
developing countries, labor relations may have been characterized by wage restraints in an act of anticipatory
obedience.
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4.2.3 Factors that affect the substitution elasticity of foreign invest-
ment in developing countries
Foreign investment in developing countries mostly comes in the form of FDI, which is
broadly speaking investment by multinational firms. FPI has historically been less relevant
(see Figure 4.2) but is recently gaining importance in many developing, especially emerging
economies. These foreign capital flows are distinguished by the fact that FDI implies some
degree of control or influence in the host firm (see IMF, 2009, §§6.8-6.24).7 One feature of
this influence often is the direct takeover of management. FDI of multinational firms thus
often has considerable influence on the production process in the host firm and economy,
while FPI should rather be interpreted as providing additional capital to domestic (host)
firms. In our view, this constitutes a major difference between the two forms of foreign
investment that is likely to result in different returns to capital (r) and substitution elasticities
and, ultimately, different impacts on developing countries’ labor share.
Let us start with the claim that globalization has improved the bargaining power of
capital vis-à-vis labor, which is likely to exercise a negative impact on the labor share (and
a positive impact on the substitution elasticity). The associated threat to withdraw capital is
less credible when that capital is fixed, or capital relocation is costly.
For FPI – which, by definition, only constitutes a very small share of the host firm’s cap-
ital structure – withdrawal of capital is relatively easy, especially in developed and liquid
capital markets. For example, it should not be difficult to sell a 0.2 % share of a company
on the stock exchange, so that this threat is largely credible.8 On the other hand, selling
a share of over 10 % (and often much more), as it would be the case for foreign direct
investors, is less of an option in most cases as it would require considerably more time.
Besides from difficulties of placing such a large share in the host financial market, divest-
ment might be costly because the host firm is often integrated in a multinational production
network (e.g. Alfaro and Chen, 2014, Badinger and Egger, 2010, Blonigen et al., 2007,
Yeaple, 2003). Detaching a single plant from this network might thus disrupt the whole
multinational production process and create severe holdup problems.9 There is a large lit-
erature theoretically investigating and empirically confirming these higher fixed setup costs
7Statistically, the distinction consists of FDI needing an ownership share of at least 10 % in the foreign
affiliate.
8FPI can also come in the form of debt flows. In this case, foreign investors might care less about host firm
developments because their capital is preferential to equity. However, it might still be possible to sell the debt
in local financial markets.
9Furthermore, multinationals often transfer technology to host firms. In case they sell their stake, the
technology is appropriated by the host firm or another investor, so the foreign direct investor has a higher
incentive to maintain ownership and control.
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of FDI and associated higher sensitivity to uncertainty, informational frictions, and risk.10
These considerations lead us to the hypothesis that FPI is in a stronger bargaining position
vis-à-vis developing country laborers than FDI and will thus tend to have a more negative
effect on labor shares.
Our other key argument relates to the influence FPI and FDI have on the production pro-
cess and associated substitution elasticities between capital and labor. As FPI takes smaller
stakes in host firms, it can be seen as ’investment at the margin’ that will potentially be
used to conduct pending firm investments in fixed capital. In that sense, it helps substituting
capital for labor, pushing the elasticity of substitution upward. FDI to developing coun-
tries, on the other hand, often revolutionizes the whole production process and produces
at higher segments of the value chain (Harding and Javorcik, 2012). This often requires
relatively high-skilled workers so that capital and labor complement each other consider-
ably more than for FPI, thus potentially lowering the substitution elasticity. Furthermore,
finding workers with required levels of human capital can often be difficult in developing
countries and as multinationals also fear transfer of their technology through labor market
churning (Görg and Strobl, 2005), they often pay higher wages (see e.g. Hijzen et al., 2013,
Lipsey, 2002) which constitutes a further argument against FDI lowering the labor share in
developing countries.
A related rationale is also explored by Maarek and Decreuse (2015) who argue (based
on a search-theoretical model with firm heterogeneity and labor market frictions) that in a
developing country with few foreign firms, FDI would lower the labor share via technology
effects but as the proportion of foreign enterprises passes a certain threshold, FDI starts ex-
ercising a positive impact on the labor share because of competition for laborers between
firms. They find some evidence of the associated U-shaped pattern in 98 developing coun-
tries over the period 1980 to 2000, although the large majority of countries lies in the part
where a negative relationship is present since the estimated threshold of over 150 % (of FDI
stock to GDP) is very high. While related to our paper, their study differs from ours in
several aspects. First, we focus on different types of foreign investment in a broader per-
spective, instead of only looking at FDI. Second, we use country-wide labor shares instead
of only focusing on manufacturing labor shares. While Maarek and Decreuse (2015) ar-
gue that FDI in developing countries is most relevant in the manufacturing sector, it is also
well-known that FDI induces considerable vertical spillovers (e.g. Havranek and Irsova,
10Examples include Albuquerque (2003), Daude and Fratzscher (2008), Davies and Kristjánsdóttir (2010),
Hashimoto and Wacker (2016), Javorcik and Wei (2009), Kesternich and Schnitzer (2010), Razin et al. (1998),
van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009), Wei (2000). See also Helpman et al. (2004) for fixed costs of
horizontal FDI.
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2011). Furthermore, although labor markets in developing countries are far from perfect,
it is unlikely that wage developments in the manufacturing sector have no effects on wages
in services, agriculture, and primaries. In that sense, our approach is more appropriate to
capture general equilibrium effects.11
4.2.4 Empirical implication and hypothesis
Our discussion highlights that there are several reasons to assume that FDI and FPI have
different elasticities of substitution between capital and labor, bargaining positions, and
hence also different effects on the labor share in developing countries. Which factors prevail
and whether they are large enough to produce a substitution elasticity significantly different
from 1 and associated effects on the labor share remains an empirical question motivating
our analysis. From the above discussion, it seems reasonable to assume that FPI might see
a substitution elasticity close to 1 and have no strong effect on the labor share, although the
discussed bargaining and substitution effects might tend to exercise a negative impact on
the labor share. Whether the effect of FDI on developing countries’ labor share is positive
or not remains to be seen but from the above discussion we have strong reasons to assume
that the impact, denoted β , will be more positive (less negative) for FDI than for FPI. Our
most important hypothesis can thus formally be denoted as testing H0 : βFDI = βFPI vs. the
alternative H1 : βFDI ̸= βFPI (see subsection 4.3.2.1).
4.3 Data, inference, and identification
In this section, we first describe our data set – most notably which measures we use for the
labor share and how we obtain foreign investment data – and show simple correlations in
the data, including fixed effect (FE) and random effects (RE) regressions. We then present
our econometric model, including the relevant testing hypothesis and identification strategy.
4.3.1 Data
We focus on the labor share as our dependent variable because of its macroeconomic and
political economy relevance (see Atkinson, 2009, Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014) and
because most standard trade and open economy models suggest distributional effects of
11Moreover, the key point of a U-shaped relationship in the Maarek and Decreuse (2015) paper is suspicious
of suffering from a spurious regression problem of interaction terms in fixed effect models. This might also
explain why their quadratic term is unidentified in the IV regressions.
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openness for production factors. Accordingly, we look at the functional income distribution
which is distinct from (but related to) other studies that look at the personal income distri-
bution or poverty effects of globalization (e.g. Arestis and Caner, 2010, Dollar and Kraay,
2004).12
4.3.1.1 Labor share
Simply speaking, the labor share is the fraction of an economy’s income that accrues to
labor (as opposed to capital). Recently, Inklaar and Timmer (2013) provided estimates of
the labor share for up to 127 countries in the Penn World Tables (PWT) 8.0, which we take
as the dependent variable for our baseline estimates.
A relevant contribution of our study, which initiated before the PWT 8.0 data were re-
leased, is that we develop an alternative measure for the labor share in developing coun-
tries. Trapp (2015) provides a detailed discussion of our method and the differences to
the PWT data but the key difference concerns the adjustment for labor income of the self-
employed.13 Our approach mainly relies on Gollin’s (2002) third suggestion which assumes
that the self-employed earn the same wage as employees and corrects for the fact that this
tends to overestimate the labor share in the more backward economies (where many of the
self-employed engage in low-productive subsistence farming).14 By contrast, the PWT data
in almost equal parts are based on Gollin’s second suggestion, which assumes that the labor
share of self-employed income is the same as for the rest of the economy, and Gollin’s first
adjustment, which adds self-employed income (proxied by total agricultural value added) to
the labor income of employees.15 Furthermore, our data use more micro-founded informa-
12However, the functional income distribution generally allows making a link between personal income
distribution on the micro level and a macroeconomic national accounts perspective (Checchi and Garcia-
Penalosa, 2010, Daudey and García-Peñalosa, 2007, Glyn, 2009, Ray, 1998). This is particularly true in
developing countries where most people (especially poor households) only have their labor to earn a living
and do not have relevant capital income, so the labor share directly relates to the personal income distribution
(Ray, 1998, p. 171).
13One may argue that correcting for self-employment is not important altogether, as the self-employed are
usually not working for foreign companies. This neglects that especially FDI can set in motion social mobility
towards the formal sector which increases labor compensation and thus the (unadjusted) labor share, even
though labor income has effectively changed little.
14As data on the share of self-employment in total employment is rare, we use the agricultural employment
share as a proxy. Where data on self-employed income is available, the first and second adjustment suggestions
of Gollin (2002) serves as upper and lower bounds, respectively. No further adjustment is undertaken in
countries that seemingly already accounted for self-employed labor income.
15In the PWT data, no further adjustment is undertaken in countries where the naive labor share exceeds
0.7. Gollin’s third adjustment using the self-employment share in total employment is used when employment
data are available and the resulting labor share is lower than that resulting from Gollin’s first adjustment using
agricultural value added as a proxy.
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tion (e.g. from Social Accounting Matrices) about trends in self-employment in developing
countries to substantiate the assumptions made. We thus think our data provide a more accu-
rate measure of the labor share for the specific sample of our study because it incorporates
more country-specific information about self-employment and does not build on as many
assumptions as the PWT (interpolation, constant labor shares at start and end points). How-
ever, to refuse any concerns our labor share measure was constructed in a way to support
our hypothesis, we rely on the PWT data for our baseline estimates and use the measure of
Trapp (2015) only to check for robustness.
Compared to previous studies about the effect of globalization in developing countries,
it is finally worth highlighting that both our labor share measures adjust for the problem of
labor income of the self-employed (as opposed to Diwan, 2001, Harrison, 2005, Jayadev,
2007, Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014) and cover the whole economy, instead of only
relying on the manufacturing or corporate sector (such as Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014,
Maarek and Decreuse, 2015, respectively).
The measures for the labor share in our relevant sample range from 21.2 % in Azerbaijan
(2008) to 78.1 % in Armenia (1998) for the PWT series, and from 18.7 % in Azerbaijan
(2008) to 64.3 % in Bolivia (2000) for our newly constructed measure. For the econometric
estimation, we log-transform the data. To avoid potential spurious regression problems to
inference that can also arise in standard panel data models if series are integrated of order
one (Kao, 1999), we test for unit roots using Fisher-type panel data tests based on Phillips
and Perron and augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, including also drifts and trends up to three
lags. Of the 15 different tests conducted, 14 (13, 12) allow to reject the null hypothesis of
a unit root in our newly constructed log labor share on the 10 (5, 1) % level of statistical
significance, while the same is only true for 5 (5, 5) of the PWT data.16 Because this
casts some doubt on the PWT series, we emphasize that our key results are also robust for
our newly constructed labor share data which are less suspicious to suffer from unit-root-
induced inference issues. Results are available upon request.
4.3.1.2 Foreign investment
Our main explanatory variables of interest are foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign
portfolio investment (FPI), both measured in stocks (taken from the International Invest-
ment Position, IIP, of the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, IFS) relative to GDP (as
reported by the UN SNA) in order to arrive at a good measure of the relative importance
16This might partly be due to the PWT method of filling missing values with interpolation and keeping labor
shares constant.
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of foreign investment in the host economy (see IMF, 2009, and Wacker, 2013, for more
information on these measures). Along the lines of our discussion in section 4.2.3, the
key distinction between these two types of foreign investment in the IIP is their degree of
ownership which is reflected in different equity stakes in the host enterprises.
Note that this is a de facto measure of capital stocks or financial globalization (cf. Edin-
son et al., 2002). De jure measures, which are based on legal restrictions on international
capital flows, may have some advantages but they do not always indicate the actual degree
of investors presence in the country (see e.g. Kose et al., 2009b, who use an equivalent
benchmark measure for de facto financial openness). For example, many countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa have loosened their capital controls but are only experiencing small inflows
of foreign investment. Furthermore, actual legislation does not tell much about the invest-
ment that has accumulated in the past and hence currently exercises economic effects in the
sense of section 4.2.3 in the host economy, which is captured more appropriately by our
stock measures. Finally, we are mainly interested in the heterogeneous effects of different
types of capital flows which would be hard to compile from de jure data.
The according measures for FDI and FPI in our sample range from 0 (Côte d’Ivoire,
1994-1997) to 132.3 % (Azerbaijan, 2004) and from -0.04 (Tanzania, 2008) to 65.2 % of
GDP (Jordan, 2005), respectively.
4.3.1.3 Control variables
To obtain the ceteris paribus effect of FDI and FPI stocks on the labor share, we control for
a set of variables that have been found to influence the labor share in previous research and
which are also likely to correlate with capital stocks, so that parameter estimates would be
biased when omitting these variables. In the baseline regressions, we limit the control vari-
ables to those we consider most relevant and which still allow us to rely on a comprehensive
sample. In section 4.5, we will demonstrate that our results are also robust to the inclusion
of additional control variables.
To accommodate the possibility that the labor share is systematically different at higher
development levels, we control for GDP p.c., transformed into logs. Note that most of our
panel estimations remove unobserved cross-country heterogeneity, so this variable will to
some extent also capture cyclical effects. As an even more cyclical variable that is easily
available, we control for the inflation rate which might influence the labor share in the short
run since wages react to price fluctuations with some delay, as pointed out by Marterbauer
and Walterskirchen (2003). To control for the fact that countries that produce more capital
intensive should earn more interests and experience therefore a lower labor share, we include
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the capital-to-labor (K/L) ratio (with labor taken from WDI and capital stocks estimated
from PWT 7.0 with the perpetual inventory method).
Furthermore, we control for government consumption/GDP, taken from PWT 7.0, since
Harrison (2005) and Jayadev (2007) find that government inference positively influences the
labor share. The reason is that governments in general pursue redistribution policies in favor
of labor. Government policies, however, change with the opening up of capital markets and
the resulting ’discipline effect’ (Prasad et al., 2003, p. 2), leaving it a priori unclear whether
government consumption correlates positively or negatively with the labor share. National
governments in open economies may be prompted to adopt policies that disproportionally
serve the interests of capital (Stiglitz, 2000).
Another standard control variable, especially with regard to developing countries, is
institutional quality. We therefore experiment with a composite risk rating and an index
for financial risk from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), where higher values
indicate lower risk. The baseline results will focus on the composite risk rating.
Furthermore, trade/GDP is a control variable of particular interest to us because standard
models predict that trade increases the labor share of developing countries. Our arguments
instead suggest that trade may negatively influence the labor share because the bargaining
power of labor can be weakened with increased international competition as labor at home
indirectly competes with labor abroad (cf. Dube and Reddy, 2014, Ortega and Rodriguez,
2001). In any case, it is important to control for trade in our setting, as it might not only
influence the labor share but also be correlated with foreign investment.
Finally, to control for the important effect of education, we use an education index
compiled by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) as our last baseline control
variable. It combines mean years of schooling with expected years of schooling and has the
advantage of wide availability. Again, this is a potentially important control variable in our
setting, as a more educated labor force may acquire a higher labor share while at the same
time influencing foreign investment (as e.g. the knowledge-capital model for FDI points
out; cf. Blonigen et al., 2003).
As a mere statistical control, we further include an (unreported) dummy variable SNA
which indicates if a country’s system of national accounts follows the 1993 convention (or
the 1968 convention otherwise).
In section 4.5, we demonstrate the robustness of our results to including additional/alternative
control variables that we do not include in the baseline regression (mostly due to data avail-
ability and according sampling issues). Including gross fixed capital formation (GFCF/GDP)
helps taking into account different aggregate production technologies. For a similar reason,
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we also control for labor productivity, defined as GDP per worker from PWT 7.0, although
it is highly correlated with GDP. Furthermore, we control for crisis periods, identified by
swift changes in the nominal exchange rate, which also tend to depress the labor share (cf.
Arseneau and Leduc, 2011, Diwan, 2001, Harrison, 2005, Jayadev, 2007, Onaran, 2009).
Theoretical considerations further suggest to also control for the real interest rate (WDI)
because the government may be encouraged to pursue a high interest rate policy once the
capital markets have been liberalized in order to attract foreign investors. This, however,
can depress domestic investment and may have a negative effect on the labor share. We also
consider the PPP-implied exchange rate (IMF WEO) because appreciations may adversely
affect employment in the export sector and thus the labor share and because the exchange
rate can also be considered as a proxy for the fixed costs for capital of relocating abroad
(Harrison, 2005), with an appreciation decreasing the costs of relocating.17 Finally, we also
test for robustness to including an employment vulnerability measure: the fraction of paid
family workers and own-account workers (as a percentage of total employment, from WDI).
4.3.1.4 Descriptive statistics and correlations
Table C.1 in appendix C provides summary statistics of each variable used (based on the
sample for our baseline model (2) in table 4.1). The same appendix also provides a list of
included countries.
Figure 4.2 shows the developments of our key variables of interest over time. As one can
see, the labor share shows a significant downturn since the early 1990s, a trend which pre-
vails in most developing regions. Regressing the log labor share on time (using fixed effects
and limited to observations in the baseline sample) shows a negative trend of -0.008*** and
-0.009** for the PWT and our newly constructed series, respectively. The figure further
shows that FDI plays a much more important role than FPI in developing countries and saw
a much more dynamic development through the sample period.
Table C.2 in appendix C provides pairwise variable correlations. Three observations
seem worth highlighting. First, pairwise correlations in our baseline variables seem small,
so multicollinearity is unlikely to be an issue. Second, the low correlation between our two
labor share measures is remarkable and possibly highlights the degree to which the different
adjustment methods suggested by Gollin (2002) might matter. Third, for both labor share
measures, the (unconditional) correlation with portfolio stocks is more negative than with
FDI stocks.
17Since we note price notation, an appreciation of the currency is associated with a decrease in the exchange
rate.
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Source: See C.1 in appendix C.
Conditional correlations can be inferred from table 4.1 that provides simple panel data
results from fixed effect (FE) and random effect (RE) estimation. For both estimation tech-
niques, correlations of the labor share with FDI stocks are positive, while those with portfo-
lio stocks are negative. While they are individually insignificantly different from 0 without
controlling for other factors, their difference is statistically significant once one controls for
other macroeconomic variables (at the 5 % level, at least), as indicated by the test statistic
in the last line (and discussed in more detail in subsection 4.3.2.1). With those baseline
controls, the positive correlation of the labor share with FDI itself also turns statistically
significant, while the negative correlation with the portfolio stock is only significant in the
FE estimation.
4.3.2 Econometric model and inference
While those first results are already indicative of our key hypothesis, they are potentially
prone to several sources of endogeneity bias. We thus move to a more causal identifica-
tion concerning the effect of foreign capital investments on the labor share in developing
countries. As in the simple FE and RE results above, we start by modeling our labor share
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Table 4.1: Panel correlations (FE and RE)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(LSPWT ) ln(LSPWT ) ln(LSPWT ) ln(LSPWT )
FDI stock/GDP 0.00167 0.00178*** 0.00148 0.00170**
[0.00122] [0.000419] [0.00106] [0.000789]
Portfolio stock/GDP -0.00145 -0.00234*** -0.00166 -0.00177
[0.00146] [0.000789] [0.00126] [0.00112]






ln(Government share) -0.0655*** -0.0490
[0.0173] [0.0329]






Observations 433 309 433 309
Number of countries 51 38 51 38
R-squared (within) 0.27 0.57 0.27 0.55
Estimation FE FE RE RE
test statistic 1.84 16.55*** 2.55 5.79**
Cluster-robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
time dummies, constant and SNA not reported
variable, ln(LS), as a log-linear function of the foreign capital stock variables (FDI, FPI)







+Ψitθ +uit , (4.2)
where uit := αi + γt + εit with αi being country dummy variables, γt representing year
dummy variables18 and εit is an error term with E(εit) = 0 and existing second moment. As
18Note that the included time dummies also nest a time trend, even with a structural break and that they also
account for any ’global’ factors and shocks (such as oil prices).
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discussed below, this model is estimated in first differences and using instrumental variable
techniques, respectively.19 With respect to statistical inference, all estimated standard errors
of these models are robust to any pattern of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within
countries.
4.3.2.1 Inference and null hypothesis
At this point, it is important to stress that our main argument (see subsection 4.2.3) and
related null hypothesis is not about a parameter being statistically indifferent from zero,
as in most empirical studies. As discussed in subsection 4.2.1, a parameter estimate of
zero would even be a resonable a priori expectation under most conventional neoclassical
assumptions. It would not be conflicting with our hypothesis when both forms of foreign
investment have an impact on the labor share that is statistically not different from zero, as
our main hypothesis is that βFDI > βFPI .
We therefore test for equality of parameters in our null hypothesis
H0 : βFDI = βFPI (4.3)
against the alternative
H1 : βFDI ̸= βFPI. (4.4)
Although we assume βFDI > βFPI , we still test against a two-sided alternative given the
absence of a formal model deriving this (alternative) hypothesis. Our inference is therefore
rather conservative. Under the null hypothesis and conventional least squares estimation
(especially first differences and FE), the according test statistic t := β̂FDI−β̂FPI
ŝe(β̂FDI)
follows a t-
distribution with k−1 degrees of freedom, where k is the number of estimated parameters.20
When using instrumental variable methods, we have to rely on other test statistics that
are robust to weak instruments. In that case, the distribution of the IV estimator and accord-
ing test statistics are not well-approximated by standard asymptotic limits. Therefore, we
rely on the conditional likelihood ratio (CLR) test proposed by Moreira (2003) and on the
Anderson and Rubin (1949) AR test, both of which are robust to weak instruments and can
also be inverted to produce a confidence region for our parameters of interest. This allows
a visual inspection to infer where the true parameter is likely to lie. Moreover, the AR test
19For the RE model presented above, it is assumed that αi
!
= α ∀ i and parameters are estimated via gener-
alized least squares in this case.
20In case of GLS estimation in the RE model presented above, the distribution follows a χ2 distribution
with one d.o.f., i.e. the distribution of a simple normal deviate squared.
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includes a test for the exogeneity condition E(Zu) = 0. That is, the null is also rejected
if exogeneity is not supported by the correlation of residuals with the instrument(s). Con-
versely, the CLR test assumes the exogeneity condition to be satisfied. While it has more
power than the AR test, it can only accommodate a single endogenous regressor.
4.3.2.2 Identification
Against the background of our relevant hypothesis, a discussion of potential problems that
may cause a bias to our parameters of interest, βFDI and βFPI , seems at order. It is important
to stress that, given our hypothesis, the relevant problem we should be concerned about
is a potential endogeneity problem that causes an upward bias in βFDI relative to βFPI .
Conversely, anything that will bias βFDI and βFPI upward (or downward) at the same order
is unfortunate for the precision of our point estimates (which we still care about) but does
not affect inference concerning our relevant null hypothesis.
In our view, there is only one relevant economic problem that might cause such a bias,
which is reverse causality from wages (which proxy for workers’ skill) to types of foreign
investment. It is widely accepted that multinational firms tend to pay higher wages and hire
more skilled workers (e.g. Hijzen et al., 2013). To the extent that wages reflect skills, a
higher labor share might attract mulitinationals’ FDI, which is also less sensitive to a higher
wage bill than FPI, and bias our estimated effect for the causal effect of FDI on the labor
share upward relative to the effect of FPI.
Our distributed lag first-difference strategy takes care of this (and any other potential)
source of reverse causality. The model can be written as









FD + γFDt + ε
FD
it , (4.5)
where ∆ is the first-difference operator, i.e. ∆xt = xt − xt−1 (and ∆Ψ might also include
lagged differences). Note that this transformation cancels out the (time-invariant) country
fixed effects while still accounting for unobserved cross-country heterogeneity.
To see why this approach resolves reverse causality issues, first note that the model
relates innovations in the labor share in year t to changes in foreign capital stocks in t −1.
Hence, reverse causality could only be an issue if foreign investors in t (differently) react
to changes in wages or, precisely, the labor share in t +1. This is very unlikely, especially
since we look at capital stocks, not flows, which to a large extent reflect past investment (and
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its revaluations).21 An issue could only arise with high persistence of the (first differenced)
series, i.e. if wage (or labor share) developments in t + 1 are largely echoing those in t.
However, this is not the case as the correlations between current and lagged first differences
of our labor share measures are only 0.05 (for the PWT series) and -0.07 (for our newly
constructed series), and in neither case significant at the 10 % level. Furthermore, first-order
autoregressions of these (differenced) series produce an (insignificant) AR(1) parameter
estimate of 0.003 and -0.021, respectively, indicating that persistence in differences of the
labor share is not an issue.
However, the skeptical reader might come up with other sources for an endogeneity
bias. Therefore, we propose a novel strategy to identify the effect of international capital
flows using instrumental variables based on global financial conditions that credibly meet
the exogeneity and exclusion restrictions, though suffer from a weak-instruments problem,
for which we account in our inference techniques. In our view, this identification approach
is an innovation to the literature that has to date failed to provide a time-varying instrument
for international capital that is not only credibly exogenous but also convincingly meets the
exclusion restriction.
Our instrumental variable identification strategy is based on the well-established fact
that capital flows to emerging and developing countries can at least partially be driven by
push factors in industrialized economies, most notably monetary and financial conditions
(e.g. Dabla-Norris et al., 2010, di Giovanni, 2005, Fernandez-Arias, 1996, Fratzscher, 2011,
Reinhart et al., 1993, Rey, 2013). To gauge those financial conditions, we use the US
financial conditions index (FCI) developed by Wacker et al. (2014). This measure is credibly
exogenous as US financial conditions and monetary policy are not influenced by events in
developing countries in general and the labor share in particular. Furthermore, it meets the
exclusion restriction as the FCI is constructed to be conditional on the US business cycle,
i.e. it captures developments in financial conditions that are exogenous to most important
real developments. This avoids that latter aspects in the FCI exercise a relevant impact on
developing countries’ labor share through other channels than foreign investment, especially
since we control for time dummies in the second stage regression. While the US are by far
the most important foreign investor in developing countries, we certainly also want to gauge
financial conditions in Japan and the European Union (EU) to improve identification in the
first-stage regression. Unfortunately, elaborated FCIs with the required time range are not
available for these economies, so we construct proxy measures that are basically an average
21Note in this context that capital flows are not simply the first difference of capital stocks. See Wacker
(2016).
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of equity prices, bond interest rates and the spread between long term and short term bond
rates.22 These measures should matter for capital flows to developing countries as they are
crucial for the (re-)financing conditions of most relevant investors. The wave of capital
flows to emerging economies in the aftermath of the US Fed easing after the financial crisis
and its reversal amid the ’Taper tandrum’ are obvious examples. To make these (’global’)
measures country-specific, we interact them with the distance of the capital of the respective
host country to Washington D.C., Brussels, and Tokyo, respectively, using CEPII’s GeoDist
database (Mayer and Zignago, 2011). Economically, this captures the idea that US financial
conditions might matter more for geographically close countries (e.g. in Latin America)
than for Eastern European economies, where EU financial conditions might matter more.
Statistically, our identification strategy essentially builds on the idea of Nunn and Qian
(2014) that only the interaction term of both variables needs to be exogenous (conditional
on the baseline controls). To see a discussion of the correlation between our newly proposed
instruments and foreign investment, including first-stage regression results, see appendix C.
4.4 Estimation results
In this section, we report our baseline results of the first-difference and the IV model. In
the following section 4.5, we provide some residual diagnostics and show that our results
are robust to alternative sets of control variables and to the changes in the sample that they
induce. In addition, we provide results from using an alternative measure for the labor share
as the dependent variable and on the marginal effect of foreign investment in dependence of
the domestic capital stock.
4.4.1 First-difference results
Table 4.2 starts with the first-difference results. The unconditional model in column (1) al-
ready confirms our basic intuition of opposing effects of FDI and FPI on the labor share in
developing countries even though only the (positive) FDI variable is significant in a statis-
tical sense, while the difference to FPI, our key statistic of interest is slightly insignificant
at the 10 % level if no control variables are included (as indicated in the last column of
the table). However, the opposing effects of FDI and FPI on the labor share in developing
22We take OECD data for long-term interest rates, a spread between short-term and long-term rates, and a
share price index. These three series are smoothed with a Hodrick-Prescott filter, Pearson transformed, and
the first two are inverted so that a rise in each variable indicates finance becoming more easily available. For
the EU, we take an average of the largest FDI economies, i.e. UK, Germany, France, and Belgium.
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countries, with FDI exercising a positive effect, is clearly supported by our baseline model
reported in the second column of table 4.2. The results suggest that a 10 % point increase in
the FDI stock relative to GDP will increase the labor share by slightly more than 1 %, with
a negative effect of similar magnitude for FPI. Both parameter estimates are statistically
significant (at the 5 and 10 % level, respectively), with their difference being significant at
the 5 % level. Interestingly, the only other two variables that exercise a statistically signif-
icant influence on the labor share in this specification are the capital-to-labor (K/L) ratio
and trade intensity. As expected, but at odds with standard neoclassical theory, a higher
capital-to-labor ratio tends to lower the labor share, while the negative effect of trade sup-
ports the notion that globalization is indeed an important factor influencing the labor share
in developing countries.23
In column (3), we check that the lag structure of our key explanatory variables is well-
defined. Allowing for an additional lag of the differenced foreign investment stocks does
not alter our main results and the additional lags are individually and jointly insignificant.24
Column (4) shows different lags for the control variables, again with our main results con-
cerning the opposing effect of FDI and FPI on the labor share in developing countries un-
changed.25
4.4.2 IV results
As an alternative identification strategy, we rely on the instrumental variable approach dis-
cussed above to estimate our baseline model, with second-stage results presented in table
4.3. As already indicated, first-stage identification is weak (a presentation and discussion is
provided in appendix C), so while the exogeneity assumption of our approach is economi-
cally credible, statistically we have to rely on weak-identification techniques.
In the first and second column of table 4.3, FDI and FPI are only individually instru-
mented, respectively. For both cases, the respective CLR statistics of the relevant parame-
ters are depicted in figure 4.3 (together with the Wald statistics that are not robust to weak
instruments). The vertical axes of the graphs show a statistical rejection probability for the
23The estimated magnitude is of similar order as for our capital flow variables. Given that trade/GDP
increased by a considerable magnitude in those countries over the last decades, this might add up to a relevant
decline in the labor share.
24The p-value of the F-statistics of the second lags of FDI and FPI is 0.78 and does therefore not allow us
to reject the null of joint insignificance.
25We decided to lag the differences of the more structural (as opposed to cyclical) variables education and
capital-labor ratio by one year as we assume that they might take more time to materialize, whereas we allow
for the contemporaneous and one-year lagged difference of short-term variables (such as inflation), which
might affect the labor share quickly.
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null hypothesis that the true parameter is equal to the corresponding value on the horizontal
axes. For example, from the left panel we can infer that one can reject that the true FDI
parameter equals -0.002 at a 90 % (but not a 95 %) statistical significance level, as the de-
picted CLR function exceeds the 0.9 (but not the 0.95) threshold. More generally, despite
weak identification, we can reject a negative value of the FDI parameter at the 90 % level of
statistical significance. Accordingly, we can reject (at the 10 % level at least) the hypothesis
that the true FDI parameter is equal to the point estimate of the FPI parameter in column 1
(not instrumented) or 2 (instrumented). This is also visible from the CLR statistic in the last
line of column (1). Conversely, an according statement cannot be made for the FPI parame-
ter estimate from IV identification (depicted in column 2 of table 4.3 and in the right panel
of figure 4.3). While the results suggest that a negative effect of FPI on the labor share in
developing countries is more likely, weak identification only allows us to reject a parameter
of rather high size (approximately above 0.01) which is clearly above the estimated FDI
effect (of 0.002). However, it is worth emphasizing that rejection of a larger FPI parameter
is much more probable than of a more negative one, while the opposite is true (with more
confidence) for the FDI parameter.26
For a joint IV assessment of both our parameter estimates of interest, we also instrument
them simultaneously, with results provided in column (3) of table 4.3. The point estimates
are close to those obtained from individual IV estimates in the first two columns. For infer-
ence with respect to our key hypothesis, we work with the AR statistic, which is available
for the case of 2 potentially endogenous regressors, and can reject (on a 10 % level) the joint
hypothesis that the true parameter values are equal to their respective other foreign capital
estimates. That is, we can reject the null H0 : βFDI = β̂FPI ∧ βFPI = β̂FDI in favor of the
alternative that both parameters are unequal. Figure 4.4 plots a 90 % confidence set and a
more detailed rejection surface of parameter combinations. The latter is a 3-dimensional
extension of the previous CLR confidence area, reflecting that there are now 2 instead of 1
endogenous regressors. Since visual inspection is difficult, the left panel displays the area
of parameter combinations where the surface in the right panel does not surpass the 90 %
rejection probability.
Looking at the left panel, one could imagine a line where βFDI = βFPI , that would
cross the 90 % confidence set, thus not allowing us to reject our relevant null hypothesis at
those specific points. However, as is clearly visible, the confidence set is not symmetrically
distributed around these parameter combinations of equality but extends much more to the
26Careful observers might have noticed that the point estimates in table 4.3 are not equal to the parameter
values where the CLR function reaches its minimum in figure 4.3. By construction, this does not need to be
the case. Rather, the fact that both are quite close suggests that the model is supported by the data.
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Source: See C.1 in appendix C.
lower right into the area where the effect of FDI on the labor share is positive, while the
effect of FPI is negative, in line with our discussion and previous results.
It is interesting to note that IV estimates suggest a larger effect (in absolute terms) of
both foreign investment parameters than the first difference results. For the most part, how-
ever, this does not seem to be driven by an estimation bias but by the difference between
estimation in levels and first differences27, with the former possibly capturing more long-run
effects.
Looking at other control variables, we can confirm the previous result that trade and
a higher K/L ratio negatively correlate with the labor share. The positive correlation of
the education index with the labor share turns statistically significant in the second column,
with reasonable standard errors in the other two specifications. The negative correlation with
GDP turns significant and government consumption also exhibits a negative effect. Taken
at face value, both latter results are somewhat surprising and at odds with most findings
in previous studies. However, a negative effect of GDP p.c. on the labor share was also
found in Harrison (2005) and the conventional rationale that higher GDP (growth) leads to
27This can be seen when comparing the FD results with level results in table 4.1. Additionally, non-
instrumented foreign capital variables in IV table 4.3 are still larger (in absolute size) than the FD results.
116 Chapter 4






























−.002 0 .002 .004 .006 .008
beta: FDI−Stock−GDP−ratio, in %
90% Confidence set
beta: FDI−Stock−GDP−ratio, in %
0

























Source: See C.1 in appendix C.
more scope for trade unions to redistribute to workers seems problematic in the context of
developing countries that are often characterized by surplus labor, leaving little bargaining
power to unions (at least in the broad economy). The negative correlation of the labor share
with government expenses is an artefact of the PWT data and not robust to our alternative
labor share measure, as demonstrated in the next section.28
The relative economic relevance of different explanatory variables can be inferred from
the standardized beta coefficients in table 4.4. As one can see, foreign investment (and also
trade) does matter for the labor share in developing countries from an economic perspective,
although FDI and FPI seem to cancel each other out for the most part. No clear picture that
is robust across specifications emerges for the other variables, though the more structural
(as opposed to cyclical) variables – education, K/L ratio, and development level – seem to
matter in the IV regression, which captures more long-run effects (with the education effect
being potentially economically relevant but insignificant from a statistical perspective).
28A negative correlation could also arise if governments increasingly moved away from public job-creating
investment programs to social benefits. In this likely case, social benefits would no longer be reflected in
wages.
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4.5 Robustness and further results
In this section, we provide several specification and robustness checks as well as some
further results.
4.5.1 Diagnostic checks
We start with a diagnostic check on the functional (linear) form of the first-difference
model.29 The upper panel of figure C.1 therefore provides a plot of the model residuals
against fitted values and a leverage-to-residual plot. As one can see, the only truly worri-
some residuals concern Azerbaijan (2006) and Moldova (1999). Column (5) of table 4.5
thus re-estimates our model without these two observations. This somewhat lowers (in ab-
solute terms) the point estimates of our two foreign investment variables of interest, without
changing the qualitative implications of our results (as both individually and their difference
remain statistically significant).
The lower panel of figure C.1 provides a component-plus-residual plot for the FDI and
FPI variable, respectively. One can see that there is no reason to believe that the linear
functional relationship would be inappropriate.
4.5.2 Alternative specifications and labor share measure
Column (1) of table 4.5 adds a crisis dummy and gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as
additional controls to the baseline first-difference model. Column (2) further adds labor pro-
ductivity and the interest rate. Note that this also leads to a relevant decrease in the sample
size. However, in neither of the two alternative specifications our key result is affected: Our
foreign capital stock variables are both individually significantly different from zero and
significantly different from each other (in a statistical sense). The same is true for the point
estimates of the IV model when adding the crisis dummy and GFCF (column 6), although
weak-instrument robust inference does not allow us to reject parameter equality at the mar-
gin (p-value 0.108). Notably, our results with respect to the K/L ratio and the negative effect
of trade remain robust to the inclusion of further controls.
We also add an index for employment vulnerability, the implied PPP exchange rate, and
mean years of schooling (as an alternative education measure) as control variables, respec-
tively.30 Neither of those variables turn out significant. With respect to our key hypothesis,
29An indirect assessment of the functional specification of the IV model can be inferred from the fact that
the point estimate is close to the minimum of the rejection probability function of the CLR and AR tests.
30Results not reported but available upon request.
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results remain unaffected in the first-difference model, with parameter equality rejected at
the 5 % level in all three cases and individual FDI (and FPI) parameters being positive
(negative) and statistically significant at least at the 5 (10) % level in all cases. For the IV
model, our key result does no longer hold when including the employment vulnerability in-
dex, which most likely is driven by the enormous decline in sample size to 170 observations.
Key results hold, however, when including the exchange rate or years of schooling.
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Table 4.2: First-difference results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ∆ln(LSPWT ) ∆ln(LSPWT ) ∆ln(LSPWT ) ∆ln(LSPWT )
∆FDI stock/GDP 0.00100* 0.00119** 0.00118** 0.00105**
(-1) [0.000541] [0.000490] [0.000554] [0.000475]
∆FDI stock/GDP -0.000288
(-2) [0.000418]
∆Portfolio stock/GDP -0.000191 -0.00108* -0.000907 -0.000866*
(-1) [0.000636] [0.000554] [0.000759] [0.000509]
∆Portfolio stock/GDP 0.000523
(-2) [0.00144]
∆ln(GDP p.c.) -0.185 -0.183
[0.154] [0.158]
∆ln(Inflation) -0.00178 -0.00118 -0.000203
(-1) [0.00337] [0.00368] [0.00244]
∆Risk 0.00276 0.00238 0.00237
[0.00167] [0.00188] [0.00181]
∆ln(Government share) 0.0373 0.0401 0.0462
[0.0745] [0.0770] [0.0734]
















Observations 361 245 220 244
Number of countries 47 35 33 34
R-squared 0.134 0.263 0.248 0.269
t-statistic 1.94 6.31** - 5.72**
Cluster-robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
SNA and time dummies not reported
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Table 4.3: IV results
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES ln(LSPWT ) ln(LSPWT ) ln(LSPWT )
FDI stock/GDP 0.00318** 0.00188*** 0.00312**
[0.00138] [0.000639] [0.00125]
Portfolio stock/GDP -0.00263** -0.00422 -0.00419
[0.00111] [0.00354] [0.00362]
ln(GDP p.c.) -0.333*** -0.360*** -0.336***
[0.0613] [0.0747] [0.0614]
ln(Inflation) 0.00201 0.00103 0.00252
(-1) [0.00528] [0.00455] [0.00541]
Risk 0.00173 0.00205 0.00202
[0.00160] [0.00168] [0.00170]
ln(Government share) -0.0765*** -0.0685*** -0.0782***
[0.0202] [0.0222] [0.0219]
Trade -0.00186*** -0.00140*** -0.00169***
[0.000555] [0.000519] [0.000474]
Education index 0.655 0.896** 0.676
[0.586] [0.400] [0.557]
K/L -2.67e-06** -3.56e-06** -3.17e-06*
[1.33e-06] [1.69e-06] [1.63e-06]
Instrumented FDI FPI FDI & FPI
Observations 308 308 308
Number of countries 37 37 37
R-squared 0.406 0.433 0.399
CLR / AR χ24 6.63* 1.85 8.18*
Cluster-robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time dummies partialled out, SNA not reported
CLR test for single parameter equality in columns 1 & 2,
AR test for joint equality of both endogenous regressors in column 3.
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Table 4.4: Standardized beta coefficients
(1) (2)
difference model IV model
FDI Stock GDP 0.207** 0.357**
(2.43) (2.49)
Portfolio stock/GDP -0.096* -0.199
(-1.94) (-1.16)






ln(Government share) 0.080 -0.169***
(0.50) (-3.57)







t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Results correspond to column (2) of table 4.2 and (3) of table 4.3, respectively.
Table 4.5: Robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES ∆ln(LSPWT ) ∆ln(LSPWT ) ∆ln(LSTrapp) ∆ln(LSTrapp) ∆ln(LSPWT ) ln(LSPWT ) ln(LSTrapp) ∆ln(LSPWT )
FDI stock/GDP 0.00130** 0.00141*** 0.00242** 0.00305** 0.000817*** 0.00365*** 0.00307** 0.00209***
[0.000479] [0.000425] [0.00114] [0.00122] [0.000299] [0.00125] [0.00146] [0.000663]
Portfolio stock/GDP -0.00135** -0.00144* -0.00201* -0.00279*** -0.000937* -0.00678** -0.00736 -0.00186*
[0.000503] [0.000719] [0.00112] [0.000971] [0.000511] [0.00333] [0.00599] [0.00102]
FDI Stock × K/L -3.34e-08**
[1.55e-08]
Portfolio Stock × K/L 2.94e-08*
[1.69e-08]
ln(GDP p.c.) -0.318*** -0.375* -0.240* -0.350*** -0.162* -0.275*** 0.00530 -0.171
[0.107] [0.186] [0.133] [0.123] [0.0869] [0.0590] [0.0984] [0.152]
ln(Inflation) -0.00767** -0.00726** 0.00703 0.00245 -0.000848 0.00236 0.0117 -0.00177
(-1) [0.00313] [0.00344] [0.00508] [0.00525] [0.00303] [0.00648] [0.00795] [0.00326]
Risk -0.000442 0.00120 0.00558*** 0.00428* 0.00168 0.000826 0.00607** 0.00259
[0.00140] [0.00128] [0.00191] [0.00227] [0.00145] [0.00183] [0.00263] [0.00168]
ln(Government share) -0.0432 -0.0256 0.0916 0.0196 -0.0189 -0.0871*** 0.232*** 0.0393
[0.0387] [0.0365] [0.0737] [0.0419] [0.0332] [0.0168] [0.0450] [0.0757]
Education Index 0.606 1.229* 0.821 1.889** -0.174 0.614 1.069 0.00689
[0.563] [0.686] [0.964] [0.915] [0.614] [0.645] [0.783] [0.675]
K/L -5.80e-06*** -5.72e-06*** -8.36e-07 5.15e-07 -3.53e-06* -5.08e-06*** -3.07e-06 -3.93e-06*
[1.95e-06] [1.75e-06] [1.68e-06] [2.60e-06] [2.00e-06] [1.93e-06] [1.92e-06] [2.29e-06]
Trade -0.00102** -0.000998** -0.000943* -0.00106* -0.000933** -0.00112*** -0.000884 -0.000983**
[0.000454] [0.000459] [0.000498] [0.000607] [0.000444] [0.000389] [0.000574] [0.000415]
Crisis -0.0353** -0.0336 -0.107* -0.00883
[0.0153] [0.0219] [0.0635] [0.0537]
FCF/GDP -0.000594 -0.000560 -0.00233* -0.00134





Observations 197 144 251 203 243 261 316 245
Number of countries 34 27 37 36 35 35 39 35
R-squared 0.406 0.551 0.221 0.289 0.235 0.459 0.342 0.275
Estimation FD FD FD FD FD IV IV FD
test statistic 8.52*** 7.45** 5.14** 8.24*** 6.30** 7.59 (AR) 7.62 (AR) N/A
Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Differences and lag structures not indicated in explanatory variables. IV instruments for both types of foreign investment.
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Columns 3 and 7 of table 4.5 use the alternative labor share measure calculated by Trapp
(2015) as the dependent variable in our baseline first-difference and IV model, respectively.
Even with this alternative labor share measure, which differs considerably from the PWT
measure (as demonstrated in the correlation matrix of appendix table C.2), our qualitative
results remain unaffected. If anything, the (absolute) magnitude of the effects increase (es-
pecially in the first-difference model). Column 4 further adds the crisis dummy and GFCF
to the first-difference model using the alternative labor share measure by Trapp (2015), with
results still remaining robust.
4.5.3 Additional results: Marginal elasticity of substitution
We further experimented with different interaction terms. Column 8 of table 4.5 shows
the results of the first-difference model when our two key foreign investment variables are
interacted with the capital-to-labor ratio. Note that we principally estimate the model in
first differences to control for unobserved heterogeneity, but interact the (first-differenced)
foreign investment stocks with the level of the K/L ratio to obtain marginal effects of foreign
investment on the labor share conditional on differences in the K/L ratio across (and not
within) countries.
This provides an interesting result as the interaction has a different prefix for FDI as
opposed to FPI, meaning that an increasing K/L ratio shrinks the effect of foreign invest-
ment towards 0, and eventually leads to a change in the prefix (though the latter is not sig-
nificant).31 Without over-emphasizing the robustness of these results, they have a relevant
economic implication that could be explored further in future research: As we argued, ’clas-
sical’ foreign capital in the form of FPI might possess some bargaining power, in tendency
increasing the elasticity of substitution. However, this effect will be the more important, the
more capital-scarce a country is, e.g. the lower the K/L ratio, consistent with our results.
Conversely, our argument for the lower substitution elasticity of FDI essentially results from
a capital market friction: Foreign direct investors (in developing countries) cannot easily
withdraw their establishment. This constraint will become less binding, however, as capital
markets deepen. The latter makes it easier to sell FDI assets to local investors and allow
multinationals to become increasingly ’footlose’.
Consistent with this result, we also find squared terms of FDI and FPI to be negative
(and significant) and positive (but insignificant), respectively. The former is at odds with
31For both effects, the threshold is slightly above a K/L ratio of 60,000, which is only the case for 5 countries
in the sample. Also, the (interactive) effect does not turn significant at such high levels of the K/L ratio within
the sample range. Plots of the marginal conditional effects are available upon request.
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the findings of Maarek and Decreuse (2015), who find a negative FDI effect but a positive
squared term, with the labor share only covering the manufacturing sector. Quantitatively,
the effect of our squared FDI term is negligible: it only leads to a negative effect on develop-
ing countries’ labor share if the first-differenced FDI stock reaches more than 40 % of GDP,
which is only true for one observation in the sample. Interacting the FDI stock with the FPI
stock leads to a positive (and significant) interaction term. Most importantly, in all those
specifications, our main conclusions about the opposing effect of FDI and FPI on develop-
ing countries’ labor share hold (for the main part of the sample). Furthermore, trade and the
K/L ratio remain negative and significant (at the 1% level) in all of those specifications.
4.6 Discussion and conclusion
Our analysis has shown that de facto financial globalization in the form of foreign direct and
portfolio investment cannot account for the decline in the labor share that has been observed
in developing countries over the last two decades. This does not mean that foreign capital
does not matter for the labor share in those countries. Rather, FDI and FPI have relevant
but opposing effects in line with our key argument that only portfolio investors are globally
flexible enough to exercise a relevant bargaining power, while FDI is more bound to the host
market than often assumed and tends to pay a wage premium to attract well-educated and
reliable employees to protect multinational firms’ proprietary asset.
In practice, since FDI is much more important than FPI, the effect of those two aspects
of financial de facto globalization on developing countries’ labor share is positive. Quanti-
tatively, the FDI stock (relative to GDP) in the sample developing countries increased from
16 to about 35 % over the last two decades, while FPI only rose from about 4.2 to 5.5 %
of GDP. Meanwhile, the log of the labor share fell from 3.77 to 3.72. This implies that FPI
can explain very little of the labor share decline (about 5 % of the overall decline) while
the actually observed increase of FDI countered the labor share decline by about three quar-
ters.32 By and large, the effects of FDI are thus not only statistically significant but also
economically very relevant, while the potential negative effects of FPI (if any) are relatively
modest.
Our results contribute to a wider debate concerning the macroeconomic determinants
and implications of the labor share (e.g. Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014) and the role
32We assume parameters of -0.002 (FPI) and 0.002 (FDI). The contributions are then calculated as (∆FI ×
β )/− 0.05, where ∆FI is the change in foreign investment, β is the respective parameter, and -0.05 is the
change in the log of the labor share.
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and effects of financial globalization in developing countries (e.g. Jeanne et al., 2012, Kose
et al., 2009a, Prasad et al., 2003). They do not preclude the possibility that financial liber-
alization policies have a relevant detrimental effect on the labor share, as de-jure financial
openness also gives foreign direct investors that have not yet realized their project an outside
option that increases their bargaining power and could hence lead to a ’race to the bottom’ in
wages. On the other hand, evidence by Görg et al. (2009) for OECD countries indicates that
multinationals might favor redistributive welfare states for stability considerations, creating
an argument against unbounded wage competition. While it is too demanding to explicitly
model all those effects econometrically, theoretical work by Arseneau and Leduc (2011)
suggests that the effect of such outside options is potentially large. Moreover, our results
about the functional income distribution between capital and labor do not preclude the pos-
sibility that financial de-facto globalization has contributed importantly to the increase in
inequality between households (that is, within labor) in developing countries.
It is also worth mentioning that our estimations show a robust negative labor-share effect
of the capital-to-labor ratio, at odds with conventional neoclassical theory, and of trade.
While being beyond the scope of this paper, we think a more detailed analysis of the latter
effect using more disaggregated data that has become available recently is a promising and
relevant area for future research, especially since the effect is potentially large in economic
magnitude.33 Similarly, the fact that different forms of FDI potentially lead to different
modes of world market integration with differing socio-economic effects (see e.g. Wacker
et al., 2016) calls for a more disaggregated analysis of the potentially heterogeneous FDI
effects. Finally, it seems important to gauge to what extent different forms of financial
de-jure liberalization can account for the observed decline of the labor share in developing
countries.
33Assuming a parameter of -0.0015, as suggested by several of our results, a 12 % point increase in the
trade/GDP ratio, as roughly observed in our sample between the pre-2000 and post-2000 period, is associated
with a decline of the labor share of 1.8 %.

Chapter 5
Cash Crops as a Sustainable Pathway
out of Poverty? Panel Data Evidence on




The cultivation of cash crops has a great potential for reducing poverty in the developing
world that may not be fully harnessed because many smallholders are inefficient producers.
Furthermore, income gains may be only static and poverty and vulnerability of smallholder
households may not be reduced sustainably. Instead, cash crop farmers, in particular those
without proper farm management skills, may experience boom and bust cycles, caused by
volatile world market prices, local weather shocks and pests. To analyze the long-term
poverty impacts of cash crop agriculture, we draw on a unique panel data set of smallholder
cocoa farmers in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia, covering the years 2000, 2006 and 2013.
We show that – over the analyzed time horizon of more than 10 years – cocoa cultivation
is associated with strong and sustainable poverty reduction. Cocoa farmers fare better than
non-cocoa farmers and the welfare gains can mainly be attributed to increasing cocoa yields.
Yet, yield gaps remain large and are increasingly heterogeneous. We can trace back this
productivity heterogeneity to farm management practices. Linking these findings to poverty
transitions, we can show that better management practices facilitate the transition out of
poverty and shields against income losses.
5.1 Introduction
In the developing world, growth originating in the agricultural sector has long been iden-
tified as an essential pathway out of poverty. Since 70 % of world’s poor live in rural
areas, diversification in cash crops for global food markets has been widely discussed as
a prospective route for agricultural growth and poverty reduction (Feintrenie et al., 2010,
Klasen et al., 2013, WB, 2008). The cultivation of commercial crops has also been found to
foster rural infrastructure and public services which both entail positive effects on broader
levels (Vanwambeke et al., 2007, Walker et al., 2002). Hence, increased commercialization
within the agriculture sector might be a key driver to transform a semi-subsistence agrarian
society to a more diversified economy including off-farm industries and higher levels of
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welfare (Achterbosch et al., 2014). Living standards of cash cropping smallholders can be,
on average, higher and the long-term income improvements depend highly on the respective
technological skills of individual households, in particular agronomic practices (Tittonell
and Giller, 2013).
However, a successful integration into global crop markets requires the individual ability
of poor households to mitigate or cope with the risks associated with cash crop production.
These are, amongst other factors, price shocks as well as marketing and production risks
(Barbier, 1989, Rist et al., 2010, Sunderlin et al., 2001, Wood et al., 2013). The exposure
to production and marketing risks faced by smallholders are, to an important extent, deter-
mined by the specific conditions of input and output markets. These conditions combined
with the idiosyncratic capacities and constraints determine the crop choices and production
technology chosen by smallholders and, in turn, their risk exposure, in particular to en-
vironmental shocks, such as floods, droughts or plant diseases (Chuku and Okoye, 2009).
Changing the crop portfolio from subsistence cultivation to intensified cash crop cultivation
might increase this risk exposure since it adds the hazards of mono-cropping that can pro-
mote and accelerate the incidence of pests (Steffan-Dewenter et al., 2007). The capacity to
deal with these hazards depends in particular on farmers’ management practices including
the timing of operations, the accurate application and composition of chemical inputs and
plantation maintenance (Chuku and Okoye, 2009, Sabatier et al., 2013, Schreinemachers
et al., 2015).
It is well known that the capacity of smallholders to apply optimal management practices
is limited, as are other means to cope with shocks, for example through credit markets
(Harvey et al., 2014, OECD, 2015). As a result, the income gains of cash crop farming
may be volatile and the long-term benefits smaller than the well-documented short-term
gains (Carletto et al., 2009, Klasen et al., 2013, Tittonell et al., 2007). Empirical evidence,
however, on the long-term impact of cash crop farming remains scarce, in particular since
such assessments require long-term panel data.
This paper addresses this gap by examining the long-term welfare impacts of small-
holder cocoa farming. Our analysis draws on a unique three-wave panel data set of small-
holder cocoa farmers in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia, which spans a period of 13 years. We
first analyze income dynamics and poverty changes over this period comparing cocoa- and
non-cocoa farmers. As cocoa yield improvements, as the key driver of increasing cocoa in-
comes, were accompanied by a higher variation in yields, we then look at the determinants
of cocoa yields. This analysis allows us to distinguish between smallholders according to
their management practices; a distinction that we, in a final step, use to assess whether
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well-managing farmers are faring better than those who fail to do so.
The paper is structured accordingly. We first provide a literature review on the welfare
impacts of cash crop cultivation. After providing some background information on Indone-
sia, its cocoa sector and the study region, we describe the data. Our empirical analysis then
looks into welfare changes, determinants of cocoa yields, and the influence of management
skills on welfare trajectories. We close with summarizing our main results and suggestions
for future research.
5.2 Literature review and research questions
In the transition from a low productivity, semi-subsistence agriculture to a high productivity,
commercialized agriculture, cash crops can serve as a potential route for agricultural growth
and thus poverty reduction in bringing substantial productivity increases and employment
opportunities to the rural economy (Timmer, 1988). Transforming sectors can stimulate
agricultural innovation by raising capital for agricultural investment and accelerating the
build-up of institutions that enable further commercialization (Achterbosch et al., 2014).
For cash crops to be also a successful driver of poverty reduction, the transition from
subsistence to commercial agriculture significantly depends on the participation of small-
holder farmers who typically farm less than two hectares in developing countries (WB,
2008). Feintrenie et al. (2010) find that cash crops with low labor requirements and the ab-
sence of seasonality are most lucrative for traditional smallholder farmers. Then, cash crops
can be easily integrated into the already prevailing farming systems through, for example,
the planting of agroforests or the intercropping of new cash crops with previously culti-
vated crops. Moreover, fragmented markets let smallholders’ choices to be non-separable
for production and consumption. Decisions on cash- and food crops are thus interlinked and
agricultural commercialization has therefore been found to have positive spill-over effects
on households’ food production (Govereh and Jayne, 2003). In turn, many farm households
mitigate production risks of cash crops and vulnerability to price variability through diverse
livelihoods relying also on food crop production or non-farm income (Eriksen et al., 2005).
However, once markets for labor and inputs develop, intercropped areas are often converted
into more intensified, productive land-use systems, possibly increasing farmers’ exposure
to shocks.
The benefits from cash crop farming have been shown, for example, by Bussolo et al.
(2007) for the case of Uganda. They find that – in the 1990s – coffee market liberalization
followed by a price boom was associated with substantial reductions in poverty that could
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be sustained when prices went down again. Cash crop cultivation has also been found to be
poverty reducing by Klasen et al. (2013). Based on a shorter panel of the same households
used in this paper (2001, 2004 and 2006), they show that households cultivating cocoa were
on average able to achieve about 14 % higher income levels compared to cultivating other
crops. The authors suggest that the switch to cocoa might be a strategy to raise income espe-
cially for the poorer segments of rural populations. In contrast, Carletto et al. (2009) present
evidence on negative long-term welfare effects of agricultural commercialization. The au-
thors focus on households’ adoption of a non-traditional, agricultural export crop (snow
pea) in the Central Highlands of Guatemala and use panel data between 1985 and 2005.
Applying difference-in-differences estimation, the results suggest that while consumption
levels have improved for all households in the surveyed communities, long-term cash crop
adopters show on average lower gains with higher benefits only in the beginning. The au-
thors point at agronomic problems – in addition to marketing and institutional problems –
leading to decreasing profitability in snow pea production.
Weak management practices, combined with input and output market failures, are the
the main cause behind such deficits and the considerable yield gaps of smallholder pro-
duction in many cash crops around the world (Mueller et al., 2012, Neumann et al., 2010,
Tittonell and Giller, 2013, Tittonell et al., 2007). The relationship between practices and
yields, however, will depend on the specific crop and region and might be non-linear across
scales. On the global level, Mueller et al. (2012) assess the link between yield variability
and agricultural management using input-yield models. They postulate as key causes for
worldwide yield gaps irrigation techniques, fertilizer application and climate condition –
together the three factors explain 60-80 % of global yield variability for most of the major
global crops. Complementary to this, studies on the regional and local level give insights
into more subtle drivers of crop yield-gaps. For example, Neumann et al. (2010) estimate
regional frontier yields to compute frontier production and inefficiencies in wheat, maize
and rice cultivation. For Indonesia, they find that the variance in efficiency comes mostly
from differences in market accessibility and availability of agricultural labor. Examining a
more detailed case, Tittonell et al. (2007) explore maize yield gaps on the field level, ana-
lyzing within-farm differences of smallholder farms in Kenya. They show that variability of
yields stems from soil and climate conditions, the land use change history of fields, and also
from the operational management, such as planting time and density or timing of weeding.
For selected African countries, Tittonell and Giller (2013) analyze yield-gaps of smallholder
farming systems. They conclude that the lack of inputs such as machinery, labor and capital
are the main sources of production inefficiencies. However, the authors suggest that – even
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in the absence of inputs like fertilizer – proper agronomic management, such as cultivars,
plant spacing and weeding, is able to narrow yield gaps.
The brief literature review illustrates that the long-term implications of cash crop pro-
duction and the link to productivity heterogeneity remain underexplored. Using a panel
sample of smallholders in a cocoa-growing region in Sulawesi, Indonesia, we therefore ex-
amine how cocoa farmers fare vis-à-vis other farmers over a longer time horizon. We also
explore the determinants of cocoa yield and investigate whether bad or improved manage-
ment practices are associated to the sustainability of the benefits of cash crop cultivation.
5.3 Cocoa in Indonesia and the study region
In the last decades, Indonesia has emerged as a key exporter of agricultural products on
global markets. Since the late 1960s, Indonesia experienced high and sustained economic
growth, partly driven by the development of its agricultural sector – specifically promot-
ing export oriented agricultural production (Feintrenie et al., 2010, Mundlak et al., 2002,
Timmer, 2007). The vast expansion of the agricultural area, the adoption of subsidized
technologies, such as irrigation, fertilizer, pesticides and improved seeds, were important
drivers of this development that shifted cropping patterns towards the cultivation of cash
crops and pushed commercialization (Maertens et al., 2006, Mundlak et al., 2002). The
country’s agricultural sector thus experienced a transformation from traditional cultivation
systems (slash- and burn cropping systems and agroforestry) towards intensified monocul-
ture plantations with cash crops such as coffee, cocoa, coconut, oil palm, and rubber (Fein-
trenie et al., 2010). In 2014, the agricultural sector contributed about 35 % to national
employment (WB, 2016c).
One of the main agricultural exports of Indonesia are cocoa products, after palm oil
and rubber, representing an exported value of 450 million USD in 2013 (BPS, 2016b). In-
donesia, which started to produce cocoa in the 1980s, now is the third largest producer and
exporter of cocoa beans in the world, after the Ivory Coast and Ghana (ICCO, 2012). The
country’s total production of cocoa beans makes 709,330 tons for 2014 and smallholder
farms contribute most to national cocoa production covering in total 1,198,962 hectares for
cocoa plantations in the same year (BPS, 2016c). The main locations of cocoa production
in Indonesia are Sulawesi, North-Sumatra, West Java, Papua, and East Kalimantan. In Su-
lawesi, smallholder farmers have started to cultivate cocoa beans extensively in the early
1990s (Akiyama and Nishio, 1997). Sulawesi contributes today with a production of over
386,130 tons (2014) the biggest part to the national cocoa production (BPS, 2016c). Our
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study focuses on the Lore Lindu region, which is part of the province Central Sulawesi and
located south of Palu, the capital of this province. The region is predominantly rural and
characterized by a high degree of diversity with respect to its geographical and climate con-
ditions (Maertens et al., 2006). The region’s centrally located Lore Lindu National Park
forms one of the last and largest mountainous rainforests of Sulawesi.
Although cocoa beans are still one of the main exported cash crops, Indonesia’s cocoa
productivity started to decline in 2005. This decline is mainly attributable to the aging of
cocoa trees and the increasing prevalence of cocoa pests and diseases which smallholder
farmers who account for the majority of plantations often cannot handle due to the lack of
plot management expertise (Nuryartono and Khumaida, 2016). The most common pest in
Sulawesi is the cocoa pod borer, which already spread in the early 2000s (Neilson, 2007).
In 2007, farmers of the Lore Lindu region report a yield loss of on average 24.3 % due to
the cocoa pod borer and also 20.5 % due to the black pod disease (Juhrband et al., 2010).
By the mid-2000s, decreasing cocoa yields – reinforced by aging plantations – had been
perceived as a crisis in the sector (Clough et al., 2009). In this context, the application of
intensification techniques – originally intended to raise yield levels – have been discussed to
increase the susceptibility of cocoa trees to pests and diseases: Clough et al. (2009) discuss
that specifically full-sun plantations and the corresponding removal of shading trees raise
the physiological stress of the trees and make them more susceptible to the cocoa pod borer
and the black pod disease.
In light of these developments, the cocoa sector in Sulawesi has been considered to fol-
low a ’boom and bust cycle’ (Clough et al., 2009, Ruf and Yoddang, 2004).1 This is also
reflected in official statistics: Cocoa yields in Central Sulawesi have decreased from about
1 ton in 2002 to 0.7 tons per hectare in 2014 (BPS, 2005, 2010, 2015). The Indonesian
government has reacted to these developments with a plan to raise productivity setting itself
a target of one million tons of cocoa beans per year by 2013-2014. In particular, the plan
intended to address the problems of aging of trees, insufficient planting material, and the
lack of knowledge on plantation maintenance (Ministry of Industry, 2016). As one policy,
the government started the national program ’GERNAS’ in 2009 to boost cocoa production
1This concept describes the process, when firstly young cocoa trees are planted within the tropical rainfor-
est, which provides ideal conditions such as fertile soils, shade trees, and low weed pressure (Clough et al.,
2009, Rice and Greenberg, 2000). Due to low investment costs economic gains can be realized once the tree
matured at the age of 3 to 5 years and continues to produce cocoa until the age of 20-25 years (Wood and
Lass, 2001). During the boom phase, other local farmers might be attracted by promising benefits and start
to adapt cocoa cultivation. Then, in-migration is triggered to the rainforest frontiers and primarily agroforests
are more and more transformed to mono-cropping systems. This process stagnates, when pest and diseases
increasingly spread and trees start to age (Clough et al., 2009).
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are in turn derived as median values from the household-level output prices for cocoa. Real farm gate prices
are in 2001 IDR prices, based on inflation data for Palu from BPS (2016a). Nominal and real world market
prices are drawn from WB (2016b).
Source: WB (2016b) and authors’ calculation and graphical representation based on STORMA and EFForTS
data.
through intensification, rehabilitation and rejuvenation activities of around 450,000 hectares
(BKMP, 2010). However, actual total production in 2014 was only 70.9 % of the set tar-
get. Indonesia’s efforts to revive cocoa production thus obviously failed in reaching the
achievable yields.2
These developments in the cocoa sector took place in a period of relatively favorable
world market prices that showed a slight upward trend between 2000 and 2013 (see figure
5.1). After 2000, world market prices for cocoa increased and remained – after the food
price hike in 2009 – on a level of around 2500 USD per ton, i.e. 2.5 USD per kg. Farm
gate prices, derived from the survey data, increase correspondingly and are 30 to 70 US-
Cents below the world market prices. Because of unfavorable exchange rate movements,
this trend did not translate into rising farm gate prices. Real farm gate prices (below in 2001
Indonesian Rupiah (IDR)) fell between 2001 and 2006 and only slightly recovered until
2Nuryartono and Khumaida (2016) discuss various reasons for the failure of the government program, such
as institutional barriers and inadequate assistance of smallholders.
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2013.
5.4 Data and sampling
In the context of two collaborative research centres (STORMA – Stability of Rainforest
Margins in Indonesia, and EFForTS – Ecological and Socioeconomic Functions of Tropical
Lowland Rainforest Transformation Systems, Indonesia), household panel data have been
collected in 2001, 2006 and 2013 in the Lore Lindu region. The surveys include information
on socio-demographics, land holdings, agricultural as well as non-agricultural activities, and
endowments. Each survey represents a random sample of 13 villages, which were randomly
chosen in 2001 out of official village census data with 115 villages (Zeller and van Rheenen,
2002). Households are then randomly drawn, with the number proportional to village size.
In 2006 and 2013, households that split off from their original households and formed a new
one within the Lore Lindu region were additionally interviewed and added to the respective
sample.
In total, the sample includes 316 households in 2001, 380 in 2006 and 387 households
in 2013. We include all households into our analysis that could be interviewed more than
once, which gives 300, 338 and 322 observations in 2001, 2006 and 2013 respectively. As
cocoa farmer we classify all farmers with a cocoa plantation of at least 0.25 hectare.
5.5 Cocoa income and poverty dynamics
In the Lore Lindu region, income from crop agriculture is the main livelihood and it has
increased significantly in recent years (see figure 5.2a). Per capita household income from
crop agriculture has risen from 644,590 Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) in 2001 to 1,605,030 IDR
in 2013, implying an annual growth rate of 7.9 % over these 12 years.3 Hence, household
income per capita drawn from crop agriculture more than doubles in this period to around
170 USD in 2013 (see figure 5.2a). Cocoa is the central source of income for many small-
holder households in the Lore Lindu region, as it is also discussed by van Edig and Schwarze
(2011) and Klasen et al. (2013). Figure 5.2b shows a large increase in cocoa income over
time with an annual growth of on average 11.6 % in per capita terms.4
3Agricultural wage employment only represents a marginal source of income for our sample households.
In addition to crop agriculture, non-farm activities also play an increasingly important role for rural incomes.
4Rice, the second most important crop, also increased substantially but only generates less than half of the
income generated by cocoa cultivation All others crops display only minor income changes in relative terms
and did not contribute significantly to increases in income.
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Note: Monetary values are real Indonesian Rupiahs with base year 2001, using the provincial Consumer
Price Index (CPI) for Palu provided by BPS (2016b). Incomes are yearly. The data represent the mean of all
per capita household income per income source. To calculate the per capita household income, households’
income (per source) is divided by the respective and idiosyncratic household size. The mean values consider
also income sources with zero income.
Source: Authors’ calculation and graphical representation based on STORMA and EFForTS data.
Agricultural growth and cocoa expansion has been a driving force of poverty reduction
in the study region. Table 5.1 shows the poverty headcount ratio and poverty gap for all farm
households, for cocoa and non-cocoa farmers, as well as separately for households that earn
at least one third of their income from off-farm employment. The poverty headcount ratio
declined from 62.33 % to 32.61 % for all households over the whole period. Especially
notable is the stark decline between 2006 and 2013. The poverty gap, which estimates
the depth of poverty and indicates the resources needed to lift the poor out of poverty by
perfectly targeted transfers, decreased substantially from 36.30 % to 17.66 % from 2001 to
2013.
These significant improvements mainly arise from the poverty reduction amongst cocoa
farmers. Table 5.1 show that poverty levels amongst cocoa farmers are lower and poverty
reduction much stronger compared to non-cocoa farmers. Sampled households in the Lore
Lindu region primarily shifted towards cocoa cultivation between 2001 and 2006, which is
around 10 years later than the farmers in the South and South-West of Sulawesi. While in
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2001, 176 out of 300 sampled households grew at least 0.25 hectare of cocoa, the share went
up to 233 out of 338 households in 2006.
Table 5.1: Comparison of poverty measures for USD 1/day PPP poverty line from 2001-
2013
Poverty headcount ratio Poverty gap Observations
2001 2006 2013 2001 2006 2013 2001 2006 2013
All households 62.33 53.60 32.61 36.30 23.38 17.66 300 338 322
Cocoa farmers 54.55 46.35 24.36 31.30 19.30 13.18 176 233 234
with at least 1/3 off-farm inc. 33.33 21.15 13.89 10.37 3.90 7.64 30 52 36
Non-cocoa farmers 73.39 69.52 54.55 43.43 32.56 29.55 124 105 88
with at least 1/3 off-farm inc. 54.55 52.63 35.71 23.59 23.37 16.54 33 38 42
Note: Currency conversion based on the World Bank PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) conversion factor for
private consumption (Local Currency Unit (LCU) per international $). Households with a cocoa plantation of
at least 0.25 hectare are classified as cocoa farmers.
Source: Authors’ calculation and graphical representation based on STORMA and EFForTS data.
The poverty depth decreased from 31.30 to 19.3 % during this time while the poverty
incidence amongst cocoa farmers fell from 54.55 % to 46.35 %. This underpins the find-
ings of Klasen et al. (2013) that the shift of households towards cocoa did not have a very
strong immediate effect on the poverty incidence as cocoa trees had not yet reached their
full maturity by 2006. Thus, poor cocoa farmers could increase their incomes and close the
poverty gap but were not able to jump out of poverty. Between 2006 and 2013, the shift to
cocoa turns out to be highly rewarding, when the cocoa trees developed their full productive
potential. During this time, the poverty headcount ratio amongst cocoa farmers decreased
from 46.35 to 24.36 % and the poverty gap from 19.3 to 13.18 %. Only households that
partly engage in off-farm activities record even lower poverty rates. Cocoa farmers that de-
rive at least one third of their income from off-farm employment show the lowest incidence
and depth of poverty of all household groups, as classified in table 5.1. However, they also
only represent a small share of the sample.
We now complement this static poverty analysis, which suggests an important role for
cocoa production for poverty reduction, by poverty transition matrices that exploit the panel
structure of our data. Table 5.2 shows the absolute numbers of cocoa farmers and non-cocoa
farmers in different poverty groups and the shares of households changing poverty status
(poor vs. non-poor at a poverty line of USD/day PPP) by main farming activity (cocoa vs.
non-cocoa farming) for the two sample periods 2001-2006 and 2006-2013. In the first pe-
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riod, farmers that cultivated cocoa in 2001 performed better than non-cocoa farmer with a
lower share of poor households remaining poor (43.6 % of all initially poor cocoa farmers)
and a higher share escaping poverty while remaining cocoa farmer (45.7 %). The share of
initial non-cocoa farmers who stick to their activity and remain poor is slightly higher with
48.9 %. Interestingly, and in line with the above assessment of poverty changes amongst
cocoa farmers, the transition to cocoa cultivation might not pay off immediately: Some
initially non-poor non-cocoa farmers switching to cocoa fall into poverty (21.2 % of all ini-
tially non-poor non-cocoa farmers) over the first period. Similarly, 20 % of initially poor
cocoa adopters cannot escape poverty. Moreover, within the first period cocoa cultivation
seems even to raise the vulnerability to poverty: A considerable amount of (initially) non-
poor cocoa farmers (33.3 %) fall into poverty between 2001 and 2006. The first period is
thus characterized by more chronic manifestations of poverty and a higher share of non-poor
households falling back into poverty. In the second period, a much more dynamic upward
mobility can be observed amongst cocoa farmers. The share of cocoa farmers escaping
poverty increases significantly to 58.7 % (of initially poor cocoa farmers) and is consider-
ably higher than the share of those remaining poor or falling into poverty. This trend holds
also for the (initially) non-poor cocoa farmers whose share of farmers remaining non-poor
rises from 60.3 % in the first period to a 79.8 % in the second period. Non-cocoa farmers’
income levels also improve, but less than for cocoa farmers. The share of non-cocoa farmers
escaping poverty or remaining non-poor is substantially lower than for cocoa households.
Moreover, the share of non-cocoa households falling into poverty is higher than in the first
period.
Hence, the results clearly suggest that cocoa production is a long-term driver of overall
poverty reduction. Yet, despite the increasing opportunity to escape poverty between 2006
and 2013, it is important to recognize that a significant share of cocoa farmers remains
poor. This heterogeneity in poverty dynamics and outcomes raises questions concerning the
individual determinants of cocoa income and its poverty-reducing potential.
5.6 Productivity heterogeneity of cocoa farmers
The direct determinants of cocoa income, i.e. cocoa yield, cocoa area and farm gate prices
are shown in table 5.3.
Whereas cocoa area per household is only slightly rising over time, we observe that
average productivity increases significantly over the whole sample period. Cocoa yields
increase slightly between 2001 and 2006, but more than double between 2006 and 2013,
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Table 5.2: Transition matrix for USD 1/Day PPP poverty line for cocoa farmers (C)





C NC C NC Σ
Poor
(USD 1/day)
C 43.6 7.5 45.7 3.2 100
[41] [7] [43] [3] [94]
NC 20.0 48.9 15.6 15.6 100
[18] [44] [14] [14] [90]
Non-Poor
C 33.3 1.3 60.3 4.1 100
[26] [1] [47] [4] [78]
NC 21.2 33.3 21.2 24.2 100
[7] [11] [7] [8] [33]
Σ
31.2 21.4 37.6 9.8 100





C NC C NC Σ
Poor
(USD 1/day)
C 28.8 8.7 58.7 3.8 100
[30] [9] [61] [4] [104]
NC 15.9 39.1 15.9 29.0 100
[11] [27] [11] [20] [69]
Non-Poor
C 12.6 1.7 79.8 5.9 100
[15] [2] [95] [7] [119]
NC 4.0 40.0 24.0 32.0 100
[1] [10] [6] [8] [25]
Σ
18.0 15.1 54.6 12.3 100
[57] [48] [173] [39] [317]
Note: Currency conversion based on the World Bank PPP conversion factor for private consumption (Local
Currency Unit (LCU) per international $). Values are rounded. Numbers of households are in brackets. Since
most households in our region have adopted cocoa during the first period, we assume as cocoa farmers all
households with at least two observations and with a cocoa plantation of at least 0.25 hectare.
Source: Authors’ calculation and graphical representation based on STORMA and EFForTS data.
explaining most of the long-term increase in cocoa income over time. As shown above, real
cocoa price fell between 2001 and 2006 and recovered somewhat until 2013.
The increase in average cocoa yields in the second period was accompanied by a consid-
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erable increase in their variance, i.e. rising heterogeneity. One important explanatory factor
for these trends is the yield cycle of the cocoa tree. The average tree age of cocoa farmers
increases from 3.8 years in 2001 (sd = 3.2 years) to 6.3 years in 2006 (sd = 4.1 years) up
to 11.2 years in 2013 (sd = 6.3 years). As cocoa trees start to produce at the age of 3 to 5
until the age of 20 to 25 and reach their productivity peak at the age of 10 (Wood and Lass,
2001), the cocoa plantations of the farmers in the study region have on average reached their
most productive age in 2013.




P.c. household cocoa inc. 513,551 (1,255,471) 496,847 (603,385) 1,353,738 (1,875,858)
Crop area (are) 1.4 (1.3) 1.4 (1.2) 1.5 (1.7)
Yield (kg/are) 211.6 (328.9) 349.0 (273.0) 815.6 (822.3)
Price (IDR/kg) 8,527 (1,206.4) 5,266.9 (423.7) 6,446.5 (279.6)
Note: Households with an cocoa plantation of at least 0.25 hectare are included. Monetary values are real
IDR with base year 2001, using the provincial CPI for Palu provided by BPS (2016a). Local land units are
measured in are. One are is equal to 100 m2. Prices are village medians of farm gate prices.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on STORMA and EFForTS data.
The strong variation of yields means that many cocoa farmers are not exploiting full
potential yields. Figure 5.3 illustrates the average yield gap, i.e. the yield potential and the
mean achieved yield for four tree age groups. Following Ittersum et al. (2013), we estimate
yield potentials by upper percentiles in the yield distribution from the surveys. We rely on
the 90th percentile of yields amongst our survey farmers to estimate the maximum potential
yield. Most farmers obtain yield levels that are well below the potential yields for the region:
On average, they achieve about half of the yield potential. For example, while the farmer at
the 90th yield percentile produces 1280 kilogram cocoa per hectare for cocoa trees aged 5
to 10 years, the average cocoa farmer only achieves 642 kilogram per hectare. Yield gaps
are present for all age groups, suggesting that the plantation age is not the only determinant
of heterogeneity amongst cocoa farmers.
We therefore analyze cocoa yield determinants (or ’correlates’ acknowledging the lim-
ited causal content of this type of exercise) using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and
static panel data methods (Fixed Effects (FE) model). We estimate the following equation
142 Chapter 5
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Source: Authors’ calculation and graphical representation based on STORMA and EFForTS data.
that relates productivity, management practices as well as farm and farmer characteristics:






βlHl,it +δDit + γi +λt + εit (5.1)
where Yit is productivity defined as household’s yield measured in cocoa beans harvested
(in kg) per hectare, P is a matrix of j variables of plot characteristics, M is a set of k vari-
ables on management practices, H is a set of l household characteristics, Dit is a dummy
controlling for the presence of pests, λt are time fixed effects and εit is the idiosyncratic
error. The Fixed Effects (FE) model also includes household fixed effects γi that control
for unobserved and time-invariant characteristics, such as unobservable ability of farmers.
Time fixed effects λt (year dummies) further capture time-specific shocks common to all
households, like time trends in average productivity or weather shocks that affect all house-
holds in the same year. All estimations are performed using cluster-robust standard errors.
Summary statistics on the key variables used in our econometric analyses are given in the
appendix D, Table D.1.
Management practices are proxied by both chemical inputs (fertilizer5 and herbicides)
and manual techniques, such as manual weeding, pruning, the removal of diseased fruits and
the frequency of harvests. Fertilizer application is included as the household’s expenditures
for fertilizer per hectare. All other management proxies are included as dummies. We
5For our sample, only about one quarter of farmers applies fertilizer.
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also have information on participation in the GERNAS Pro Kakao program and include a
corresponding dummy in some regressions without implying that this dummy will be able
to capture causal program impacts. We control for tree age by adding cocoa tree age and its
squared term. Moreover, we include a dummy for pests, mainly the cocoa pod borer and the
black pod disease. We further account for wealth (assets), education and migrant status as
household characteristics.
We estimate a log-linear model6 and some explanatory variables (agricultural area, ex-
penditure on inputs and households’ assets) are transformed to their natural logarithm to
comply with the assumption of normal distribution, mitigate the problem of heteroskedas-
ticity, and to make the model less sensitive to outliers. The estimated coefficients can thus
be interpreted as (semi-)elasticities. The model potentially suffers from endogeneity, in par-
ticular without household fixed effects. The OLS estimates of the effects of management
practices are likely to be affected by omitted variable bias, as it is plausible that they are re-
lated to the same – unobserved – farmer ability as cocoa yields. To mitigate reverse causality
of wealth, which might be determined by cocoa yields giving the farmer financial capacity
to engage in input-intensive activities, we use lagged values of assets.
Table 5.4 shows the results of our analysis of yields. Columns (1) to (4) present the
results of the pooled OLS model with time effects and column (5) without time effects. Our
baseline model (column 1) regresses yield on the main plot conditions as well as labor input.
The coefficient of cocoa area is statistically significant and indicates that an 1 % increase in
total cocoa area under cultivation is on average associated with a 0.18 to 0.32 % decrease in
yields. This result indicates that larger cocoa plantations of smallholders are less intensively
managed (for example, by intercropping with other plants). As expected, the estimated
coefficient for tree age is significantly positive while the estimate for its squared term is
negative. This reflects the yield curve for cocoa with first increasing and then decreasing
yields and a turning point at about 16 to 19 years in our estimation. Labor input as measured
by expenditures for hired workers is also associated with higher yields; the number of family
members working on the plot does not seem to play a role though. Column 2 adds variables
on management practices and we find input-intensive as well as labor-intensive activities to
be an essential means to achieve high yields. The yield elasticity of fertilizer expenditure
is 0.02. Similarly, the application of herbicides is positive and significant. Furthermore,
manual practices seem to be an important ingredient for successful cocoa cultivation. A
6Using the log value of yield removes observations with zero yields (e.g. during the initial phase of cocoa
cultivation) from the estimation. As a robustness check, we also include observations with zero yields into the
regression by adding 1 to each observation before transforming into logs. Results are similar and displayed in
the appendix D, Table D.2.
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striking example is that farmers who prune their cocoa trees on average achieve about 1.5
times the yield than those refraining from doing it (referring to column 2). Also removing
diseased cocoa pods is essential, whereas controlling the growth of weeds by hand does not
make a difference (only statistically significant in column 5).
Results on household characteristics (added in column 3) are mixed. Financial condi-
tions of farm households – as measured by the ownership of assets – are statistically signif-
icant and positively correlated with yield. In other specifications, we use lagged values of
assets to avoid reverse causality and the effect is no longer significant. The dummy on mi-
gration status is significantly negative (equals 1 in case of a local farmer) and thus indicates
that migrants are more successful in cocoa cultivation than the local population. We further
control for education of the household head and find the completion of primary and tertiary
education to be positively correlated with cocoa yield.
Column (4) adds a pest dummy which is available for observations in 2006 and 2013. As
expected, we find a negative effect which is insignificant though. However, we are hesitant
to take this insignificant result at face value because pests are endogenous to a number of
other regressors, in particular to management practices. Instead, we below investigate the
correlates of crop failure to shed more light on the effects of pests.
Column (5) controls for the frequency of harvests and participation in the national cocoa
program GERNAS that, amongst other things, trains farmers on cocoa cultivation (data is
only available for 2013). Productivity remains unaffected by harvest frequency but there is
evidence of a strong impact of GERNAS: Farmers that participate in the GERNAS program
achieve on average 82 % higher yields.7
Column (6) shows the findings of the long-term analysis based on the FE model.8 The
FE model is preferable to OLS as it takes the panel structure into account and controls for
time-invariant heterogeneity across farm households which may bias estimation results.
The FE model confirms our finding that both chemical (application of fertilizer) as well
as labor inputs (pruning, removal of diseased fruits) have a positive impact on yields. To
sum up, cocoa yields mainly depend on proper management practices which include both
the application of chemical inputs and manual strategies. The farmers’ choice of manage-
ment practices can therefore explain a large share of the observed heterogeneity amongst
our sample. Following a strategy of agricultural intensification (heavy use of fertilizer as
7This result is likely to suffer from endogeneity given the self-selection into the GERNAS program.
8An alternative panel data method is the Random Effects (RE) model. Performing the (robust) Hausman
tests, however, allows us to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of explanatory variables with the time
and household fixed effects at the 1% level of significance for our baseline model and confirms therefore our
choice for the FE model specification.
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well as application of herbicides) helps to increase yields. Also plot maintenance practices
(especially pruning and the removal of diseased pods) have a great potential to considerably
increase yields. These management practices appear to primarily affect yields in a direct
way and rather not through preventing disease infestations.
While the FE model addresses endogeneity arising from household-specific time-invariant
omitted variables, there might still be endogeneity originating from time-varying unob-
served effects if correlated with the explanatory variables. To handle this problem of en-
dogeneity, we adopt an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach to estimate equation 5.1. The
various management practices – our main explanatory variables – are instrumented with the
average management practice in the village (excluding the specific farmer), the rationale
being that farmers’ management practices are influenced by those of their neighbors.9 Ap-
plying this IV approach yields very similar results and confirms that management practices
have a strong impact on cocoa yields (see table D.3 in appendix D).
To further explore the heterogeneity of production we apply a quantile regression, i.e.
an approach that allows the parameters in equation 5.1 to vary across different quantiles of
cocoa yields (here the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th quantile). The Breusch-Pagan test for
heteroskedasticity rejects the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity and thus rules out that
heteroskedastic errors are driving our results.
Table 5.5 shows again the estimation results for our main covariates. It becomes appar-
ent that yields of less productive and more productive farmers are determined by different
factors. We find coefficients on plot conditions, management practices as well as household
characteristics to vary across quantiles and to differ from the OLS model. The pseudo R2
which varies between 0.25 and 0.28, however, indicates that the quantile regression model
explains yield more or less equally well at different parts of the distribution.
With regard to plot conditions, the coefficients on plantation age are very instructive.
They reveal that the shape of the cocoa yield curve varies markedly across quantiles. In
contrast to the successful farmers, the productivity of low performers has a much steeper
rise in the beginning, reaches the turning point at an earlier stage (e.g. at a tree age of 13
years for the 10th quantile compared to 17 years for the 90th quantile) and records a steeper
downturn afterwards. Moreover, the quantile regression results suggest that low and high
performers have varying degrees of success with regard to management strategies.
At the lower tail of the yield distribution (10th quantile), farmers’ agricultural practices
do not have an effect on yield at all. Only the dummy on migrant status has a significant
9This correlation is likely in a region where cocoa was only introduced in the early 2000s, whereas the
neighbors’ management practices should not have a direct effect on the farmer’s yield.
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impact showing that being local has a strong negative effect on yield for the low performers.
The low- to medium-performers (25th and 50th quantile) successfully rely on labor-intensive
strategies (pruning and removal of diseased fruits, hired labor) to increase their yields. The
effective application of fertilizer at the 50th and 75th quantile suggests that a well-managed
intensification strategy could also help the lower quantiles to increase their yields. The high
performers’ (75th and 90th quantile) labor input (hiring labor and plot maintenance practices
such as pruning and removal of diseased fruit) has also a positive effect, though with a
slightly lower magnitude compared to the low- to medium-performers. To sum up, the
quantile regression reveals that heterogeneity in yield amongst cocoa farmers illustrates the
importance of both the choice of management practices and their effective implementation
for the observed productivity heterogeneity of farmers.
In a final exercise of our empirical analyses, we examine the incidence and determinants
of crop failures, which may be a threat to sustainable income gains of cocoa farmers. In
line with the above mentioned reports on problems in Indonesia’s cocoa sector at large we
observe a sharp increase in crop failures in our sample (see table 5.6): In 2006, 9 % of cocoa
farmer report on crop failure for the last 5 years. This share increases to 44 % alone for the
year 2013. These losses are mostly due to pests and diseases, which explain 96 % of all
crop failures in 2006 and 78 % in 2013 (other reasons are drought, flood or other weather
phenomena). Hence in 2013, about one third of farmers is affected by pests and diseases.
The reported pests and diseases are mainly the black pod disease and – to a slightly lesser
extent – the cocoa pod borer.
The incidence and intensity of crop failure increase both across tree age groups within
the respective year as well as over time. To explore this trend further, we run an auxiliary
regression that relates crop failure, management practices and agricultural shocks (see table
5.7). We first regress crop failure on basic plot conditions and management practices (col-
umn 1), then add household characteristics (column 2), and finally the pest dummy (column
3). We measure crop failure by the percentage of regular yield lost, due to natural disasters
(droughts, storms) or infestations with pest and diseases. Results are available only for 2006
and 2013, for which data on agricultural shocks do exist.
As expected, proper management practices that are related to disease and pest manage-
ment such as the application of herbicides, manual weeding and the removal of diseased
pods are associated with lower yield losses. The same is true for harvest frequencies: Har-
vesting the cocoa trees more than once per month decreases the magnitude of yield loss.
Additionally controlling for household characteristics (column 2) does not affect the
estimated coefficients on the management practice proxies, which reinforces that we are
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actually observing an effect of those practices rather than the effect of some unobserved
farmer ability that would be correlated with them. We find further evidence that especially
the production of local farmers is affected by pests as the migrant status dummy is highly
significant and positive. When we add a pest dummy (column 3) we can see that pests in-
deed explain the largest proportion of the variance in crop failures, as R-squared increases
from 0.233 to 0.595. The effect is large: If a pest occurs, yield is on average diminished by
30 %. The coefficients on management practices, in particular the use of herbicides, weed-
ing, and removal of diseased pods, are smaller when the pest dummy is included. In other
words, the omission of the pest dummy induced an upward bias of the mitigating effect of
these practices in the first two specifications of table 5.7. This indicates that a major trans-
mission channel of better management practices on yields runs through the prevention and
mitigation of pests. In addition, there is a significantly positive time trend in crop failures
indicating that crop failures become more frequent in the region. In contrast to productivity,
the magnitude of yield loss is largely unrelated to cocoa tree age and plantation size (when
controlled for management practices). Further, the use of hired labor is significantly raising
crop losses, but turns insignificant when including the pest dummy. This might indicate that
farmers count on labor in the event of a crop failure, especially for pesticide spraying. Also
the migrant status dummy gets insignificant in column (3), suggesting that the yield loss of
locals, and probably lower yields in general, is partly due to pest infestations.
5.7 Heterogeneity in cocoa yields and poverty outcomes
To connect our findings, we explore in a final step how productivity heterogeneity and the
associated management practices are linked to long-term poverty reduction amongst cocoa
farming households in the Lore Lindu region. To proxy good management practices of co-
coa plantations, we draw on three key determinants of cocoa productivity derived from the
OLS and FE model above. First, we include the practice of tree pruning, which is highly
positively correlated with cocoa yield and thus crucial for farmers’ successful management
of cocoa trees. Second, we consider the regular removal of diseased fruits as a key method
to reduce the susceptibility to pests, especially the cocoa pod borer and the black pod dis-
ease. Third, we use the application of fertilizer, herbicides or both as proxy for advanced
management practices with chemical inputs. Accordingly, to be classified as a cocoa farmer
with good management practices, a farmer has to prune his cocoa trees, has to remove dis-
eased fruits from his trees and has to apply any chemical input. Applying these criteria,
we separate our sample into well-managing and not-well managing farmers, resulting in 33
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farmers with good management practices in 2001, 82 in 2006 and 131 farmers in 2013 (see
table 5.8). Management practices on average thus improve considerably over time.
We combine this information with the respective poverty status of farmers’ households
and illustrate in a next step all transitions in both farmers’ management quality and income
status over the total sample period. To this end, table 5.9 shows all transitions of cocoa
farmers between 2001, 2006 and 2013.11
The results indicate that initially poor households can benefit from applying better man-
agement practices (23.4 % of all initially poor and not-well managing farmers), but that a
transition out of poverty is also possible without doing so (a third of all initially poor and
not-well managing farmers). Staying poor is associated with continued worse farm man-
agement while well-managing farm households find it much easier to escape poverty (59.3
% from the initially poor, well-managing households).
Looking at non-poor households confirms an important role for farming practices. The
majority of cases (N=54 and 72 %) of initially non-poor, well-managing households are
households continuing their good management practices and maintain non-poor income
levels. The latter holds also for the 43 farmers that improve management practices. And
while only 10 initially non-poor farmers who manage well fall into poverty, this happens to
27 households without good management practices.
5.8 Conclusion
The present study shows that cash crop farming can be associated with strong and sustain-
able poverty reduction. In our study region in Central Sulawesi and over the analyzed time
horizon of more than 10 years, cocoa farmers fare considerably better than non-cocoa farm-
ers and the welfare gains are less volatile than might be anticipated in light of the problems,
in particular the occurrence of pests, faced by the Indonesian cocoa sector at large in the
period under consideration. The large increases in cocoa income can mainly be attributed
to increasing cocoa yields. However, yield gaps remain large and are increasingly heteroge-
neous. We can trace back this productivity heterogeneity to farm management practices that
include both the application of chemical inputs and manual practices. The farmers’ choice
of management practices can therefore explain a large share of the observed productivity
heterogeneity in our sample. These management practices seem to have a direct positive
11In total, 275 farmers could be interviewed concerning their management practices in 2001, 2006 and/or
2013. Of those 275 households, 141 could be interviewed three times (i.e. two transitions), 86 could be
interviewed twice (i.e. one transition) and 48 could be interviewed once (i.e. no transition), adding up to 643
observations and 368 transitions.
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effect on yields as well as indirect positive effect through the prevention and mitigation of
crop failures, which tend to become increasingly common because of more frequent pest
infestations in the region.
Taken together, increased cocoa yields and the importance of management techniques
suggest that the improvement of management practices can be linked to improved liveli-
hoods. And indeed, we can empirically establish this link: We can show that better man-
agement practices facilitate the transition out of poverty and shields against income losses.
In light of the still gasping yield gaps of cocoa farmers in the region, our findings are good
news as they show the potential of improving agricultural productivity to raise living stan-
dards. However, poverty persistence and the persistence of bad management amongst a
substantial fraction of farmers may imply that these farmers may be much harder to reach.
Finally, the increasing incidence of pests, especially the cocoa pod borer and the black pod
disease, might require more focused interventions. While intensification strategies have in
the past helped cocoa farmers to considerably increase yields, they may, together with ag-
ing plantations, aggravate the incidence of pests and diseases. Thus, management skills
may have to improve beyond the simple intensification techniques and replanting will have
to accelerate. This may be required to sustain the livelihood improvements that the cocoa
sector has brought to many smallholders in Sulawesi.
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Table 5.4: Determinants of cocoa productivity (pooled OLS and FE model), 2001-2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cocoa yield (log) Cocoa yield (log) Cocoa yield (log) Cocoa yield (log) Cocoa yield (log) Cocoa yield (log)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FE
Cocoa area (log) -0.175*** -0.211*** -0.267*** -0.296*** -0.320*** -0.460***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tree age 0.221*** 0.195*** 0.183*** 0.118*** 0.099** 0.164***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.015) (0.000)
Tree age2 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.003** -0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.016) (0.000)
Labor exp. (log) 0.049*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.020* 0.015 0.017
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.052) (0.414) (0.139)
Family workers (#) -0.017 -0.016 -0.014 0.018 0.028 0.011
(0.582) (0.571) (0.635) (0.608) (0.646) (0.804)
Fertilizer exp. (log) 0.018** 0.007 0.014 0.007 0.031**
(0.046) (0.463) (0.148) (0.605) (0.034)
Use of herbicides 0.323* 0.305* 0.553** 1.146*** 0.330
(0.081) (0.100) (0.015) (0.003) (0.120)
Manual weeding 0.046 0.086 0.212 0.775** 0.084
(0.795) (0.626) (0.331) (0.035) (0.688)
Pruning 0.445*** 0.405** 0.417** 0.189 0.734***
(0.007) (0.022) (0.044) (0.432) (0.000)
Removing pods 0.661*** 0.667*** 0.617*** 0.486** 0.383*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.048) (0.078)
Migrant status -0.273*** -0.274*** -0.525***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.003)
Primary edu. 0.143 0.234 0.656**
(0.258) (0.141) (0.025)
Secondary edu. -0.187 -0.123 0.126
(0.271) (0.576) (0.715)












Year = 2006 0.081 0.065 0.148 0.265*
(0.508) (0.584) (0.216) (0.066)
Year = 2013 0.537*** 0.481*** 0.590*** 0.445*** 0.771***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 4.273*** 3.290*** 3.050*** 3.524*** 3.615*** 3.222***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 554 554 551 368 209 554
R-squared 0.312 0.384 0.405 0.355 0.306 0.472
Adj. R-squared 0.303 0.370 0.386 0.324 0.241
Number of id 257
Within R-squared 0.472
Between R-squared 0.151
Note: Pval in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1, year dummies included, cluster-robust standard errors. Households
with a cocoa plantation of at least 0.25 hectare are included.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on STORMA and EFForTS data.
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Table 5.5: Quantile regression of determinants of yields (pooled OLS), 2001-2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cocoa yield (log) Cocoa yield (log) Cocoa yield (log) Cocoa yield (log) Cocoa yield (log) Cocoa yield (log)
VARIABLES OLS Q(10th) Q(25th) Q(50th) Q(75th) Q(90th)
Cocoa area (log) -0.240*** -0.276* -0.193* -0.272*** -0.215*** -0.290***
(0.000) (0.059) (0.064) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tree age 0.189*** 0.397*** 0.252*** 0.172*** 0.129*** 0.101**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011)
Tree age2 -0.006*** -0.015*** -0.009*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.003*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.075)
Labor exp. (log) 0.035*** 0.040 0.041** 0.034*** 0.024** 0.022*
(0.000) (0.147) (0.024) (0.000) (0.015) (0.092)
Family workers (#) -0.012 -0.037 -0.010 -0.008 -0.023 -0.001
(0.679) (0.637) (0.858) (0.706) (0.446) (0.983)
Fertilizer exp. (log) 0.010 0.014 0.008 0.012** 0.016* 0.011
(0.252) (0.565) (0.611) (0.042) (0.075) (0.345)
Use of herbicides 0.348* 0.233 0.438 0.219* 0.040 0.076
(0.055) (0.481) (0.202) (0.092) (0.824) (0.722)
Manual weeding 0.096 0.094 0.269 -0.027 -0.123 -0.076
(0.578) (0.762) (0.416) (0.828) (0.472) (0.721)
Pruning 0.428** 0.351 0.554* 0.474*** 0.456*** 0.346
(0.014) (0.203) (0.081) (0.000) (0.006) (0.136)
Removing pods 0.662*** 0.421 0.666*** 0.786*** 0.569*** 0.397**
(0.000) (0.201) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022)
Migrant status -0.300*** -0.696*** -0.442** -0.142** -0.109 -0.189*
(0.001) (0.010) (0.013) (0.034) (0.254) (0.088)
Primary edu. 0.158 0.302 0.095 0.057 0.074 0.235
(0.213) (0.439) (0.720) (0.561) (0.599) (0.164)
Secondary edu. -0.150 -0.130 -0.412 -0.350*** 0.092 0.315
(0.377) (0.777) (0.200) (0.003) (0.587) (0.151)
Tertiary edu. 0.089 0.287 0.015 0.083 0.110 0.283
(0.552) (0.521) (0.959) (0.450) (0.477) (0.121)
Year = 2006 0.090 0.110 0.201 0.179** 0.078 -0.245
(0.451) (0.723) (0.380) (0.029) (0.513) (0.135)
Year = 2013 0.559*** 0.333 0.624** 0.656*** 0.593*** 0.455**
(0.000) (0.372) (0.024) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011)
Constant 3.413*** 1.941*** 2.533*** 3.517*** 4.540*** 5.383***
(0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 554 554 554 554 554 554
R-squared 0.400
Adj. R-squared 0.382
Pseudo R-squared 0.273 0.267 0.245 0.227 0.253
Note: Pval in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1, year dummies included. Households with a cocoa plantation of at least
0.25 hectare are included.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on STORMA and EFForTS data.
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Table 5.6: Cocoa tree age: Yield and crop failures, 2006-2013
2006 2013
Tree age Cases Yield (kg/ha) Crop failure Lost yield (%) Cases Yield (kg/ha) Crop failure Lost yield (%)
Years n mean (sd) N mean (sd) N mean (sd)10 n mean (sd)
0−4 89 154.3 (200.2) 2 0.6 (3.7) 22 236.9 (386.3) 0 0
5−10 115 462.0 (240.9) 13 3.6 (12.2) 110 905.0 (967.8) 52 18.5 (23.8)
11−20 28 497.9 (247.8) 7 8.25 (16.1) 84 823.8 (656.1) 40 18.1 (24.0)
> 20 1 513.3 (-) 0 0 18 938.0 (689.9) 10 28.0 (31.6)
0−36 233 349.0 (273.0) 22 3.0 (10.7) 234 815.6 (822.3) 102 17.4 (24.1)
Note: Households with a cocoa plantation of at least 0.25 hectare are included.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on STORMA and EFForTS data.
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Table 5.7: Determinants of crop failure (pooled OLS), 2001-2013
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Crop failure Crop failure Crop failure
Cocoa area (log) -0.802 -0.676 -1.053
(0.556) (0.672) (0.366)
Tree age 0.873 1.143* 0.410
(0.109) (0.061) (0.345)
Tree age2 -0.020 -0.025 -0.001
(0.269) (0.175) (0.945)
Labor exp. (log) 0.411** 0.525*** -0.023
(0.015) (0.006) (0.873)
Family workers (#) 1.034 1.198 1.382**
(0.123) (0.116) (0.011)
Fertilizer exp. (log) -0.168 0.012 -0.195
(0.429) (0.960) (0.243)
Use of herbicides -24.279*** -23.701*** -13.018**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.013)
Manual weeding -21.173*** -19.955*** -12.370**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.021)
Pruning 3.363 9.670** 4.195
(0.608) (0.047) (0.137)
Removing pods -6.550** -7.344** -5.323**
(0.023) (0.021) (0.024)
Harvest frequency -3.721* -4.859** -4.076**
(0.066) (0.026) (0.011)
Migrant status 4.498** -0.461
(0.041) (0.782)
Primary edu. -0.987 0.923
(0.719) (0.677)
Secondary edu. 5.572 6.030*
(0.160) (0.076)
Tertiary edu. 1.075 6.000**
(0.741) (0.027)




Year = 2013 14.469*** 12.066*** 4.872***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Constant 21.541** 13.813 10.042
(0.017) (0.171) (0.187)
Observations 430 365 365
R-squared 0.224 0.233 0.595
Within R-squared . . .
Between R-squared . . .
Note: Pval in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1, cluster-robust standard errors. Households
with a cocoa plantation of at least 0.25 hectare are included.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on STORMA and EFForTS data.
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Table 5.8: Numbers of well managing and not-well managing cocoa farmers
2001 2006 2013
No. of well managing farmers 33 82 131
No. of not-well managing farmers 143 151 103
No. of all farmers 176 233 234
Note: Households with a cocoa plantation of at least 0.25 hectare are classified as cocoa farmers.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on STORMA and EFForTS data.
Table 5.9: Transition matrix for USD 1/day PPP poverty lines for cocoa farmers with
well and not-well agricultural practices, 2001-2013, total transition cases
TRANSi,t
TRANSi,t+n




WELL NOT WELL WELL NOT WELL Σ
Poor
(USD 1/day)
WELL 3.7 14.8 59.3 22.2 100
[1] [4] [16] [6] [27]
NOT WELL 10.4 33.1 23.4 33.1 100
[16] [51] [36] [51] [154]
Non-Poor
WELL 13.3 0.0 72.0 14.7 100
[10] [0] [54] [11] [75]
NOT WELL 4.0 24.1 38.4 33.0 100
[5] [27] [43] [37] [112]
Σ
8.7 22.3 40.5 28.5 100
[32] [82] [149] [105] [368]
Note: Currency conversion based on the World Bank PPP conversion factor for private consumption (LCU
per international $). Households with a cocoa plantation of at least 0.25 hectare are classified as cocoa
farmers. Transitions are considered for at least one change.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on STORMA and EFForTS data.
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Table C.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) N Source
ln(LSPWT ) 3.883 (0.197) 309 PWT 8.0
ln(LSTrapp) 3.756 (0.241) 307 own calculation
FDI stock/GDP 26.376 (22.488) 309 IFS, UN SNA
Portfolio stock/GDP 6.4 (9.351) 309 IFS, UN SNA
ln(GDP p.c.) 8.129 (0.783) 309 PWT 7.0
ln(Inflation) (-1) 1.948 (1.371) 309 WDI
Risk 66.52 (6.076) 309 ICRG
ln(Government share) 2.035 (0.425) 309 PWT 7.0
Education index 0.526 (0.165) 309 UNDP
K/L 30,504 (28,043) 309 own calculation
Trade 77.471 (34.781) 309 PWT 7.0
Crisis 0.03 (0.172) 263 own calculation
GFCF/GDP 21.226 (7.411) 309 WEO, UN SNA
Countries included (in baseline estimation of table 4.1), incl. number of observations:
Armenia (11), Azerbaijan (8), Belarus (9), Bolivia (13), Brazil (3), Bulgaria (8), Burkina
Faso (6), China (5), Colombia (17), Cote d’Ivoire (7), Dominican Republic (4), Egypt (6),
Guatemala (5), Honduras (6), India (14), Jamaica (2), Jordan (10), Kazakhstan (8), Latvia
(3), Lithuania (2), Moldova (12), Morocco (8), Mozambique (6), Namibia (3), Niger (11),
Nigeria (5), Panama (3), Paraguay (15), Peru (18), Philippines (1), Poland (2), Russian Fed-
eration (9), Senegal (12), Tanzania (16), Thailand (15), Tunisia (15), Ukraine (9), Venezuela
(2).
Table C.2: Variable correlation matrix
ln(LSPWT ) ln(LSTrapp) FDI FPI ln(GDP) Inflation Risk ln(G/GDP) Educ K/L Trade
ln(LSPWT ) 1
ln(LSTrapp) 0.462 1
FDI stock/GDP -0.149 0.0558 1
Portfolio stock/GDP -0.198 -0.198 0.193 1
ln(GDP p.c.) -0.141 -0.0273 0.222 0.369 1
ln(Inflation) (-1) 0.159 0.119 -0.309 -0.0768 0.140 1
Risk -0.221 -0.0854 0.373 0.273 0.446 -0.356 1
ln(Government share) 0.241 0.0764 -0.151 0.0379 -0.121 0.0216 -0.0861 1
Education index 0.0523 0.0724 0.403 0.330 0.805 0.191 0.303 -0.149 1
K/L 0.0520 -0.000133 0.178 0.417 0.595 0.141 0.314 -0.0326 0.524 1
Trade 0.0609 0.168 0.431 0.244 0.311 -0.116 0.293 -0.0117 0.430 0.349 1
N 309
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Table C.3 provides the first-stage results of our model, that is the equation explaining for-
eign investment by financial conditions in the financial centers and the distance therefrom.
It should be noted that the model includes country and year fixed effects. The negative co-
efficient on the US FCI is hence not worrisome and should not be interpreted because it is
only identified because of some year fixed effects dropping out. The measure of relevance is
the (mostly positive) interaction of the respective FCIs with distance. This suggests that in
times where it is easy for investors to attain access to finance, they are more likely to invest
in more distant countries than otherwise. This is consistent with theory and can be com-
pared to investors moving towards the long end of the yield curve (with more risky assets)
if financial conditions are easy (and hence risk-taking increases).
Table C.3: First-stage results
(1) (2)
VARIABLES FDI/GDP FPI/GDP
US FCI -33.843** -5.9290
(14.428) (5.2580)
US FCI x Dist(USA) 0.00020 0.00022**
(0.00015) (0.00009 )
Euro FCI x Dist(BEL) -0.00057 0.00059***
(0.00057) (0.00021)
Japan FCI x Dist(JPN) 0.00021 -0.00016
(0.00054 ) ( 0.00030)
included instruments: ln(GDP) ln(inflation)(-1),
ICRG risk, ln(govt share), educ index, K/L, trade
observations (clusters) 308 (37) 308 (37)
F-stat: overall / excluded IV 6.38 / 1.66 5.44 / 5.11
Kleibergen-Papp underidentification p-value: 0.1226
Hansen J overidentification p-value: 0.4570
The Hansen J statistic does not allow to reject the null hypothesis of joint validity of
instruments and overidentifying restrictions (suggesting that the set of instruments are co-
herent in the sense that they identify the same vector of parameters).
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Figure C.1: Diagnostic checks (first-difference model)
Note: The upper panel provides a plot of the model residuals against fitted values and a leverage-to-





Table D.1: Summary statistics
VARIABLES Unit Year Average Min Max Median Std. Dev. N
Dependent variables
Cocoa yield kg/hectare 2001 211.6 0.0 2933.3 93.0 328.9 176
2006 349.0 0.0 1140.0 300.0 273.0 233
2013 815.6 0.0 4800.0 592.9 822.3 234
Crop failure % of yield - - - - - - -
lost 2006 3.0 0.0 75.0 0.0 10.7 233
2013 17.4 0.0 90.0 0.0 24.1 234
Basic agricultural parameters
Cocoa area hectare 2001 1.4 0.25 8.3 1.0 1.3 176
2006 1.4 0.25 8.0 1.0 1.2 233
2013 1.5 0.25 15.0 1.0 1.6 234
Tree age years 2001 3.8 1.0 20.0 3.0 3.2 166
2006 6.3 0.3 22.0 5.0 4.1 233
2013 11.2 0.3 36.0 10.0 6.3 234
Labor exp. 000 IDR/ha 2001 25.3 0 500.0 0 76.9 176
2006 39.0 0 966.7 0 111.9 233
2013 52.2 0 1982.3 0 250.1 234
No. of family workers number 2001 3.0 0 8 3 1.6 176
2006 2.5 0 7 2 1.3 233
2013 1.9 0 6 2 1.2 233
Management practices
Fertilizer exp. 000 IDR/ha 2001 29.5 0 710 0 110.5 176
2006 17.5 0 433.7 0 60 233
2013 69.3 0 1397.2 0 170.7 234
Use of herbicides dummy 2001 0.1 0 1 0 0.3 176
0=no 2006 0.4 0 1 0 0.5 233
1=yes 2013 0.5 0 1 0 0.5 234
Manual weeding dummy 2001 0.6 0 1 1 0.5 176
0=no 2006 0.5 0 1 1 0.5 233
1=yes 2013 0.5 0 1 1 0.5 234
Pruning dummy 2001 0.7 0 1 1 0.5 176
0=no 2006 0.9 0 1 1 0.3 233
1=yes 2013 0.9 0 1 1 0.3 234
Removing pods dummy 2001 0.9 0 1 1 0.3 176
0=no 2006 0.8 0 1 1 0.3 233
1=yes 2013 0.9 0 1 1 0.4 234
Harvest freq. dummy - - - - - - -
0=less than 2 times/month 2006 0.7 0 1 1 0.5 210
1=more than 2 times/month 2013 0.4 0 1 0 0.5 221
GERNAS dummy - - - - - - -
0=no - - - - - - -
1=yes 2013 0.1 0 1 0 0.3 234
Pest incidence
Pest dummy - - - - - - -
0=no 2006 0.1 0 1 0 0.3 233
1=yes 2013 0.3 0 1 0 0.5 234
Household characteristics
Migrant status dummy 2001 0.7 0 1 1 0.5 176
0=migrant 2006 0.7 0 1 1 0.5 233
1=local 2013 0.8 0 1 1 0.4 233
Primary Edu. dummy 2001 0.6 0 1 1 0.5 176
0=no 2006 0.5 0 1 1 0.5 233
1=yes 2013 0.6 0 1 1 0.5 233
Secondary Edu. dummy 2001 0.2 0 1 0 0.4 176
0=no 2006 0.1 0 1 0 0.3 233
1=yes 2013 0.1 0 1 0 0.3 233
Tertiary Edu. dummy 2001 0.2 0 1 0 0.4 176
0=no 2006 0.2 0 1 0 0.4 233
1=yes 2013 0.2 0 1 0 0.4 233
Assets 000 IDR 2001 4321.1 15.0 58050.0 1025.0 7775.1 175
000 IDR 2006 3555.0 3.7 97473.6 68.1 9264.0 232
000 IDR 2013 6820.0 3.1 331381.9 2698.4 24533.8 231
Source: Authors’ calculation based on STORMA and EFForTS data.
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Table D.2: Robustness check: Inclusion of zero yields, determinants of cocoa produc-
tivity (pooled OLS and FE model), 2001-2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cocoa yield (log) Cocoa yield (log) Cocoa yield (log) Cocoa yield (log) Cocoa yield (log) Cocoa yield (log)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FE
Cocoa area (log) 0.020 -0.010 -0.053 -0.194** -0.319*** -0.078
(0.816) (0.903) (0.525) (0.017) (0.000) (0.638)
Tree age 0.568*** 0.458*** 0.448*** 0.238*** 0.099** 0.370***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000)
Tree age2 -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.007*** -0.003** -0.012***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000)
Labor exp. (log) 0.040*** 0.016 0.015 0.025** 0.015 -0.010
(0.006) (0.228) (0.255) (0.029) (0.413) (0.557)
Family workers (#) 0.047 0.018 0.012 0.050 0.028 0.000
(0.329) (0.689) (0.798) (0.235) (0.647) (0.996)
Fertilizer exp. (log) 0.018 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.038**
(0.107) (0.457) (0.476) (0.605) (0.043)
Use of herbicides 0.501* 0.477* 1.090*** 1.143*** 0.422
(0.061) (0.078) (0.002) (0.003) (0.171)
Manual weeding 0.218 0.223 0.797** 0.773** 0.090
(0.413) (0.408) (0.025) (0.034) (0.773)
Pruning 1.496*** 1.489*** 1.590*** 0.190 1.490***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.429) (0.000)
Removing pods 0.958*** 0.963*** 0.810*** 0.482** 0.767***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.048) (0.010)
Migrant status -0.240* -0.256* -0.522***
(0.074) (0.080) (0.003)
Primary edu. -0.065 0.251 0.652**
(0.700) (0.156) (0.025)
Secondary edu. -0.403* -0.140 0.125
(0.093) (0.579) (0.715)












Year = 2006 0.527** 0.436** 0.452** 0.805***
(0.011) (0.024) (0.023) (0.000)
Year = 2013 0.530** 0.416* 0.497** 0.273* 0.918***
(0.035) (0.071) (0.032) (0.091) (0.005)
Constant 1.700*** 0.014 0.197 1.056* 3.627*** 0.505
(0.000) (0.965) (0.634) (0.073) (0.000) (0.205)
Observations 632 632 628 381 209 632
R-squared 0.447 0.551 0.553 0.464 0.307 0.524
Adj. R-squared 0.440 0.542 0.540 0.439 0.241
Number of id 273
Within R-squared 0.524
Between R-squared 0.538
Note: Pval in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1, year dummies included, cluster-robust
standard errors. Households with a cocoa plantation of at least 0.25 hectare are included. Zero yields are
included by adding 1 to yield before transforming into log.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on STORMA and EFForTS data.
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Table D.3: Robustness check: Instrumental variable approach, determinants of cocoa
productivity (2SLS and Maximum Likelihood), 2001-2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cocoa yield (log) Cocoa yield (log) Cocoa yield (log) Cocoa yield (log) Cocoa yield (log) Cocoa yield (log)
VARIABLES OLS IV-2SLS IV-ML IV-ML IV-ML IV-ML
Cocoa area (log) -0.267*** -0.283*** -0.270*** -0.259*** -0.262*** -0.244***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tree age 0.183*** 0.166*** 0.185*** 0.185*** 0.183*** 0.162***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tree age2 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Labor exp. (log) 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.027***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.010)
Family workers (#) -0.014 -0.010 -0.012 -0.013 -0.016 -0.027
(0.635) (0.741) (0.704) (0.679) (0.593) (0.407)
Fertilizer exp. (log) 0.007 0.072** 0.005 0.007 0.010 0.005
(0.463) (0.042) (0.584) (0.467) (0.316) (0.610)
Use of herbicides 0.305* 0.253 0.968*** 0.717 0.615* 0.260
(0.100) (0.184) (0.006) (0.368) (0.082) (0.200)
Manual weeding 0.086 0.081 0.645** 0.529 0.391 0.092
(0.626) (0.655) (0.035) (0.534) (0.256) (0.632)
Pruning 0.405** 0.308* 0.129 0.206 -0.203 0.295
(0.022) (0.091) (0.542) (0.617) (0.737) (0.113)
Removing pods 0.667*** 0.641*** 0.654*** 0.668*** 0.702*** 1.630***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Migrant status -0.273*** -0.120 -0.279*** -0.287*** -0.269*** -0.289***
(0.004) (0.315) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
Primary edu. 0.143 0.164 0.150 0.148 0.163 0.167
(0.258) (0.228) (0.309) (0.313) (0.275) (0.277)
Secondary edu. -0.187 -0.098 -0.191 -0.194 -0.188 -0.140
(0.271) (0.594) (0.275) (0.267) (0.284) (0.445)
Tertiary edu. -0.002 0.013 -0.014 -0.002 -0.015 0.006
(0.988) (0.934) (0.932) (0.992) (0.930) (0.973)
Assets (log) 0.062** 0.031 0.064*** 0.062** 0.062** 0.065***
(0.018) (0.339) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007)
Year = 2006 0.148 0.222* 0.076 0.118 0.205 0.332**
(0.216) (0.073) (0.552) (0.382) (0.127) (0.022)
Year = 2013 0.590*** 0.579*** 0.493*** 0.545*** 0.625*** 0.753***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 3.050*** 3.168*** 2.802*** 2.857*** 3.243*** 2.314***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 551 551 551 551 551 551
Instrument relevance:
- F-statistic 29.2
- correlation 0.43 0.36 0.14 0.21 0.19
Endogenous regressor Fertilizer Use of Manual Pruning Removing
exp. (log) herbicides weeding pods
Note: Pval in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1, year dummies included, cluster-robust
standard errors. Households with a cocoa plantation of at least 0.25 hectare are included. Zero yields are
included by adding 1 to yield before transforming into log.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on STORMA and EFForTS data.
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